2. The appeal costs and incidental appeal costs shall be borne respectively by each person;

The Defendant’s order of return of KRW 272,312,780 to the Plaintiff on December 29, 2017 is revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding to the revocation is dismissed.

3. Purport of incidental appeal;

The part of the first instance judgment against the Plaintiff shall be revoked. The part of KRW 164,945,090 among the order of return of the fuel subsidy amounting to KRW 272,312,780 that the Defendant rendered to the Plaintiff on December 29, 2017 shall be revoked.

The reasoning for the judgment in this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the parts to be used or added below, and thus, it shall be quoted in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

○○ 4-5 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du24115, Apr. 15, 2010) from the fifth bottom of the judgment of the first instance is as follows.

[See Supreme Court Decision 2009Du24115 Decided April 15, 2010, etc.: (a) the purport of Article 13(3) of the former Tourism Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 5654, Jan. 21, 1999; hereinafter “former Tourism Promotion Act”) is to recognize the status of a tourism business operator as the same as that of the previous tourism business operator even if the previous tourism business operator had already been equipped with facilities meeting the registration standards for tourism business and completed registration through lawful examination procedures; (b) Article 13(3) of the former Tourism Promotion Act does not comprehensively succeed to the rights and obligations of the previous tourism business operator; and (c) Article 13(3) of the former Tourism Promotion Act differs from the legislative purpose of the Trucking Transport Business Act and the succession to the status of the status of the trucking transport business operator and its system; and therefore, (c) the aforementioned legal doctrine can not be invoked as it is in this case].

○ The following is added to 6 pages of the first instance judgment on the ground that 9 is under 6 pages.

[Defendant received notification from Incheon Metropolitan City around November 25, 2015 that the registration of each of the instant automobiles may be revoked ex officio, and received a voluntary request for the registration of cancellation and a prior notification for the ex officio cancellation on February 11, 2016, and subsequently revoked the registration of automobile related to the instant vehicle on February 11, 2016. Accordingly, upon the Plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit seeking revocation of the ex officio revocation (Seoul District Court 2016Guhap5093), the Plaintiff actively responded to the lawsuit (Seoul District Court 2016Guhap72718), and it was decided upon the judgment of the appellate court (Seoul High Court 2016Nu72718) against the Plaintiff. The Defendant appears to have tried to confirm the legal relationship in the instant lawsuit (No. 2 and 3 evidence), and it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff expressed a public opinion that the Plaintiff would not recover the fuel subsidy received by the Plaintiff).

○ The following shall be added to the 7th day of the first instance judgment, the 7th day of the first instance judgment.

(1) Although the Defendant asserted that the order of return of the fuel subsidy was an administrative disposition and that such administrative disposition cannot be deemed to have taken place with the statute of limitations, the Nonparty ( Nonparty 2) received the fuel subsidy for the instant vehicle through active deception in collusion with the public officials in charge of the instant case by means of false or altered notification of acceptance of the substitute and scrapping, etc., so it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant can immediately claim the return of the fuel subsidy as unjust enrichment at the time of issuing the fuel subsidy to the Plaintiff, and that the instant disposition was only a specific exercise of the right. Therefore, the Defendant’s above fuel subsidy return claim is subject to the statute of limitations regardless of the instant disposition. In addition, the Defendant asserted that the foregoing statute of limitations is ten years since the Framework Act on Local Taxes or the Civil Act is applied, but the provision that “the period of extinctive prescription can be recovered according to the example of the disposition on default of national or local taxes” under Article 44(3) of the Trucking Transport Business Act does not include the meaning that the statute of limitation period of limitation under Article 38(1) of the Framework Act applies to the Defendant’s local Finance Act.

○ The 7th 10 pages of the first instance judgment are “,” and the following is added thereto:

A lawsuit seeking revocation of ex officio registration and disposition of revocation of registration and criminal litigation against illegal increase vehicles related to the instant vehicle was in progress.

○ The following is added to the 7th day below the judgment of the first instance.

In addition, although the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claim for the completion of extinctive prescription is in violation of the principle of good faith, there are no special circumstances such as that the plaintiff's exercise of right or interruption of prescription is impossible or considerably difficult (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du11028, Mar. 28, 2003). Thus, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance is just, and the defendant's appeal and the plaintiff's incidental appeal are dismissed.

Judges Doing and decorations (Presiding Judge)