2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning of this court's judgment is as follows, and it is identical to the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance (excluding the part of "4. conclusion" excluding the part of "4. conclusion") except for the supplement or addition of the judgment as follows 2. Thus, it is acceptable to accept it as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Revised parts

○ 5 8 pages "(including paper numbers)" shall be amended to "(including paper numbers, hereinafter the same shall apply)".

○ 17 Up to 5 re-investment requirements shall be amended to “the obligation to re-investment”.

○ 18 The last 18th and the 8th below shall be amended to “gross income” respectively.

○ 21 Not less than 5~4 below were amended as follows:

“ insofar as the Plaintiff complied with the procedures under the Housing Site Development Promotion Act and relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and has obtained approval for modification of the implementation plan, including the housing site development cost reviewed several times thereafter, the housing site development cost so approved by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport falls under “reasonable estimated construction cost by reflecting the changes in the situation by the end of the relevant business year” under Article 34(2) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act, but it is difficult to view otherwise solely on the ground that there was approval by

3. Supplement and addition of judgments;

A. The plaintiff's assertion that the development gains cannot be included in the gross income as the trustee of the instant development project.

1) The Plaintiff asserts that the development gains calculated by deducting the total sales cost from the total sales cost of the instant development project (hereinafter “development gains of this case”) shall belong to all the local governments of this case, and no profit shall accrue to the Plaintiff, the actual trustee of the instant development project, in addition to the settlement of the project cost, and the development gains of this case shall not be deemed the Plaintiff’s gross income under the Corporate Tax Act, and thus, the instant disposition that was made on the premise that the development gains of this case are the Plaintiff’s gross income under the Corporate Tax

2) According to the facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 19, 20, Eul evidence Nos. 3 and 4, Eul evidence Nos. 3 and 4, and the overall purport of testimony and arguments of this Court* The following facts can be acknowledged as to the process between the local government of this case and the plaintiff to conclude the agreement of this case:

A)****do,************ (a) the Corporation ( irrespective of whether the name was changed to the Plaintiff; hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff, regardless of whether the name was changed; hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff on December 2003 ** Dong,** Dong,** Dong, Dong,**** Dong, Dong,*** Dong*** Dong,*** Dong*** Dong*** Dong*** Dong*** Dong, Eup**** per Eup***95,00 square meters of a house developed and supplied as administrative, convention center, tourist amusement facility, etc., and the implementation of the project is jointly carried out (hereinafter referred to as “203 agreement”). The main contents are as follows.

(B) Subsequent to that *** the Do Governor,** the market,* the market,* the market, and the plaintiff, around November 2004, added the market ** the market as a co-project operator,*** the Gu*** the Gu**(hereinafter referred to as the "204 Convention") to add the same KRW to the project implementation area, the main contents of which are as follows:

C) However, Article 71(1) of the former Local Public Enterprises Act (amended by Act No. 10990, Aug. 4, 201; hereinafter referred to as the "former Local Public Enterprises Act") and Article 63(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22765, Mar. 29, 201; hereinafter referred to as the "former Enforcement Decree of the Local Public Enterprises Act"), and Articles 20 and 26 of the former Ordinance on the Establishment and Operation of Local Public Enterprises (amended by Presidential Decree No. 11, Apr. 11, 2005; * also Article 33* of the Ordinance on the Establishment and Operation of Local Public Enterprises (amended by Ordinance No. 33*), which stipulates that the Plaintiff shall bear expenses incurred by the State or a local government in the event that the Plaintiff performs its business on behalf of the State or a local government, so it was pointed out that the Plaintiff’s direct procurement of the instant development project violated the former Local Public Enterprises Act, etc.

3) Determination

In full view of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged in the above facts and the judgment of the first instance court cited by this court, Gap's facts, Gap's evidence Nos. 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 222, Eul's evidence Nos. 3 and 4, it is difficult to regard the plaintiff as a trustee of the development project of this case, and the plaintiff's assertion on a different premise is without merit.

① In the 2003 Convention and the 2004 Convention, the Plaintiff and the instant local governments designated the Plaintiff as a trustee or a business agent of the instant development project, and the Plaintiff, who is in the position of the trustee or business agent, was in violation of the relevant statutes, concluded the instant agreement with the purport that the provision on the designation of the trustee was deleted and the Plaintiff was changed to the joint project executor of the instant development project. Accordingly, the Plaintiff determined the policy matters of the instant development project in addition to the existing business activities, such as the establishment of various plans concerning the instant development project, compensation, implementation of the project, and raising business funds (Article 5(1)), and became able to acquire the land necessary for the instant development project in the name of the Plaintiff (Article 5(3)). Considering the process and text of the conclusion of the instant agreement, and the role of the Plaintiff in the instant development project, it is difficult to deem the Plaintiff as the trustee of the instant development project.

② Article 71(1) of the former Local Public Enterprises Act provides that "the Corporation may carry out the projects of the State or a local government on behalf of the State or the local government, and expenses incurred in such cases shall be borne by the State or the local government," and Article 63(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Public Enterprises Act provides that "if the Corporation intends to carry out the projects of the State or the local government on behalf of the State or the local government pursuant to Article 71(1) of the Act, it shall be governed by an entrustment contract." However, it is possible for a local public enterprise to carry out the projects of the local government on behalf of the local government through entrustment contract. However, according to the instant agreement,

③ If the Plaintiff is merely a simple trustee, it is difficult to find the reasons why the instant local government unilaterally determines the scale of the development gains of this case and the amount re-investment in this case and without notifying the Plaintiff thereof.

④ The Plaintiff asserts that, pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Convention, the development gains of this case are re-invested in a public project of *** Si or * Si, so the development gains of this case cannot be deemed to have accrued to the Plaintiff. However, even until the closing date of argument in this court, the above provisions did not clearly determine the whole amount of the development gains of this case and set the approximate standards for the use of the development gains of this case. Even if the development gains of this case are ultimately attributed to the local government of this case, it is difficult to deem that the development gains of this case were immediately reverted to the local government of this case, excluding the Plaintiff, at the same time as the development gains of this case occurred.

B. The plaintiff and the local governments of this case are joint business operators and they cannot include development gains in the gross income.

1) The Plaintiff and the instant local governments are co-project implementers of the instant development project, and at least 0% of the Plaintiff’s profit distribution ratio during the business year 2008, 2009, which falls under each of the instant dispositions, and the instant development gains accrue to all of the instant local governments. Therefore, the instant development gains cannot be deemed the Plaintiff’s profit under the Corporate Tax Act, and the instant disposition that was made on the premise that the instant development gains are the Plaintiff’s profit under the Corporate Tax

2) In full view of the following facts and circumstances as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the development gains of this case are part of the Plaintiff’s gross income under the Corporate Tax Act, in view of the following facts and circumstances, which can be acknowledged by the purport of Gap’s aforementioned facts, Gap’s evidence Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11 through 15, 19, 20, 22, 46, 49-52, and Eul’s evidence Nos. 2 through 2, 6, 11, and 12, since it is difficult to view the Plaintiff as a joint business proprietor liable for tax payment for each share in the instant

① The Plaintiff is a party to a direct contract with a subcontractor by means of a competitive bid with the Public Procurement Service, such as entering into a contract independently with a subcontractor and bearing the rights and obligations under the contract. The instant local government has no rights and obligations with a third party, such as a subcontractor.

② The instant local governments did not agree on how to share the risk of damage only in the case of the instant development gains (the Plaintiff asserted that, on the ground of Article 711(2) of the Civil Act, the allocation rate should be applied as it is, however, as the criteria for profit distribution stipulated in Article 8 of the instant Convention in the event of the occurrence of losses based on Article 711(2) of the Civil Act. However, it is difficult to recognize that there was a specific agreement on the share distribution ratio or profit distribution ratio of the Plaintiff and the instant local governments with respect to the instant development

③ Since the commencement of the instant development project, the Plaintiff reported accounting and corporate tax to recognize the same amount as the development gains as the Plaintiff’s sales cost and long-term unpaid costs as the Plaintiff’s financial statements. The Plaintiff received evaluation as appropriate by external auditors, such as Ansan Accounting Corporation, etc., and the Plaintiff asserted only the use of the development gains of this case and the inclusion of re-investment costs in deductible expenses until the first instance court. In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff appears to have been aware of the development gains of this case as the Plaintiff’s gross income under the Corporate Tax Act. Meanwhile, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the instant local government included the development project as a joint business of the instant development project in gross income.

④ 이 사건 개발사업에 관한 원고와 이 사건 지방자치단체들의 지분 또는 손익분배비율에 관한 구체적인 약정을 인정할 증거가 없다. 이에 대하여 원고는 다시 이 사건 협약 제8조의 '사업지구 내 사용', '당해 시 지역', '사업면적 등 감안' 등의 문구 및 이 사건 개발이익 중 일부를 지방자치단체 사업 소요비용으로 지원한 내역 등에 비추어 보면 이 사건 개발이익의 실제 분배는 원고를 제외한 이 사건 지방자치단체들 사이에서 사업부지 내 관할 면적비율을 주된 기준으로 하였으므로 손익분배약정을 인정할 수 있다고 주장하나, 이 사건 개발이익을 이 사건 지방자치단체들의 면적 비율로 귀속시키기로 하는 합의의 존재를 인정할 증거도 부족하다.

(5) Article 7, etc. of the former Housing Site Development Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 8852 of Feb. 29, 2008) cannot be deemed to be a joint project operator under Article 7, etc. of the same Act, and thus, it cannot be deemed that each share of the government is liable to pay tax. The sole fact that the government was designated as a joint project operator or obtained authorization, cannot be readily concluded

(6) Ultimately, the Plaintiff and the instant local governments take the form of a joint project operator under the instant agreement to avoid restrictions under the relevant provisions, such as the instant local governments’ contribution burden. The substance of the development project is to proceed with the instant development project at their own expense, such as raising funds, and to vest the Plaintiff with the preferential interest and expenses, and if the instant development gains occur, it appears that the agreement was reached to divert the instant development gains to the construction cost of public facilities to be borne by the instant

7) If the Plaintiff’s development gains accrued to the Plaintiff and deemed ex post to have been used for the instant local government pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention, the agreement of this case is null and void, contrary to Article 5(1) of the Act on the Collection and Use of Donations (hereinafter “Donations Act”) and Article 103 of the Civil Act. However, the Plaintiff asserts that the agreement of this case is null and void, considering the pertinent local government’s adequate amount of investment gains through consultation with the pertinent local government around November 2010, it is difficult to view the portion of the development gains of this case as the donation under the Act on the Collection and Use of Donations.

(c) Claim for the determination of assets at the rate of construction progress, including charges;

1) In relation to the instant development project, the Plaintiff disbursed approximately KRW 1.32 billion in total of various charges in the business year 2008, approximately KRW 1.338 billion in the business year 2009, and the said charges fall under the cost of construction directly related to the instant development project, and thus, the rate of work progress should be calculated based on the estimated total construction cost reflecting the said charges. In this case, each disposition of the instant case is unlawful as it exceeds the legitimate amount of tax.

2) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the pleadings as to Gap evidence No. 55, the plaintiff paid approximately KRW 1.320 billion in the business year 2008, approximately KRW 1.33,38.3 billion in the business year 2009 as various charges, such as transmission cable installation, urban gas removal construction, waste charges, etc., and the plaintiff and the defendant calculated the work progress rate based on the scheduled total construction cost excluded from various charges.

Article 69(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act and Article 34(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provide that, in cases of construction, etc., the contract period of which is not less than one year, to ensure that the estimated total construction cost calculated based on the cost estimated at the time of the contract coincides with the estimated construction cost per actual cost, the total cumulative construction cost incurred by the end of the pertinent business year until the business year including the date of its delivery shall be calculated by dividing the total construction cost by the total construction cost as the estimated cost, i.e., the calculation of earnings and expenses according to the rate of work progress. Considering the legislative intent and text of the above provision, even if the construction cost is included in the construction cost, it is reasonable to take into account the calculation of the rate of work progress. However, even if various charges paid by the Plaintiff are included in the construction cost, the payment period shall not be determined by the statutes or by the agreement with the recipient of the charges, so the Plaintiff’s assertion is not acceptable.

(d) argument that the re-audit decision has binding force

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant’s correction disposition against the Plaintiff on November 1, 2013, among each of the instant dispositions, was unlawful in violation of the purport of the re-audit decision.

Article 81 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 14382, Dec. 20, 2016) provides that "Article 65 of the Framework Act on National Taxes shall apply mutatis mutandis to a request for a trial." Article 80 (1) and (2) provides that "a decision under Article 65 applicable mutatis mutandis in Article 81 shall be binding on the relevant administrative agency, and when a decision is made with respect to a request for a trial, the relevant administrative agency shall immediately take necessary measures in accordance with the purport of the decision." Article 65 (1) 3 provides that "where a request for a trial is recognized as well as reasonable, the cancellation or correction of the disposition which is the object of the request or the decision on necessary disposition shall be made." The decision of re-examination, which is made in practice as a type of the decision on the request for a trial, constitutes a change in the outcome of re-audit of the disposition by the administrative agency as to the matters pointed out in the decision of the ruling agency, and thus, it shall be deemed that the subsequent disposition should be made (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Du15.

Comprehensively taking account of the developments leading up to the dispositions recognized in the judgment of the first instance court cited by this court, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, and Eul evidence No. 11, the Tax Tribunal rendered a re-audit decision to the effect that "on December 16, 2015, after re-auditing whether the development gains of this case constitute losses corresponding to the sale in lots pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention, the tax Tribunal shall rectify the tax base and tax amount for the pertinent business year according to the results of re-audit," and that the mid-term regional tax office notified the plaintiff that the initial disposition was justifiable as a result of re-audit on February 19, 2016 after re-audit from January 22, 2016 to February 5, 2016.

Furthermore, according to the re-audit report (Evidence 11), it is difficult for the Central Tax Office to re-examine the development gains of this case to identify the development gains of this case as the progress rate of sale of land available for profit during 2008, 209, and estimate 80% of the development gains of this case as the development gains. ② The development gains of this case in accordance with the joint implementers’ meeting during 2010 and 201 were self-determined as 41 billion won. ③ The development gains of this case were calculated as 8 out of the external service report on June 2012, 2012, including the first proposal, 30 billion won of the development gains of this case were calculated as 200 billion won of the development gains of this case, and the possibility of changing the sale gains of this case to 300 billion won of the development gains of this case to 300 billion won of the development gains of this case to 300 billion won of the development gains of this case to 300 billion won of the development gains of this case.

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant conducted a reinvestigation according to the purport of the Review Decision by the Tax Tribunal and maintained the initial disposition according to the results thereof. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant disposition violates the binding force of the

4. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim shall be dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit. The judgment of the first instance court with the same conclusion is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.