2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning for the court's explanation on this case is as follows, except for the case that the plaintiff claims in the court of the first instance, and it is also accepted by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Additional matters to be determined;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The invalidity of the first, second, and second, corrective measures in this case

Article 2(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that a taxpayer who is not a taxpayer shall be liable to pay tax due to a significant defect in the basic elements of the taxation requirement. The first revision is based on the premise that the taxpayer of the value-added tax related to the tax invoice of this case is D well-being, but there is no ground for this. In other words, the tax invoice of this case shall be paid advance payment of construction cost under the construction contract of this case and issued by CCC Construction on December 30, 209, and then on June 29, 2010, the tax invoice of this case cannot be issued again from CCC Construction when it reached an agreement on the settlement of accounts concerning CCC Construction and construction (hereinafter referred to as “1 transaction”). It is clear that D well-being was not subject to the principle of no taxation without law and without law and without law and without law, Article 20(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes (hereinafter referred to as “D 200 or 201).

2) Effects of appropriation of national tax refund of 000 won

In light of the fact that the second correction disposition was conducted at the time of legitimate transfer request, and that the head of the Suwon Tax Office did not notify the plaintiff of the fact of the second correction disposition, and that the head of the Suwon Tax Office sent the second correction disposition to the D well-being that could not be served normally because the business was actually discontinued, and that the second correction disposition was made at the time of the second correction disposition, the appropriation of the national tax refund amounting to KRW 117,477,580 and its additional appropriation for additional payment for the tax refund accrued at the time of the second correction disposition, and the Plaintiff, the transferee, as a result, would result in the collection of the tax claim for the property that is not owned by the transferor.

3) A disposition imposing value-added tax for the second period of 2010 on DNA well-being was void.

In the trust contract, other beneficiaries than the truster have been designated as the beneficiary and the proceeds of the trust accrue to the beneficiary (hereinafter referred to as "other profit trust"), and the benefits and expenses incurred from the management and disposal of the trust property are ultimately reverted to the beneficiary within the scope within which the beneficiary's rights are affected, and in such a case, the business operator and the taxpayer of value-added tax must be regarded as the beneficiary, not the truster. The construction project of this case was conducted by lending the project expenses to the project implementer including the plaintiff, and then trust to Korea Land Trust Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Korea Land Trust"), which made the loans to the financial institution including the plaintiff, as the priority beneficiary, for the security of the loan claims. Since approval for use was made on June 2009 but the project implementer was unable to perform its obligation, the Plaintiff demanded to dispose of the above trust property to the trustee's land, and the Plaintiff was also subject to disposition of value-added tax on the transfer of the trust property of this case 20,000,000,000.

B. Determination

O For the following reasons, the Plaintiff’s above assertion is without merit.

1) There are objective circumstances to regard the taxpayer for the first transaction as D well-being, and whether it is subject to taxation can be identified only after accurately investigating the facts. In addition, the first and second dispositions in this case cannot be deemed as invalid as a matter of course.

국세기본법 제14조 제1항은 과세의 대상이 되는 소득， 수익， 재산， 행위 또는 거래 의 귀속이 명의일 뿐이고 사실상 귀속되는 자가 따로 있을 때에는 사실상 귀속되는 자 를 납세의무자로 하여 세법을 적용한다고 규정하고 있다. 위 규정이 천명하고 있는 실질과세의 원칙은 헌법상의 기본이념인 평등의 원칙을 조세법률관계에 구현하기 위한 실천적 원리로서， 조세의 부담을 회피할 목적으로 과세 요건사실에 관하여 실질과 괴리되는 비합리적인 형식이나 외관을 취하는 경우에 그 형식이나 외관에 불구하고 실질에 따라 담세력이 있는 곳에 과세함으로써 부당한 조세회피행위를 규제하고 과세의 형평을 제고하여 조세정의를 실현하고자 하는 데 주된 목적이 있다. 이는 조세법의 기본원리인 조세법률주의와 대립관계에 있는 것이 아니라 조세법규를 다양하게 변화하는 경제생활관계에 적용함에 있어 예측가능성과 법적 안정성이 훼손되지 않는 범위 내에서 합목적적이고 탄력적으로 해석함으로써 조세법률주의의 형해화를 막고 실효성을 확보한다는 점에서 조세법률주의와 상호보완적이고 불가분적인 관계에 있다고 할 것이다. 이러한 실질과세의 원칙 중 위 국세기본법 제14조 제1항이 규정하고 있는 실질귀속자 과세의 원칙은 소득이나 수익， 재산， 거래 등의 과세대상에 관하여 그 귀속 명의 와 달리 실질적으로 귀속되는 자가 따로 있는 경우에는 형식이나 외관을 이유로 그 귀속 명의자를 납세의무자로 삼을 것이 아니라 실질적으로 귀속되는 자를 납세의무자로 삼겠다는 것이다. 따라서 당해 재산의 귀속 명의자는 이를 지배ㆍ관리할 능력이 없고 그 명의자에 대한 지배권 등을 통하여 실질적으로 이를 지배ㆍ관리하는 자가 따로 있으며，그와 같은 명의와 실질의 괴리가 위 규정의 적용을 회피할 목적에서 비롯된 경우에는，당해 재산은 실질적으로 이를 지배ㆍ관리하는 자에게 귀속된 것으로 보아 그를 납세의 무자로 삼아야 할 것이다. 그리고 그 경우에 해당하는지는 당해 재산의 취득 경위와 목적， 취득자금의 출처， 그 관리와 처분과정， 귀속명의자의 능력과 그에 대한 지배관계 등 제반 사정을 종합적으로 고려하여 판단하여야 할 것이다(대법원 2012. 1. 19. 선고 2008두8499 전원합의 체 판결 참조). 이 사건에 관하여 보건대， 원고의 주장과 같이 제1거래가 BBB레포츠와 CCC건설 사이에서 이루어진 것이라고 하더라도，앞서 인정한 것처럼 BBB레포츠와 DDD웰빙은 모두 김LL이 실질적으로 운영에 관여하고 있는 회사로서[김LL은 이 사건 워터파크 건립사업의 시행자로서 이 사건 워터파크 건물을 BBB레포츠에 매도한 주식회사 BBB리조트(이하 'BBB리조트'라 한다)의 대표이사이기도 하다)，DDD웰빙은 2010. 4. 23. BBB레포츠로부터 이 사건 워터파크 건립사업에 관한 BBB레포츠의 권리를 양수하는 이 사건 자산양수도계약을 체결한 점，위 계약상 양수도의 대상은 '신탁 계약에 따른 수익권과 그에 부수하는 모든 권리(계약변경권 및 신탁해지권을 포함하나. 그 에 한하지 아니한다) 및 위 신탁부동산에 관한 매매계약상의 권리'(밑줄은 편의상 덧붙인다)로 되어 있어 이 사건 워터파크 건립사업에 관한 포괄적인 권리의 이전형태에 더 가깝다고 보이고，위 자산양수도계약에 대한 부가가치세 신고도 없었던 점(부가가치세법 제6조 제6항 제2호，같은 법 시행령 제17조 제2항은 사업에 관한 모든 권리와 의무를 포괄적으로 승계시키는 사업의 양도를 재화의 양도에서 제외하여 비과세대상으로 하고 있다)，제1거래는 이 사건 자산양수도계약 후인 2010. 6. 29. BBB레포츠가 CCC건설과 위 워터 파크 실내인테리어 공사에 관하여 타절정산 합의를 한 것으로서 당시 BBB레포츠는 이 사건 워터파크 건립사업에 관한 권리 대부분을 이미 DDD웰빙에 양도한 후인 점，김LL은 2011. 1.경 피고에게 자신이 BBB레포츠와 DDD웰빙을 실질적으로 모두 경영하였고，이 사건 세금계산서를 DDD웰빙이 아닌 BBB레포츠가 수취한 것은 사실과 다르다는 취지의 확인서(을 제19호증)를 작성ㆍ교부한 점 등의 제반 사정에 다가 앞서 본 실질귀속자 과세의 원칙을 보태어 보면，피고로서는 DDD웰빙이 제1거래 당시 이 사건 워터파크 건립사업에 관한 실질적 권리자로서 이 사건 세금계산서의 실질적인 수취인이 되어야 한다고 판단할 만한 객관적인 사정이 있다고 할 것이고，나아가 DDD웰빙이 실질적인 과세대상자인지 여부는 그 사실관계를 정확히 조사하여야 비로소 밝혀질 수 있는 경우임이 분명하므로，이 사건 제1경정처분 및 그에 따른 이 사건 제2경정처분은 그 하자가 중대하고 명백하여 무효라고 볼 수 없다. 원고의 이 부 분 주장은 이유 없다.

2) The appropriation of the national tax refund of KRW 000 is valid as it is simultaneously constituted with the confirmation of the national tax refund claims.

As seen earlier, the validity of a refund and appropriation should be determined on the basis of whether the Defendant, who received the request from the Plaintiff, promptly appropriated the national tax refund claim when it became final and conclusive. As seen earlier, the part of the national tax refund 000 won was determined by the second revision of the instant case on January 5, 2012, which became final and conclusive as a national tax refund only once, and the Defendant immediately appropriated the refund and additional refund on the refund on the same day for the second time of 2010 value-added tax for which D wellet was in arrears, and it is valid as the refund and additional refund on the refund were made without delay from the time when D wellet was final and conclusive. As so claimed by the Plaintiff, the validity of the appropriation cannot be denied solely on the ground that the Defendant did not notify the Plaintiff of the corrective disposition. The Plaintiff’s allegation

3) It is difficult to view that the imposition of value-added tax for the second period of 2010 on DD well-being was null and void.

(a)a fact of recognition;

O) On September 3, 2008, the BBL representative Kim LL, the implementer of the instant resort construction project, was loaned KRW 22 billion from the Plaintiff on September 3, 2008, and when the Plaintiff gives written notice of the transfer of the right to implement the project due to the occurrence of the nonperformance under the said loan agreement, the Plaintiff prepared and issued a written notice of the transfer of the right to implement the project to the person designated by the Plaintiff without any condition of the said right to implement the project.

(O) On June 29, 2009, the Korea Land Trust entered into a real estate security trust agreement in which the instant high-frequency building is entrusted, and the above contract sets the first beneficiary as the number of creditors, etc., and the beneficiary as BB interest trust agreement in which the debtor is the loan, and the right of the first beneficiary to the trust principal and trust proceeds in trust real estate shall take precedence over the truster's right to benefit (Article 3 of the special agreement), and the first beneficiary's profit limit is set (Article 7 of the contract), and the priority beneficiary's profit limit is set (Article 7 of the contract), and the trust real estate can be disposed of even before the expiration of the trust period at the request of the first beneficiary (Article 18 (1) of the contract and Articles 5 and 12 of the special agreement).

O) After that, the plaintiff sent a peremptory notice to the effect that the business fund was added to BBrit on April 15, 2010, and the plaintiff, on September 2, 2010, requested seizure of the business site, provisional seizure, and cancellation of provisional disposition based on the above loan agreement, but failed to implement it.

O) On the other hand, on December 22, 2010 with respect to the above collateral trust agreement, the truster entered into a contract for the change of the trust and the change of the ledger to the BBriart and the beneficiary and the debtor into a DD well-being.

C. On January 4, 2011, the Plaintiff requested to dispose of the trust real estate to K Leisure as the truster, beneficiary, and debtor's default loss due to provisional disposition and provisional attachment since it was impossible to fulfill the contractual obligation of the BB interest management company, and the construction was suspended, and the trust real estate has been disposed of to K Leisure, and the sale was made on January 12, 201, and the ownership transfer registration for the trust real estate has been completed. The Plaintiff paid the value-added tax following the above sale on April 201.

Around January 201, 201, the O KimL prepared and issued a written confirmation to the Defendant that “A person, as the actual representative of DD well-being, transferred all rights to the instant warranty to the Plaintiff according to the highest order on September 2, 2010, due to the occurrence of the Plaintiff’s nonperformance of obligation as the Plaintiff’s actual representative of D well-being.”

O In the case of a trust with other profits, where the right of use, profit-making, disposal, etc. of the trust property (actual control right) is transferred to the truster under the conditions prescribed by the relevant trust contract and special agreement, the truster shall be deemed to have supplied the goods to the beneficiary and shall be subject to value-added tax, and on March 3, 2011, the value of the supply of the goods shall be deemed to be KRW 00,00, the average appraised value of the building at the instant warranty, and accordingly, the defendant imposed value-added tax for the second period of 2010.

[Based on recognition] 3-5 of Gap evidence 13, Gap evidence 114, Eul evidence 5-1-5, Eul evidence 21-28, and the purport of the whole pleadings

B)Judgment

The gist of the plaintiff's assertion is that the taxpayer of value-added tax should be the beneficiary, not the truster, in the case of ice trust, and that since the plaintiff, who is the first beneficiary, demanded the disposal of real estate held in a trust to the trustee, the disposition of value-added tax for the second period of 2010, which is the truster, is null and void. However, it is clear that the plaintiff, who is the first beneficiary, has the right to obtain the loan from the trust principal as stipulated in the trust agreement, and it is clear that the plaintiff, as the first beneficiary and the first beneficiary, has the right to obtain the loan from the trust principal, and it is not clear that the plaintiff, as the first beneficiary, has the right to obtain the loan from the truster and the first beneficiary, even after the transfer of the right to the above real estate, and that the transfer of the right to the above real estate should be applied to the plaintiff, the first beneficiary, and that the transfer of the right to taxation for the real estate should be determined by the court's decision that the transfer of the right to the trust property should be determined by the first beneficiary.

3. Conclusion

The judgment of the court of first instance is justifiable, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.