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(영문) 대법원 1997. 7. 22. 선고 95다6991 판결

[손해배상(자)][집45(3)민,4;공1997.9.15.(42),2602]

Main Issues

[1] Acts and subordinate statutes applicable to cases of compensation for damages caused by railroad accidents (=civil law)

[2] Where the victim of a railroad accident can receive compensation under the Act on the Honorable Treatment, etc. of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State, whether it should be deducted from compensation for the accident (negative)

[3] The case recognizing a special circumstance where the damage was compensated if the victim obtained the same income as the previous one in the previous workplace regardless of the loss from the aftermath disability caused by an accident

[4] Whether an extension of retirement age under Article 24 of the Police Officers Act and Article 48(1) of the Decree on the Appointment of Police Officers can be included in calculating the maximum working age (negative)

[5] The court's duty of explanation in a case where the occurrence of the damage is presumed by the assertion or evidentiary materials submitted before the conclusion of the trial proceedings, among damages for opening expenses or medical treatment expenses, for which the expected period has elapsed at the time of the conclusion of the trial proceedings

[6] The case holding that a traffic loss is recognized for the treatment of outpatient disorders

Summary of Judgment

[1] Even if the State or a local government is a state or a local government, if it is not a public authority but a mere private economy entity is involved, the State Compensation Act cannot be applied to its liability for damages, and the employer's liability is recognized under the Civil Act, and the State's railroad operation business is not a state's exercise of public authority, but a private and economic activity is not a state's exercise of public authority. Thus, even if a public official involved in

[2] In light of the purpose of the compensation system under the former Act on the Honorable Treatment, etc. of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (amended by Act No. 5291 of Jan. 13, 1997), and the purport of the relevant provisions, the payment system of compensation such as pension, various allowances, etc. to persons of distinguished service to the State has the character of social security to promote their stable livelihood and improvement of their welfare, as well as the system that compensates for damages, unlike its purport and purpose, is different from that of the compensation system. Thus, even if the victim receives basic pension, additional pension, nursing allowances, etc. from the State under the Act on the Honorable Treatment, etc. of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State, even if the State receives compensation, it shall not be deducted from the amount of damage to be compensated by the employer liability under the Civil Act in a separate position as the person of private economy, and since the victim cannot be deemed to have newly acquired profits in proximate causal relation with the accident due to the tort, it cannot be deducted

[3] The case holding that, if the court assessed the victim's loss rate of labor ability properly, even if the victim obtained income from the previous workplace without any difference from the previous workplace until the time of the closure of the arguments in fact-finding proceedings, it cannot be concluded that the victim did not have any property damage due to physical disability, on the other hand, since the damage compensation system aims to compensate the victim's specific loss of reality, in special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that there are losses, since the plaintiff lost the entire operating ability, and the plaintiff was unable to work for the defendant's workplace objectively due to the accident at the time of the closure of arguments in fact-finding proceedings, and the state, the same subject, which is the same, paid the victim the same remuneration as the previous one after the accident, it shall be deemed that the actual loss already occurred within the scope is compensated.

[4] In light of the victim's work attitude and physical condition before the accident, even if the victim satisfies the criteria for review on extension of the retirement age set by the Commissioner of the National Police Agency pursuant to Article 48 (1) of the Decree on the Appointment of Police Officers, whether to extend the retirement age shall be determined by taking into account other circumstances such as the current supply and demand plan. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the victim

[5] In cases where the victim of a tort claims and evidence for damages, such as nursing expenses and medical expenses, which occurred continuously from a certain point of time to a certain point of time after the closure of argument in the actual process of the trial proceedings, there is a time interval at all times between the time of such assertion and evidence and the time of the closing of argument. Therefore, if there are special circumstances, such as where the occurrence of damages during the above period is inferred by the assertion or evidence submitted before the closing of argument, the court shall be obliged to explain the damages during the above period by demanding proof, etc.

[6] The case holding that since the victim's accident recognized that he/she should undergo medical treatment while travelling to a hospital equipped with facilities, such as physical therapy, work therapy, and rupture test, etc. during the life period for which he/she was reduced by suffering from chronic disorder, such as incomplete paralysis, neutronic cycy, etc., and as long as both parties make a statement on the victim's consent that he/she was receiving outpatient treatment by at least 20 days a month, transportation expenses should be recognized in light of the victim's state of after-age disorder, it should be recognized in light of the empirical rule as requiring transportation expenses, and it should be recognized that a reasonable amount should be recognized as transportation expenses

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 750 and 756 of the Civil Act, Article 2 of the State Compensation Act / [2] Articles 393, 756, and 763 of the Civil Act, Articles 1, 12, and 41 of the former Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State (amended by Act No. 5291 of January 13, 1997) / [3] Articles 393, 756, and 763 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 393, 756, and 763 of the Civil Act, Article 24 of the Police Act, Article 48 (1) of the Decree on the Appointment of Police Officers / [5] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act, Article 126 of the Civil Procedure Act / [6] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 68Da2225 delivered on April 22, 1969 (No. 17-2, No. 36), Supreme Court Decision 70Da961 delivered on July 28, 1970 (No. 18-2, No. 242), Supreme Court Decision 70Da1148 delivered on November 24, 1970 (No. 18-3, No. 279), Supreme Court Decision 72Da1184 delivered on May 22, 197 / [3] Supreme Court Decision 88Da11220 delivered on February 27, 199 (Gong190, No. 743) (No. 190, Nov. 23, 1990); Supreme Court Decision 90Da21022 delivered on Nov. 23, 199) / [No. 3198Da4894 delivered on May 194, 1997

Plaintiff, Appellant

Plaintiff (Law Firm Han, Attorneys Park Hong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellee

Korea

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 93Na42527 delivered on December 9, 1994

Text

The part of the judgment below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul District Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney are examined.

1. As to ground of appeal No. 7

Even if the State or a local government is not a public authority but a mere private economy entity, the State Compensation Act cannot be applied to the liability for damages, and the employer's liability is recognized under the Civil Act, and the State's railroad operation business is not a state's exercise of public authority but a private and economic activity. Thus, even if a public official participated in an accident caused by this, the State Compensation Act is not applicable, but shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Act in general (see Supreme Court Decisions 70Da961, Jul. 28, 1970; 70Da1148, Nov. 24, 1970; 72Da184, May 22, 1973, etc.).

Meanwhile, the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (hereinafter referred to as the "Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State") provides that the name of the Act shall be changed from January 13, 1997 to the "Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State" after being amended by Act No. 5291 on July 13, 1997, and the name of the Act shall be changed to the "Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State". The purpose of the Act is to promote their livelihood stability and welfare by providing honorable treatment for persons of distinguished service to the State who have contributed to or have made a sacrifice to the State and their bereaved family members, and to contribute to the cultivation of national patriotism (Article 1). The State shall compensate for the degree of their living according to the degree of their contribution and sacrifice (Articles 7 and 79). In light of the purpose of the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State and the purpose of the compensation system is not to contribute to social security or welfare.

Therefore, even if the plaintiff was paid the basic pension, additional pension, nursing allowances, etc. by the State under the Act on Persons of Distinguished Services to the State, it should not be deducted from the amount of damages that the defendant country should compensate for in accordance with the employer's liability under the Civil Act in a separate position, which is the subject of private economy. Moreover, the plaintiff's receipt of the above compensation cannot be viewed as the profits newly acquired due to the tort of this case, and it cannot be viewed as the profits in proximate causal relation with the accident of this case. Thus,

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the total amount of basic pensions, additional pensions, nursing allowances, and pensions to be paid by the time of death under the Act on Persons of Distinguished Services to the State, which the plaintiff had already been paid, deducted from the amount of damages to be paid by the defendant, affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal nature of compensation and the legal principles on offsetting profits and losses under the

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

If the court assessed the victim's loss rate of labor ability properly, it cannot be concluded that the victim did not have any property damage due to the physical disability in the same workplace as the previous one even though the victim had earned income without any difference from the previous one until the time the argument of the fact-finding court is closed, notwithstanding the fact-finding disability. However, since the compensation system aims at compensating the victim for the damage of the specific reality caused by the victim, there are special circumstances, it cannot be viewed that there is damage. In this case, as in this case, the plaintiff is unable to work in the defendant's workplace objectively due to the accident at the time of the closure of the argument of the court below, since the plaintiff was unable to work in the defendant's workplace objectively due to the loss of operation ability, and the defendant, the same principal agent, after the accident of this case, has paid the plaintiff the same remuneration as the previous one, it shall be deemed that

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the recognition of damages for lost profits or offsetting profits and losses, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Article 24 of the Police Officers Act provides that the retirement age of a police officer shall be 58 years of age and the retirement age of the police officer shall be extended by up to three years as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 48(1) of the Decree on the Appointment of Police Officers provides that the extension of retirement age shall be conducted by an appointment authority or appointment-recommendation authority in accordance with the standards set by the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency, taking into account manpower supply and demand relationship, peculiarity of duties

In this case, even if the Plaintiff’s working attitude and physical conditions prior to the instant accident meet the standard for review on the extension of the retirement age set by the Commissioner of the National Police Agency pursuant to Article 48(1) of the Decree on the Appointment of Police Officers, whether to extend the retirement age shall be determined by taking into account other circumstances, such as the supply and demand plan of human resources at the time. Therefore, it is difficult to view that

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

4. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 3, 4, and 5

In a case where the victim of a tort claims and evidence for damages, such as nursing expenses and medical expenses, which occurred continuously from a certain point of time to a certain point of time after the closure of argument in the actual proceedings of the trial court, there is time interval between the time of such assertion and evidence and the time of the closing of argument. Thus, if there are special circumstances, such as where the occurrence of damages during the above period is inferred by the assertion or evidence submitted before the closing of argument, etc., the court shall be obliged to explain the damages during the above period by demanding the presentation of evidence, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da14423, May 10, 191).

According to the evidence adopted by the court below, the plaintiff needs medical treatment and auxiliary equipment during the life expectancy of which the injury occurred due to the accident in this case, and two nursing workers need medical care and auxiliary equipment during the same period. At the third date for pleading of the first instance court (the third date for pleading of the first instance court (the date for pleading of August 12, 1993) and the third date for pleading of the first instance court (the date for pleading of the first instance court No. 256 pages of the record No. 10, No. 150), the court below should have confirmed the receipt of nursing expenses (the date for pleading of the record No. 10, No. 150) after the date for pleading of the first instance court (the date for pleading of March 18, 1993) and the fact that the plaintiff continued to have been hospitalized on the 19th date for pleading of the first instance court (the date for pleading of the accident in this case had been proved on 193 et al., 193).

Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of the claim of medical expenses, assistance equipment expenses, and nursing expenses from January 1, 1993 to November 18, 1994, which was the date of closing argument of the court below, by failing to take such measures as above, and there is no proof as to them, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal is with merit within the scope of pointing this out.

5. Regarding ground of appeal No. 6

According to the evidence adopted by the court below, the plaintiff's accident of this case recognized that the plaintiff should undergo medical treatment while coming to a hospital equipped with facilities, such as physical therapy, work therapy, and fachising test, during the life period for which the plaintiff was reduced by suffering from an incomplete malutical disorder, such as galute, and gys, due to the accident of this case, and as long as both parties make a statement at the 10th day of pleading of the court below (No. 836 of October 21, 1994, the record No. 836 of October 21, 1994) agree that the plaintiff was receiving medical treatment at the level of 20 days per month, considering the situation of the plaintiff's fachising disorder, it shall be recognized in light of the rule of experience that transportation cost is required.

Nevertheless, the lower court’s rejection of all of its claim and proof as to the amount of traffic cost damage caused by its failure to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the allegation pointing this out has merit.

6. Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Im-soo (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울민사지방법원 1994.12.9.선고 93나42527
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