2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning for this Court’s reasoning is as follows, and the reasoning for this Court’s reasoning is as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the judgment on a new argument made by the Plaintiff in the trial, and thus, it is acceptable to accept this as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

A. The height part

Part 3 of the judgment of the first instance court is "excess appropriation of excessive amount" in Part 17 of the judgment of the first instance, and the "in case of the last act" in Part 8 is "B", respectively.

B. Additional parts

1) No. 8 of the judgment of the court of first instance is n.e., the following parts are added.

① Although the instant housing was partially damaged by its function as a residential building, such as power plant and water supply from around 200 to 200Y, it is reasonable to view that the instant housing had been continuously maintained the potential function as a residential building for the said period in light of the fact that it was temporarily used as a normal residential building from around 201 X to the present time through repairs for which no excessive cost is required. 7 When comparing the value at the time of acquiring the instant housing (i.e., the appraised value of KRW 1, an amount equivalent to KRW 2, an amount equivalent to KRW 1, an amount of capital) and the cost required for repairing (an amount equivalent to KRW 1, an amount of capital or 2, an amount of capital gains), the Plaintiff asserted that the instant housing was in the state of losing the function as a residential building, but whether it falls under the instant housing should be determined at any time on the basis of whether it maintained its function as a residential building, and whether it falls under the instant housing can be easily determined by the Plaintiff’s residential condition being destroyed and used as a residential building for 2018.

2) The following parts shall be added to the part 9 and 10 pages of the first instance judgment (Article 64 of the Income Tax Act or no provision) (Article 64).

In light of Article 64(1) of the former Income Tax Act, the No. 50% of the total amount of tax calculated by applying the tax rate under Article 104 of the former Income Tax Act to the profit margin from the sale and purchase of housing, etc., a real estate sales businessman who seeks to calculate the global income tax amount (i.e., "the tax rate of global income" + "the tax rate of global income" + the larger of the tax amount calculated by applying the tax rate under Article 55 of the former Income Tax Act to the tax base of global income (i.e., "the tax rate of global income") and the total amount of tax (i.e., "the tax rate of global income") calculated by deducting the total amount of income from the tax base of global income, which is calculated by applying the tax rate under Article 104 of the same Act.

3) In Part XI of the first instance judgment, the following shall be added to the "inwards" of Part XI of the first instance judgment:

In addition, the Plaintiff did not know whether the Plaintiff, other than a tax specialist, constitutes a real estate sales businessman at the time of transfer of the instant real estate, or whether the sale and purchase of the instant real estate was the cause of global income tax, and the Plaintiff was in the state of loss at the time of filing a comprehensive income tax return for the year 200Y, and the Plaintiff merely declared the final tax return by reflecting the profits accrued from the sale and purchase of the instant real estate in the transfer income tax for the year 200Y. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the above circumstances cited by the Plaintiff were illegal. However, it was irrelevant to the “justifiable cause that may cause the Plaintiff to cause the violation of the duty as above,” which is the criteria for imposing additional tax due to the Plaintiff’s intentional act or negligence on the land or on the taxpayer’s intent or negligence (in addition, the Plaintiff did not know of the special case of tax amount on real estate sales businessman or did not have any tax knowledge related to the transfer of the real estate).

4) The following parts shall be added to the last part of Part XI of the first instance judgment.

In the final return of tax base under Article 70 of the Act, "the plaintiff shall not be subject to the additional tax on negligent tax returns under Article 81 (1) of the Act in the case where a resident files a return of global income as transfer income or transfer income with his global income, etc. due to an error in the classification of income in the final return of tax base under Article 70 of the Act: Provided, That where the plaintiff files a return of income classification differently from the fact intentionally with the intention to reduce the tax burden, the additional tax on negligent tax returns shall apply. Thus, in filing the final return of tax on the land of this case, it may be deemed that the plaintiff files a false report on the classification of income in accordance with the "general tax rules of the National Tax Service". Accordingly, the plaintiff asserts that at least 12, the additional tax

On the other hand, "Common Provisions of the National Tax Service" is merely an administrative rule that issued the criteria for interpretation and enforcement of the tax-related Acts and subordinate statutes within the tax authority, and is not an effective law that binds the court or the people (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu11347, Dec. 22, 1994; 2003Du7064, Oct. 15, 2004). As seen above, in order to facilitate the exercise of the right to taxation and the realization of tax claims, additional tax under the tax law is an administrative sanction imposed under the law in cases where a taxpayer violates a tax return, tax liability, etc. under the law without justifiable grounds, and the taxpayer's intention and negligence is not considered as a justifiable reason. Accordingly, as seen above, it cannot be deemed that the land site of the law constitutes a justifiable reason. Thus, as long as the Plaintiff transferred the real estate for profit as part of a business for the purpose of profit and reported it as global income not as global income, it cannot be asserted that the above real estate income is not known.

C. Determination on the Plaintiff’s assertion in the trial room

1) The plaintiff's assertion

In the trial of the party, the Plaintiff asserts as follows, on the premise that the residential function of the instant housing is not lost, and it is assumed to be regarded as a house.

A) The instant house constitutes “rental housing” under Article 167-3(1)2(a) and (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, and thus, constitutes “three houses for one household” where capital gains tax is excessive.

B) Even if the instant house does not correspond to the “rental house” under Article 167-3(1)2(a) and (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, it falls under the “ordinary house” under Article 167-3(1)2(a) and (b) of the former Enforcement Decree, and eventually, the instant house does not fall under the “three houses for one household with capital gains tax heavy.”

2) Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

3) Determination

A) We examine the Plaintiff’s first argument.

Article 167-3 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act provides that "Housing falling under three or more houses for one household prescribed by Presidential Decree" shall be a house owned by one household which owns three or more houses in Korea, and "national housing leased for five or more years" through ten or more years is not a house for three houses for one household, which is a house owned by a resident who has certain requirements (registration of a business operator under Article 168 of the Income Tax Act, registration of a rental business operator under Article 6 of the Rental Housing Act, etc.) under subparagraph 2 of the same Article.

However, this case's house does not fall under "where the plaintiff owns three or more houses at the time of transfer of the house of this case, and there is no dispute between the parties, but there is no evidence to recognize that the plaintiff has leased the house of this case for at least five years (the plaintiff acquired the house of this case until June 23, 2000 and leased it before 200S thereafter, and left it as official leave until 200Y, which is the time of transfer)." This case's house of this case does not fall under "where it is not deemed a house from 3 houses for one household" of Article 167-3 (1) 2 (a) and (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act [this case's house of this case's house of this case is not considered a house from 5 years or more" under the interpretation of the above Enforcement Decree, and even if it does not meet the rental period of 5 years or more, the plaintiff's assertion that this case's house of this case is leased for at least 15 years or more than 7 years in Seoul Metropolitan area."

B) We examine the second argument of the Plaintiff.

In each subparagraph of Article 167-3 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, the houses not included in the "three houses for one household" are listed, and subparagraphs 1 through 8 and 8-2 of the same Article stipulate "house below a certain value, long-term rental house, long-term rental house, etc." and "one household owns only one house except for the houses falling under subparagraphs 1 through 8 and 8-2". In other words, even if not less than three houses are owned, the remaining house except for one house in question falls under subparagraphs 1 through 8 and 8-2 of Article 167-3 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act does not fall under the "three houses for one household" as the ordinary house.

In light of the structure and legislative purport of Article 104(1)2-3 of the former Income Tax Act and Article 167-3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (in principle, 60% heavy taxation rate shall be applied to the transfer of a house corresponding to three or more houses for one household in the purport of preventing ownership of a house for the purpose of speculation, and in order to promote stability in housing prices and stability in housing life, the aforementioned subparagraph 10 does not constitute three houses for one household under Article 167-3(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act.

However, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff possessed three or more houses at the time of the transfer of the instant house. In order to view the instant house as the ordinary house which is one house for one household, the Plaintiff’s existing houses [the Plaintiff’s real estate content table (Evidence B) 6 through 9, 14, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 34, 39, 45, 46, 49, 57, 60, 64, 65, 68 through 71, 78, 135 through 139, 190, 191, 192, 203, 204, 214, 214, 29, 29, 39, 40, 45, 46, 68 through 71, 74, 135 through 139, 196, 203, 25 through 2324, 2637-2.

Therefore, we cannot accept the plaintiff's assertion on the premise that the housing of this case falls under the general housing of Article 167-3 (1) 10 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance with this conclusion is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.