B. If a collective agreement provides that disciplinary action requires special procedures, whether such procedures are valid

(c) In cases where dismissal is null and void, whether wages may also be claimed during the period of not providing labor without any cause attributable to the employer;

B. If a collective agreement provides that disciplinary action requires a special procedure, such procedure is a valid requirement for disciplinary action conducted by an employer, regardless of the existence of substantive grounds for disciplinary action and whether it constitutes an unfair labor practice.

C. In a case where dismissal of an employee is null and void, the employee is deemed to have failed to provide his/her labor due to the cause attributable to the employer even though the employment contract relationship remains effective, and thus, he/she may claim the payment of wages in return for which he/she may receive when he/she provides his/her labor during that period pursuant to Article 538(1) of the Civil Act. However, even if dismissal was not made, if the employer discontinues his/her business due to a cause attributable to the employer, regardless of the occurrence of the situation where the employment is virtually impossible, or the situation where

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

A. On the first ground for appeal

(1) According to the above disciplinary procedure, the lower court: (a) determined that the Plaintiff had been on June 25, 198 as an employee of the Defendant Company and had been subject to disciplinary action for two months or more from the date of dismissal on the ground that “from November 1, 1989 to the date of release from office.” (b) the Plaintiff still could not be subject to disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that “from the date of release from office to the date of release from office.” (c) the Plaintiff’s act of absence under the above provision of the Rules of Employment for the reason that “from the date of release from office to the date of release from office,” and “from the date of release from office to the date of release from office.” (d) the Plaintiff still should be subject to disciplinary action for more than three months on the ground that the Plaintiff’s act of absence from office would continue to exist for more than three days without any justifiable reason,” and (d) the Plaintiff’s act of absence from office under Article 27-2 of the Rules of Employment as the same Act.

(2) Even if a specific cause falls under both the grounds for disciplinary dismissal and the grounds for ordinary dismissal in a collective agreement or rules of employment, etc., and the grounds for disciplinary dismissal fall under the grounds for ordinary dismissal but does not fall under the grounds for ordinary dismissal, the employer’s discretion is legitimate to the extent that it does not go against Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act.

However, unless there is a special reason such as the degree of time for dismissal, even if a worker is not given an opportunity to defend himself/herself, a certain procedure according to the dismissal dismissal by disciplinary action should be additionally required even if a reason for dismissal dismissal falls under ordinary grounds for dismissal. Furthermore, the disciplinary procedure cannot be omitted due to the fact that a reason for dismissal by disciplinary action would normally be a reason for dismissal by disciplinary action. This is because the purpose of the relevant provisions guaranteeing procedural security may lead to instability in the status of workers by avoiding the purpose of the relevant provisions.

Upon examining the evidence relations established by the court below in accordance with the records in this case, the judgment of the court below that deemed the "not less than three days of absence from office" as grounds for disciplinary action shall be justified, and even if the defendant company ordinarys the plaintiff by applying Article 41 of the Rules of Employment which provides for the grounds for dismissal from office, such as the theory of lawsuit, the dismissal disposition of this case by the defendant company, which omitted such procedures to the extent that the defendant company should undergo a disciplinary procedure, is null and void. Thus, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to dismissal, such as the theory of lawsuit, in the court below.

B. On the second ground for appeal

If a collective agreement provides that disciplinary action is required, such procedure is a valid requirement for a disciplinary action conducted by an employer, regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive cause of disciplinary action or an unfair labor practice (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 85Da375, 85Meu1591, Jul. 8, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 92Da18542, Sept. 25, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 92Da4935, Oct. 22, 1993); and there is no reason to believe that it is an independent opinion.

2. We examine the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal.

A. On the first ground for appeal

If dismissal of an employer is null and void, the employee is unable to provide labor due to a cause attributable to the employer even though the labor contract relationship remains valid, and thus, it is possible to claim the payment of wages for consideration that can be paid when the employee provided labor during that period pursuant to Article 538(1) of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2132, May 23, 1989; Supreme Court Decision 90Da25277, Jun. 28, 191; Supreme Court Decision 92Da39860, Dec. 8, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 90Da8763, Mar. 31, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 90Da8763, Mar. 31, 1992). Thus, if the employer discontinues his/her business due to a justifiable cause, it cannot be claimed for wages during that period.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the plaintiff was detained on November 1, 1991, and was released from the prison on April 28, 1992. Thus, since from the date of the dismissal of this case to the date of the above release, the problem of the place of receipt cannot occur since the plaintiff could not provide labor. Thus, there is no error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles as to the non-performance of the decision of the court below and the place of receipt that rejected the plaintiff's claim for wages during that period. There is no reason to discuss.

B. On the second ground for appeal

The fact that 750 won has been increased as a result of renegotiation with respect to the basic salary applied from April 1992, but the fact that other workers actually worked after May 1, 1992 that the Plaintiff had the burden of proving that the Plaintiff had the burden of proof and that the arguments in this case have the duty to explain. There is no reason to interpret.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)