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(영문) 서울행정법원 2012.6.15. 선고 2011구단24999 판결

장해연금수급권소멸및부지급처분취소청구

Cases

2011Guern 24999 Demanding the termination of entitlement to disability pension and revocation of a disposition to revoke payment.

Plaintiff

A

Defendant

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Conclusion of Pleadings

May 25, 2012

Imposition of Judgment

June 15, 2012

Text

1. On November 2, 2010, the Defendant’s disposition to extinguish the entitlement to a disability pension and the disposition to pay a site for a disability pension against the Plaintiff is revoked.

2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

Purport of claim

The same is as the order (it appears that November 1, 2010 stated in the written complaint's purport of the claim seems to be a clerical error).

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On March 19, 2005, the Plaintiff, a worker who belongs to B, suffered from occupational accidents, and received medical care benefits by April 9, 2005 under the Defendant’s approval. After the treatment was closed, the Plaintiff filed a claim for disability compensation with the Defendant for disability compensation at Grade VII, and received a disability compensation annuity from May 1, 2005 to October 31, 2010.

B. On October 28, 2010, based on Article 58 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 8694, Dec. 14, 2007; hereinafter “Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act”) on the ground that the Defendant’s right to receive the Plaintiff’s disability compensation annuity was extinguished as of November 1, 2010, and thus, the Defendant rendered the instant disposition that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the Plaintiff’s disability compensation annuity, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s right to receive the Plaintiff’s disability compensation annuity was extinguished as of November 1, 2010.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence No. 1, the whole purport of the pleading

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The parties' assertion

1) The plaintiff's assertion

A) According to Article 21(2) of the Addenda of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8694, Dec. 14, 2007), the Plaintiff falls under a person who received disability compensation annuities under the previous provisions at the time of the enforcement of the amended Act and is subject to re-determination of disability grade under Article 59 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. Thus, the Defendant’s disposition based on the premise that the above provision is applied to

B) The Plaintiff did not receive additional medical care in relation to the instant occupational accident, and solely received a sex surgery at the Plaintiff’s expense. However, despite such surgery, the Plaintiff still remains 5 m or more of the margin of the conversation’s e.g., a well-known chest in the appearance, to the extent that the other party to the conversation can be identified. The instant disposition on a different premise is unlawful.

2) The defendant's assertion

The Plaintiff’s entitlement to disability compensation annuity was extinguished, since the Plaintiff’s first medical care was terminated and received a disability compensation annuity, and the state of disability was improved and the disability was excluded from the beneficiary of disability compensation annuity due to the change of the disability grade stipulated in Article 58 subparag. 4 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.

In addition, there is a change of circumstances in which it is no longer necessary to maintain the original disability compensation annuity payment disposition due to the change of the Plaintiff’s disability grade, and the Defendant has the right to withdraw the original disposition.

Therefore, the instant disposition is lawful on the premise that the right to receive a disability compensation annuity was extinguished, or on the premise that the Defendant withdraws the original disposition against the Plaintiff.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

1) According to Article 6 of the Addenda to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8694, Dec. 14, 2007), the amended provisions of Articles 57 through 60 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act concerning the termination of entitlement to disability compensation annuities shall apply from the person who caused a cause to claim disability benefits after the enforcement of this Act." Thus, the above amended provisions do not apply to those who completed and recovered medical care before the enforcement of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, such as the Plaintiff in this case.

On the other hand, if the amended Act is a whole amendment, it is the same as the repeal of the existing Act and the enactment of a new Act, and therefore, the transitional provisions of the previous Act as well as the supplementary provisions of the previous Act shall be deemed to be null and void in principle. However, even if there is no such provision, the transitional provisions of the previous Act shall be deemed null and void in principle, or even if there is no such provision, it shall remain effective only where there are special circumstances to deem that the previous transitional provisions are null and void without being null and void, by comprehensively taking into account the legislative background and purport of the previous transitional provisions, the legislative intent and overall structure of the whole amended Act, whether there is a legal gap, and all other circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du27919, Mar. 29, 2012).

However, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act does not provide for the case where a beneficiary who acquired the right to receive a disability compensation annuity before the enforcement of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, dies after the enforcement of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, or is excluded from the eligibility for a disability compensation annuity due to a change in the state of disability. As such, in such a case, Article 41 of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8694, Dec. 14, 2007; hereinafter referred to as the "former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act") and Article 31-2 subparagraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 20875, Jun. 25, 2008) are still applicable.

Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of each of the above old laws, we examine whether the plaintiff's condition of disability is excluded from the object of disability benefit payment.

In light of the following facts: (a) the steam 1, 2, 1, 2, and 3 of the evidence Nos. 5-1, 5-2, and 1, 2, and 3 (including each number), the court can find the fact that the above steam 5-1, 2, 2, and 3 remains in line 5-meter or more of the length to the extent that the other party to the conversation can be identified even if it is not to give a sense of aversion to the plaintiff’s face, based on the time when the argument

However, Article 42(2) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act; Article 31(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act

[Attachment 2] According to the criteria for determining a disability grade by physical parts of Article 42 [Attachment 4] of the table of physical disability and the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (wholly amended by Ordinance of Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 304 of July 1, 2008), where there is a well-known margin of not less than 5 cm in length of the Plaintiff, which remains in the Plaintiff, falls under Grade 7 subparag. 12 of the disability grade.

Ultimately, according to the above laws and regulations, the Plaintiff’s entitlement to disability compensation annuity is not extinguished because the Plaintiff’s condition of disability is changed and excluded from the eligibility for disability compensation annuity payment.

2) On the other hand, as the defendant asserts that even though there was no particular defect at the time of the disposition, and there was no separate legal ground for the withdrawal of the disposition after the disposition, the disposition agency which conducted an administrative act may withdraw it as a separate administrative act which would lose its effect in the event of a change of circumstances where it is no longer necessary to continue the original disposition, or where it is necessary for the

(See Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1194 delivered on June 9, 1995). In addition, according to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes such as the Industrial Accident Insurance Act at the time of the instant disposition, the disability condition remaining in the Plaintiff at the time of the closing of argument in the instant case falls short of the disability grade No. 7 subject to the payment of disability pension.

However, when revoking or withdrawing a beneficial administrative disposition or suspending it, it is an infringement on the vested rights of the people already granted. Thus, even if there are grounds such as revocation, the exercise of the right to cancel shall be determined by comparing and comparing with the disadvantage that the other party receives, only when it is necessary for the important public interest to justify the infringement of the vested rights or when it is necessary to protect the interests of a third party. If the disposition causes enormous disadvantages that the other party would suffer than the necessity of the public interest, it is unlawful in itself (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du17018, Apr. 8, 2010), and the legislators shall decide on the possibility of the existence of the previous disposition in amending the relevant applicable laws and regulations, and if not, in principle, it shall not affect the continuity of the disposition in accordance with the legality principle of the administration and the legal stability principle.

In addition, according to the relevant laws and regulations applicable to the Plaintiff, there is no reason to change the initial disposition against the Plaintiff when applying to the Plaintiff. In the case of the remaining chest, the legislators usually set the criteria for disability grade, taking into account these circumstances, and the Defendant should have determined the disability grade under these circumstances (if the initial disposition did not take into account the effects of the sex surgery when performing the sex surgery as medical care benefits and the symptoms were fixed, the Defendant should have determined the disability grade by considering the treatment under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act when considering that there was no reason to change the original disposition against the Plaintiff. Even if the Defendant considered that the sex surgery was cured before the sex surgery, it is difficult to consider that there was no reason to change the original disposition against the Plaintiff, but to consider that there was no need to change the Plaintiff’s disability grade as a result of the surgery, and that it is difficult to consider that there was no need to change the Plaintiff’s disability grade with the result of the surgery to cancel the first sex surgery at his own expense. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that there was no reason to consider the Plaintiff’s disability grade of the Plaintiff’s new treatment.

3) Therefore, the instant disposition, based on the premise that the Plaintiff was excluded from the recipients of disability pension due to a change in the state of disability or that a change in circumstances occurred in the original disposition, was unlawful.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, we decide to accept the plaintiff's claim and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

Judge Lee Ho-hoon

Attached Form

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.