According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, while the deceased non-party worked as a police officer in the Chungcheongnam-nam Police Station from around December 31, 1976 to around 03:00, the court below rejected the plaintiffs' claim for damages due to the plaintiff's defect in public order and its duty to maintain public order and maintain public order, since the plaintiff's damage was clearly caused to the deceased's new public order and maintain public order by reason of the following reasons: (a) the deceased non-party was addicted to the diversary gas from the diversary room in the above diversary room from around December 31, 1976 to the diversary room in the above diversary room; and (b) the part connected with the pipe and the water pipe which entered the bottom of the kitchen and the water tank connected to the water tank installed on the ground of the above diversary room in the above diversary room; and (c) the plaintiff's claim for damages due to the plaintiff's defect in public order and management.

However, under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act, where a soldier, military officer, police officer, or member of homeland reserve forces related to combat, training, or other performance of duties, or where a police officer, who is a victim of this case, died on duty or on duty in a facility used for the purpose of maintaining national defense or public security, or where he or his bereaved family is entitled to receive compensation such as accident compensation, survivors' pension, wounded veterans' pension, etc. under the provisions of other Acts and subordinate statutes, he or she may not claim compensation for damages under this Act and the Civil Act. Thus, it cannot be deemed that it is a facility related to combat and training as referred to in this case. Thus, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiffs who are the bereaved family members of the victim of this case who died on duty in the above accommodation room cannot be denied the right to claim compensation under the provisions of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act and the Civil Act. However, it is contrary to the judgment of the court below, it affected the legal principles of the State Compensation Act that the victim police officer died on duty in the facility.

Therefore, by the assent of all participating judges, the original judgment is reversed and remanded, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Opinion concurring with the Supreme Court Judge Lee Young-chul, Yang Byung-ho, and Park Tae-ki

According to the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act, where a soldier, military officer, police officer, or member of the homeland reserve forces entered a battle, on duty, or on duty in connection with combat, training, or other performance of duties, and where he or she was killed in action, on duty, on duty, or on duty in a facility used for the purpose of maintaining national defense or public security, and where he or she was killed in action, on duty, on duty, or on duty in a vehicle, warship, aircraft, or other means of transport, and "facilities used for the purpose of maintaining national defense or public security" are clearly defined as "facilities used for the purpose of maintaining public security", it is reasonable to see that the boarding room in the police station is a facility used for the purpose of maintaining public security as seen above,

Therefore, the victim of this case died in the facility used for the purpose of maintaining public order and order as a police official. However, the court below's argument is reasonable since the court below denied the right of the plaintiffs to claim damages under the State Compensation Act and the Civil Act based on the above Act, since the benefits paid by the State under the Public Officials Pension Act, which are stipulated by other Acts and subordinate statutes, which provide that the plaintiffs who are the bereaved family members of the victim can receive disaster compensation, are paid based on the social security system for public officials, and the purport or purpose of compensating for damages differs from that of compensating for damages (Supreme Court Decision 69Da289 delivered on September 29, 1970).

Although we agree with the conclusion that we reverse and remand the judgment of the court below with the supplementary opinion of the judge of the Supreme Court, the opinion on the grounds for reversal is as follows.

According to the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act, where a soldier, military, police officer, or member of the homeland reserve forces has been killed in action, on duty or on duty in relation to combat, training, or other execution of duties, or where he or his bereaved family has been killed in action, on duty or on duty in a facility used for the purpose of maintaining national defense or public security, or where he or his bereaved family has been injured in action, on duty or on duty in a vehicle, ship, aircraft, or other transportation means, he or his bereaved family can not claim damages under this Act and the Civil Act. Thus, the interpretation of the provision of the provision of the Act of the current Act of the current Act is that a soldier, military, police officer, or homeland reserve forces member may not claim damages under this Act and the Civil Act. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the provision of the Act of the current Act of the State Compensation Act as well as the provision of the Act of this Act as the provision of other Acts and subordinate statutes.

Therefore, the view that a police station room cannot be viewed as a facility related to combat and training as referred to in the above Article, as long as there is an express provision in the above current situation, it cannot be approved because such interpretation cannot be viewed as deviating from the area of statutory interpretation. Furthermore, the court below cited the Public Officials Pension Act as another Act when the plaintiffs, who are the bereaved family members of the police station of this case, can receive compensation for disaster compensation, etc. under the provisions of other Acts and subordinate statutes.

However, Article 29 of the Police Officers Act provides that a police officer wounded in action or in the line of duty corresponding thereto or his/her bereaved family members shall be eligible for assistance under the Military Aid Act as prescribed by Presidential Decree. According to Article 8 of the Act on the Establishment of Reactor Police Units, where a police officer dies due to combat action or in the line of duty corresponding thereto, the members of the combat police unit shall be considered as a person eligible for assistance under the Military Aid Act as prescribed by Presidential Decree. In cases where a police officer died due to combat action or in the line of duty corresponding thereto, the amount of pension and allowances prescribed under the Military Aid Act shall be provided for in the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act, but facilities and automobiles used by a police officer excluding combat action or in the line of duty corresponding thereto or in the line of duty corresponding thereto for the purpose of maintaining public order. In other cases where a person died or was injured on duty within the transportation system, it cannot be deemed that there is a provision of legislation such as disaster compensation for his/her bereaved family members or his/her bereaved family members who died on duty.

Then, among the police officers under the proviso of Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, those who are related to the performance of duties under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act or those who are used for the maintenance of public order and security.In the case of a person who died on duty or was injured on duty within the transportation agency, there is no other provision of other Acts and subordinate statutes that can receive compensation for survivors' pension, etc. Therefore, in the case of this case, it cannot be said that the person or his bereaved family member who limits the right to claim compensation for survivors' pension, etc. under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act falls under a case where there is no provision of other Acts and subordinate statutes that can receive compensation for survivors' pension, etc. Therefore, in this case, the court below's decision that the Public Officials Pension Act falls under the provisions of other Acts and subordinate statutes under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act shall be erroneous in misunderstanding the legal principles as to the provisions of other

We agree with the Korean Supreme Court's Han Jin-jin also because there is no difference between the two supplementary opinions, and it is reasonable to do so.

Justices Lee Young-young (Presiding Justice)