(1) According to the records, in the first instance court, the same defendant recognized the authenticity, voluntariness, or contents of each protocol of interrogation of the suspect as to the defendant 2 prepared by the prosecutor and the investigative officer, and the defendant 1 consented to it as evidence of the facts charged, and the defendants consented to each protocol of interrogation of the suspect's interrogation of the defendant 2 prepared by the prosecutor and the investigative officer, and the defendant 1 consented to it as evidence of the facts charged. Thus, each protocol of interrogation and written statement

However, if the defendant does not agree to the testimony made by a person other than a suspect as evidence, it can be admitted as evidence only when it is admitted to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of the protocol refers to the formal authenticity of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the actual authenticity that the contents of the protocol are written as stated by the person making the original statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 85Do1843, Oct. 8, 1985; 90Do1474, Oct. 16, 199; 92Do737, Jun. 9, 192). The court below determined that each of the above statements made by the prosecutor or investigation officers are admissible as evidence, and each of the above statements made by the court below on the premise that it is not admissible as evidence, and that each of the above statements made by each of the above defendants is not admissible as evidence, and that each of the above statements made by each of the above defendants is not admissible as evidence.

However, even in cases where each of the above written statements except each of the above written statements is based on other evidence, the defendants' facts charged in this case maintained by the court below are recognized, and there is no error of incomplete deliberation like the theory of lawsuit or misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence. Thus, the above error of the court below shall not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

(2) As the judgment of the court of first instance became final and conclusive, if Defendant 2, under the mutual resolution of the Defendants, hires Defendant 1, a certified tax accountant under his own account without being directed or supervised by him, and receives the tax-related fees for the delegated tax cases after opening a tax accountant office, and Defendant 1 paid only certain amount of the revenue from Defendant 2 as the fee for the lending of name, the Defendants’ above act is conducted by a person who is not qualified as a certified tax accountant under Article 22 (1) 1 of the Certified Tax Accountant Act, or by a certified tax accountant under Article 12-3, using his name or trade name, and thereby constitutes a crime. Accordingly, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance convicting the Defendants of the facts charged of this case, and there is no violation of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to the theory of lawsuit.

(3) Since a sentence of less than 10 years is imposed on Defendant 2, the argument of unfair sentencing cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal.

All appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench, on the ground that the appeal is without merit.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)