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orange_flag(영문) 서울행법 2016. 9. 30. 선고 2015구합77189 판결

[사증발급거부처분취소] 항소[각공2016하,668]

Main Issues

In a case where: (a) the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration requested prohibition of entry to a person who lost the citizenship of the Republic of Korea by acquiring U.S. citizenship; (b) the Minister of Justice requested prohibition of entry on the grounds that “A was practically exempted from military service by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and (c) Party A applied for a visa to the head of an overseas diplomatic mission abroad (F-4); and (d) refused to issue the

Summary of Judgment

In a case where: (a) the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration requested prohibition of entry to a person who lost the citizenship of the Republic of Korea by acquiring the citizenship of the United States; (b) the Minister of Justice requested prohibition of entry to the head of an overseas diplomatic mission abroad to issue a visa for overseas Koreans (F-4); and (c) Gap applied for and refused to do so, the case holding that: (a) Gap acquired the citizenship of the United States to evade the duty of military service as a citizen of the Republic of Korea; and (b) it is deemed that Gap had acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Korea to evade the duty of military service; (c) if Gap continues to engage in broadcasting and entertainment activities after entering the Republic of Korea, it is likely to undermine the morale of the soldiers of the Republic of Korea; and (d) it would compromise the will of the performance of the duty of military service; and (d) it would endanger the preservation of territory; and (d) it constitutes a violation of the principle of prohibition of entry under Article 39(1) of the Immigration Control Act or the principle of proportionality under Article 18(1)4(2) of the Immigration Control Act.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 8(2) and (3), Article 11(1)3, 4, and 8 of the Immigration Control Act, Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act, Article 5(2) of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans

Plaintiff

Plaintiff (Law Firm Sejong et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Major consul General of Sgegeles (Government Law Firm, Attorneys Yju-ju et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

August 12, 2016

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The defendant's disposition rejecting the issuance of a visa against the plaintiff on September 2, 2015 is revoked.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. The plaintiff was born in the Republic of Korea on December 15, 1976 and acquired U.S. citizenship on January 18, 2002, and lost the nationality of the Republic of Korea on the same day. The defendant is the head of diplomatic missions delegated by the Minister of Justice with the authority to issue visas.

B. On January 28, 2002, the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration requested the Minister of Justice on January 28, 2002 that “if the Plaintiff wants to enter the Republic of Korea as an overseas Korean qualification, he shall not engage in profit-making activities, such as employment, taking-off activities, etc., in Korea, and if it is impossible, he shall prohibit entry itself from being prohibited.”

C. On February 1, 2002, the Minister of Justice decided to prohibit the Plaintiff’s entry pursuant to Article 11(1)3, 4, and 8 of the Immigration Control Act (hereinafter “instant entry prohibition measure”).

D. On August 27, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for a visa to issue an overseas Korean (F-4) qualification.

E. On September 2, 2015, the Defendant’s employee notified Nonparty 1, 1, who was Nonparty 1, to the Plaintiff, that “the Plaintiff constitutes a person subject to immigration control and the issuance of a visa was denied.” The detailed reasons are as follows, and returned the passport and the application for visa issuance to the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant refusal”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4, Eul evidence No. 1 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment on the main defense of this case

A. Summary of the main defense

1) Article 5(1) of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereinafter “Overseas Koreans Act”) does not have the right to request a foreigner to issue a visa to the Republic of Korea, and Article 5(1) of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereinafter “overseas Koreans Act”) is only a provision on the grant of status of overseas Koreans, and it cannot be deemed that the right to apply for a visa is granted to overseas Koreans or that the administrative agency is not subject to the duty to issue a visa. Therefore, the refusal of the Plaintiff’s refusal to issue a visa is merely a notification of the concept informing “the fact that the issuance of

2) There is no provision guaranteeing the freedom of entry into the Republic of Korea to foreigners, and visa-related provisions are only the provisions on procedures, not the rights to obtain a visa from foreigners or legal interests, and the benefits arising from the issuance of a visa are merely the anti-private interests, and thus, there is no standing to sue to seek revocation of the refusal of the instant case

3) Even if the refusal of this case was revoked, the Plaintiff cannot obtain a visa due to the validity of the measure of prohibition of entry, and even if a visa was issued, it is impossible to realize the purpose of the instant lawsuit as the Plaintiff could not enter the Republic of Korea, and thus, there is no interest in the lawsuit.

4) Therefore, the instant lawsuit seeking revocation of the instant refusal is unlawful.

B. Whether the refusal of this case is qualified as an appeal litigation

If an administrative agency’s refusal of a certain person’s affirmative filing of an application constitutes an administrative disposition that is subject to appeal litigation, the filing of the application must be an exercise of public authority or an equivalent administrative action, and the refusal must cause any change in the applicant’s legal relationship, and the person must have the right to file an application in accordance with the law or sound reasoning to demand that the applicant act. Furthermore, the existence of a right to file an application that serves as a premise for recognizing a disposition of rejection must be determined abstractly without considering who is the applicant in a specific case, and the applicant’s right to file an application does not mean the right to obtain the satisfactory result of accepting an application exceeding the right to receive a simple response in accordance with the application. Thus, if a certain person makes an application and it appears that an individual’s right to file an administrative action is recognized under the interpretation of the provision that provides the basis for the application, such refusal shall be deemed a disposition that becomes the subject of appeal litigation, and it shall be determined specifically whether the application can be accepted (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du3680, Sept. 27, 2009).

Article 1 of the Overseas Koreans Act provides that the purpose of Article 1 is to guarantee overseas Koreans the entry into and departure from the Republic of Korea, and Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Overseas Koreans Act provides that those prescribed by the Presidential Decree from among those who, having held or have acquired the nationality of the Republic of Korea as their lineal descendants, or those who have acquired the nationality of the Republic of Korea as their lineal descendants shall be "overseas Koreans" (hereinafter referred to as "overseas Koreans"). Article 4 provides that overseas Koreans shall be provided with necessary support so that they may not be subject to unfair regulation and treatment in the Republic of Korea. Article 5 provides that overseas Koreans may be granted the status of overseas Koreans upon request (paragraph (1)), the Minister of Justice provides that overseas Koreans may be granted the status of overseas Koreans (paragraph (2)), such as the acquisition of foreign nationality for the purpose of evading military service, and concerns that the status of overseas Koreans shall be harmed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (paragraph (4)).

In full view of the legislative purport of the Overseas Koreans Act, the status of a foreign nationality Korean, and the fact that Article 5 of the Overseas Koreans Act directly prescribes the passive requirements and requires consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to grant the status of stay, unlike other status of stay, unlike other status of stay, it is reasonable to deem that the Overseas Koreans Act gives a foreign nationality Korean the right to apply for a visa to obtain the visa for overseas Koreans by treating the visa differently from a foreign nationality Korean merely, and depending on whether the application is rejected or not, there is a change in the legal relationship of the applicant. Thus, the refusal of this case, which refused to apply for a visa by the plaintiff who has the right to apply for a visa under the laws and regulations on the issuance of the visa, constitutes a disposition subject to appeal, not a mere notification of fact, but a disposition subject to appeal.

C. Whether the plaintiff has standing to sue to seek revocation of the refusal of this case

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s right to file an application under the laws and regulations on the issuance of visa is recognized, and the Plaintiff is directly the other party to the instant refusal, and thus, the Plaintiff is entitled to file a claim to revoke the instant refusal. The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff’s interest in the issuance of visa is not a legal interest but a reflective interest. However, the legal interest is merely a standard for determining the standing to sue of a third party, who is not

D. Whether there is a benefit in a lawsuit

As the plaintiff's assertion, if the defect in the measure of prohibition of entry in this case falls under a case where the defect is serious and clear, or where there is a defect that is merely a ground for revocation of the measure of prohibition of entry in this case, it constitutes exceptional cases where the defect is succeeded to the refusal in this case, the plaintiff can enter the Republic of Korea by obtaining a valid visa due to the revocation of the refusal in this case, and thus, the defendant's assertion that the lawsuit in this case

E. Therefore, the defendant's main defense is without merit.

3. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(i) procedural defects;

Article 23(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act provides that an administrative agency shall, in principle, present the grounds and reasons for a disposition to the relevant party when rendering such a disposition, and Article 24(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act provides that an administrative agency shall, in principle, provide that the relevant administrative agency shall take a written measure when rendering such disposition. Nevertheless, on September 2, 2015, the Defendant notified Nonparty 1, who was the Plaintiff’s father, of the fact that “the Plaintiff constitutes a person subject to the entry control and the issuance of a visa was denied” by wire, and the Defendant did not sufficiently present the relevant facts of the grounds for the disposition and the relevant statutes, and did not issue any document, thereby violating Article 23(1) and Article

Article 5(3) of the Overseas Koreans Act and Article 4(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that when granting status of sojourn as overseas Korean, a consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be made. However, the defendant violated Article 5(3) of the Overseas Koreans Act and Article 4(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act by refusing to issue a visa to the plaintiff on the sole ground that the plaintiff constitutes a person subject to prohibition of entry.

2) Non-existence of grounds for disposition

Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act that allows an applicant for the issuance of a visa to examine whether the applicant for the issuance of a visa is eligible for the prohibition of entry in the issuance of a visa is also not applicable to overseas Koreans (F-4). Therefore, Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the above Enforcement Rule does not apply to the issuance of the Plaintiff’s visa, who is an overseas Korean, and the Plaintiff does not fall under the grounds for refusal of the status of sojourn as overseas Korean under each subparagraph of Article 5(2) of the Overseas Koreans Act, but does not fall under the subject of the visa regulation prescribed by the Ministry of Justice’s guidelines for the handling of immigration affairs on August 2008.

Even if the provision on the requirements for visa issuance under the Immigration Control Act applies to the issuance of the visa to overseas Koreans, it is unclear whether the plaintiff constitutes the person subject to the visa entry prohibition at the time of the refusal of the case. ② The Minister of Justice does not premise the notification to the person subject to the prohibition of entry prohibition, which does not fall under the provision of information inside the administrative agency that did not satisfy the external requirements for the prohibition of entry and does not have any effect on the refusal of the case. ③ Even if the disposition of the prohibition of entry was taken, the procedural defect in the procedure that did not deliver the document without notifying the grounds for the disposition to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's entry and entertainment activities do not constitute the grounds for the prohibition of entry under Article 11 (1) 3, 4, and 8 of the Immigration Control Act, which do not constitute a defect that does not exist any grounds for the prohibition of entry, in violation of the principle of proportionality and the principle of equality. ④ Even if the defect of the measure of the prohibition of entry in this case is merely a ground for revocation, the rejection of the binding force or binding force of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the rejection of this case is illegal as it does not have any ground for disposition.

(iii) deviation from and abuse of discretionary power;

Even if the grounds for the disposition of the refusal of this case are recognized, the refusal of this case violates the principle of proportionality due to the appropriateness of the method, the minimum of damage, and the balance of the legal interests, and is in violation of the principle of equality, and is in violation of the principle of equality, and

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(i) the existence of procedural defects

A) As to the violation of Articles 23(1) and 24(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act

Article 3(2)9 of the Administrative Procedures Act and Article 2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Administrative Procedures Act provide that the Administrative Procedures Act shall not apply to the disposition regarding entry and departure of foreigners, recognition of refugee status, naturalization, and reinstatement of nationality. Since the disposition of refusal to issue visas falls under the disposition concerning entry and departure of foreigners, it cannot be deemed that the refusal of this case is unlawful even if the defendant did not follow the procedure under the Administrative Procedures Act in the course of refusal of this case.

The plaintiff asserts that the rejection of this case does not constitute a disposition that is deemed difficult or unnecessary to undergo administrative procedures due to its nature, or a disposition that requires procedures equivalent to administrative procedures, and thus, the application of the Administrative Procedures Act is not excluded. However, the above provision that excludes the application of the Administrative Procedures Act with respect to matters concerning entry and departure of foreigners is not a citizen but a foreigner. In the case of matters concerning entry and departure of foreigners, the Minister of Justice in charge of the entry and departure of foreigners, the heads of diplomatic missions abroad, the head of immigration office, etc. are granted a wide range of discretion, and in the case of affairs concerning the issuance of visas at overseas diplomatic missions located in a foreign country, it is difficult to apply the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act as they are due to the difficulty in delivery to foreigners. Thus, the refusal of

B) As to whether Article 5(3) of the Overseas Koreans Act and Article 4(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act are violated

Article 5 (3) of the Overseas Koreans Act provides that the Minister of Justice shall consult with the Minister of Foreign Affairs when granting status of sojourn as overseas Korean pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of the same Article, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. The former part of Article 4 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the Minister of Justice shall request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to hold consultation under Article 5 (3) of the Overseas Koreans Act when there is a reason to suspect that a foreign nationality Korean who has applied for status of sojourn as overseas Korean falls under Article 5 (2) 3 of the

As seen later, the reason for the disposition of the refusal of this case was that the plaintiff was a person subject to the prohibition of entry and did not meet the requirements for the issuance of the visa under Article 8 of the Immigration Control Act and Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act. As long as the plaintiff constitutes the ground for refusal of the issuance of the visa, the defendant can immediately refuse the issuance of the visa to the plaintiff without consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to examine whether the plaintiff constitutes the requirements for granting the status of sojourn as overseas Koreans under Article 5 subparag. 1 and subparag. 2 of the Overseas Koreans Act.

(ii) the existence of the reasons for the action

A) As to the refusal of the instant case, whether the Immigration Control Act provides for the requirements for visa issuance under the Immigration Control Act

Article 7 (1) of the Immigration Control Act provides that a foreigner shall have a valid passport and a visa issued by the Minister of Justice when he/she intends to enter the Republic of Korea. Article 7 (2) of the same Act provides that a national of the country which has concluded the Visa Exemption Convention with the Republic of Korea may enter the Republic of Korea, a person who enters the Republic of Korea for international friendship, etc., as prescribed by Presidential Decree, may obtain separate entry permission without the visa, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 12 (5) of the Enforcement Decree provides that an immigration control official shall grant his/her entry status to a person who enters the Republic of Korea without the visa as prescribed by Presidential Decree when he/she grants entry permission pursuant to Article 7 (2) 2 and 3, Article 10 of the Immigration Control Act, Article 12 [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the foreigner shall have his/her individual entry status; Article 7 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act provides that whether the foreigner satisfies the requirements for prohibition of entry into the Republic of Korea under Article 1-2 of the Immigration Control Act (this Decree).

Visa refers to a document that verifies an applicant’s passport to be legally issued by the government agency of his/her nationality to undergo an entry inspection of an immigration control official in an immigration port by verifying that the applicant’s passport is a valid passport, the reason for applying for a visa and the fact that it is reasonable to enter and stay in the country intending to enter pursuant to the criteria required for visa issuance, and the status of stay refers to a qualification prescribed by the Immigration Control Act, which provides that a foreigner classifieds legal status to stay in the Republic of Korea and engage in certain activities, and accordingly grants certain rights and bears obligations. Therefore, the status of stay that refers to a visa issued in relation to entry of a foreigner and the legal status that a foreigner is able to engage in in in in the Republic of Korea, shall be distinguished in terms of concept. Whether the status of stay falls under such status of stay is valid, and matters concerning the status of stay shall be prescribed as one of the requirements for the issuance of a visa, and even under the above immigration control law

The Act on Overseas Koreans enacted for the purpose of guaranteeing the entry into and departure from the Republic of Korea of overseas Koreans provides for the grant of status of overseas Korean sojourn (Article 5), issuance and return of report of domestic place of residence and report of domestic place of residence (Articles 6, 7, and 8), period of sojourn and extension thereof, reentry permission, employment and other economic activities (Article 10), real estate transaction (Article 11), etc. of foreign nationality Korean who is granted status of overseas Korean as overseas Korean, and Article 5 provides that status of overseas Korean shall be granted upon request of foreign nationality Korean under paragraph (1). Article 5 provides that the Minister of Justice may grant status of overseas Korean sojourn upon the application of foreign nationality Korean, such as acquisition of foreign nationality for the purpose of evading military service, fear of harm to the interest of the Republic of Korea, etc. (Article 5 (2)).

According to the purport of the above provision, language, and system of the Immigration Control Act and the Overseas Koreans Act, the Overseas Koreans Act preferentially applies to the matters prescribed by the Overseas Koreans Act, such as status of sojourn as overseas Korean and period of sojourn as special laws of the Immigration Control Act. However, the Overseas Koreans Act only provides for status of sojourn as overseas Korean, etc., and does not provide any provision regarding the issuance of the visa for overseas Koreans. As seen earlier, status of sojourn is separate from the visa as one of the requirements for the issuance of the visa, and thus, the Immigration Control Act, not the Overseas Koreans Act, shall apply to the issuance of the visa for overseas Koreans.

Therefore, the Defendant may refuse to issue a visa to the Plaintiff even if the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for sojourn status under the Immigration Control Act and did not meet the requirements for visa issuance under Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act. The Plaintiff’s allegation in this part is without merit

B) As to whether the instant disposition of entry prohibition constitutes a disposition

Article 11(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act (amended by Act No. 6745 of Dec. 5, 2002) provides that the Minister of Justice may prohibit entry of foreigners falling under the grounds prescribed in the following subparagraphs, such as those who are deemed likely to engage in an act detrimental to the interest or public safety of the Republic of Korea (Article 12(3)4 and (4). Article 12(3)4 and (4) provides that an immigration control official shall, when he conducts an entry inspection, review whether the foreigner is not subject to the prohibition or refusal of entry under the provisions of Article 11, permit entry when he deems that the foreigner fails to meet the above requirements. Article 13 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17579 of Apr. 18, 2002) provides that the Minister of Justice shall notify the head of the relevant administrative agency and the person who has decided to prohibit entry pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Immigration Control Act of the Act shall, where the Minister of Justice requests the prohibition of entry of the Republic of Korea.

According to the above Immigration Control Act and subordinate statutes, the Minister of Justice’s disposition of prohibition of entry is a disciplinary measure taken on the grounds that a specific foreigner constitutes grounds for prohibition of entry. The above disposition is registered in the Immigration Control Information System, and in examining whether the relevant foreigner’s entry prohibition constitutes grounds for prohibition of entry in an entry inspection, an immigration control official is bound and judged if the Minister of Justice, who is a superior agency, takes measures to prohibit entry in an entry (Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act amended on July 3, 2008, provides that where the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission delegated by the Minister of Justice with the authority to issue a visa issues a visa, he/she shall examine and confirm whether the foreigner who applied for a visa falls under the grounds for prohibition of entry under Article 11 of the Immigration Control Act. The head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission may examine and confirm whether the foreigner is eligible for prohibition of entry in the Republic of Korea and the head of the Ministry of Justice. However, where a legitimate and effective measure of prohibition of entry is already issued, it cannot be determined against the Minister of entry prohibition of entry.

C) Whether the validity of the instant measures to prohibit entry is maintained at the time of the refusal of the instant refusal

Article 11 of the former Immigration Control Act (amended by Act No. 7406 of Mar. 24, 2005) does not stipulate any provision concerning the period of entry prohibition. Article 14 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17579 of Apr. 18, 2002) provides that Article 2 of the same Enforcement Decree shall apply mutatis mutandis to the request for prohibition of entry and cancellation of entry prohibition, but the provisions concerning the scheduled period of entry prohibition shall not apply mutatis mutandis to the request for prohibition of entry prohibition. In light of the above, the non-specified measures of entry prohibition shall continue to remain effective until the cancellation by the request of the head of the relevant agency. However, according to subparagraph 1-2 (Notification of Reasons for entry prohibition), the Minister of Justice does not specify the period of entry prohibition on February 1, 2002, and it is not reasonable to acknowledge that the above provision of this case was prohibited after the above determination of entry prohibition.

D) As to the legitimacy of the instant measures to prohibit entry

(1) Whether procedural defects exist

Article 3(2)9 of the former Administrative Procedures Act (amended by Act No. 11498, Oct. 22, 2012); Article 2 subparag. 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Administrative Procedures Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17854, Dec. 30, 2002) provides that the Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to matters concerning entry and departure of foreigners. The instant measures to prohibit entry are related to entry of foreigners and are located overseas in which foreigners subject to disposition do not have the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, and thus it is difficult for them to undergo administrative procedures such as prior notice, presentation of reasons, and written notification, etc., and thus, it cannot be deemed unlawful even if the procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act are not complied with. Accordingly, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without

(2) Whether grounds for action exist

(A) Facts of recognition

① On December 12, 1989, the Plaintiff moved to the United States with his family members, and both the Plaintiff and their family members acquired the permanent residence of the United States in 194 to 1995.

② The Plaintiff, upon entering the Republic of Korea on September 14, 1996, sold 190, Mar. 1, 1997, sold 197, and performed as a waterway in the Republic of Korea on April 1, 1997, after having sold 50,000 copies of a house, 60,000 copies of a house, published on May 1, 1998, 830,000 copies of a house, 50,000 copies of a house, published on Nov. 1, 199, 5,00 copies of a house, published on Nov. 1, 200, and 240,00 copies of a house, which were published on Nov. 1, 200.

③ From September 1997, the Plaintiff was named as “nurt youth” and has been participating in public interest activities, such as donation and brut, contribution of public Contact, and role in public relations activities, such as a public relations ambassador.

④ On June 17, 1999, the daily sports published the article stating, “The Plaintiff had shocked before and after the inter-Korean guard chilling in the West Coast Guard Sea area, and was examined on June 16, 1999, to enter the Gun as of the end of 2000 after giving up his permanent residence in the United States and undergoing physical examination on December 16, 199.” However, the Seoul Sports Seoul posted the article stating, “The foregoing article is true, and the Plaintiff has no intention to waive his permanent residence in the United States, and the contract period ends on March 2001, it is impossible to enter the military as of the end of 200.”

⑤ On February 7, 200, the Plaintiff entered into an exclusive contract on all activities, including the production of 6 and 7 copies of regular music records, with an artist management and wast Media Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “wast Media”), which is operated by the senior mother Nonparty 2, and a music record planning company (hereinafter “wast Media”), and on March 12, 2001, with the Plaintiff’s six original music tapes around August 2001 and around May 2002, the Plaintiff agreed to receive and sell the seven original music tapes from the Plaintiff’s performance of the duty of military service, and agreed to receive and sell the original music records if the Plaintiff breached the duty of military service. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 17340, Jan. 12, 2002; Presidential Decree No. 17200, Aug. 12, 2002>

(6) Article 64(1)2 of the former Military Service Act (amended by Act No. 7272 of Dec. 31, 2004) provides that a director of a regional military manpower office may exempt a person who has obtained a permanent resident status with his family in a foreign country from military service without a draft physical examination upon application. Article 134(8)2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17159 of Mar. 27, 2001) provides that a person who has stayed in the Republic of Korea for not less than one year may be exempted from military service and may be exempted from military service. However, on March 27, 2001, the Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act was amended, and thus, Article 134(8)4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act provides that a person who has been a permanent resident in the Republic of Korea may be exempted from military service.

7) On January 4, 2001, the Plaintiff received an operation on February 1, 2001 from a doctor in charge of performing an operation by hospitalized in a Madon Hospital on the 16th day of the same month, by suffering from hiversal injury, such as the escape from the 1,00-gu lap, No. 1,00.

④ On August 7, 2001, the Plaintiff was rendered a withheld judgment at the draft physical examination at the Daegu regional military manpower office on August 13, 2001, and was again rendered a final decision on August 13, 2001. On October 1, 2001, the Plaintiff received a final decision from the Daegu regional military manpower office on the ground of the nuclear escape certificate (public interest service personnel) from the Daegu regional military manpower office on October 1, 2001. Around that time, on November 12, 2001, the call-up notice for public interest service personnel as of November 12, 2001 was made, but the call-up for military service was postponed on February 14, 2002 for family reasons. The Plaintiff, “I want to sing to sing to sing the stage listed at the time of the draft physical examination, but I want to be classified as “I will fulfill the duty of national defense.”

9) Nonparty 1 notified the Plaintiff on October 23, 2001 that the date of taking an oath against the Plaintiff’s citizenship from an immigration state of the United States, and notified the Plaintiff of this fact, but the Plaintiff did not attend the above oath.

(10) On January 8, 2002, the Plaintiff filed an application with the director of the Seoul regional military manpower office for a public performance of the purpose of the trip from January 12, 2002 to February 5, 2002, with the permission of the overseas travel from January 12, 2002 to February 5, 2002, with the permission of the travel destination to Japan and the United States, and entered the United States on the 10th day of the same month after departing from Japan on the 12th day of the same month, and entering the Republic of Korea on the 14th day of the same month at the ASEAN New Stocks C&L welfare center, and submitted a report of the loss of nationality to the Defendant on January 18, 202 (the date and place of the Plaintiff’s above Japanese contact date had already been determined on November 1, 201).

① On January 24, 2002, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for a visa for overseas Koreans (F-4) with the purpose of public performance and the publication of sound records. On January 25, 2002, the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration requested the Minister of Justice to restrict the entry of the Plaintiff on January 25, 2002, to the Minister of Justice on the 28th day of the same month, and the Minister of Justice applied Article 11(1)3, 4, and 8 of the Immigration Control Act to prohibit entry on February 1, 202.

(12) On February 2, 2002, the Plaintiff, without obtaining a visa, intended to enter the Incheon Airport on the ground of the entry prohibition of the Republic of Korea, but was refused to enter the Republic of Korea on the ground of the instant measure, and returned to the United States. At the time, the Plaintiff, at the interview with the press at the time, deemed that there was a serious conflict and concern about the acquisition of citizen rights, and that there was a big problem, given up the citizen rights, but there was no way to reverse it. However, the Plaintiff acquired the U.S. citizen rights, and naturally applied for the U.S. citizen rights as a permanent resident as a permanent resident, because he was living in the United States. For the two-year period, the Plaintiff had to live in the public interest service, and should prepare again for the sovereignty and citizen rights from the beginning, and his family members have to separate his family members.

③ The Plaintiff acquired U.S. citizenship for the purpose of evading military service, so there was a critical public opinion on the Plaintiff, such as the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the U.S. citizenship for the purpose of evading military service. An advertiser suspended advertising, and the broadcasting station cancelled the Plaintiff’s MaC selection.

4) On May 2003, the representative of the Pib code, which is in charge of the Plaintiff’s overseas performance and propagation, submitted an appeal to the Commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration stating that “the Plaintiff does not fall under the grounds for prohibition of entry as prescribed by Article 11 subparag. 3, 4, and 8 of the Immigration Control Act” to the effect that the Plaintiff’s entry into the Republic of Korea was prohibited by the Ministry of Justice on June 1, 2003, on the contrary to the Military Manpower Administration, which had concerns over the fraud of soldiers, the encouragement of growth in the military service, and evasion of military service through the acquisition of foreign nationality. The Pib code side filed a petition against the Minister of Justice on the same purport on May 19, 2003, the National Human Rights Commission dismissed the Plaintiff’s refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea on the premise that “the Plaintiff’s freedom of entry and alteration of nationality cannot be considered as a fundamental right generally recognized for foreigners,” and thus, on July 28, 2003, the said Me dismissed on the ground of human Rights Act.

(15) The plaintiff applied for the issuance of a visa for the provisions on the non-party 3's addition of the teaching system, and the Minister of Justice temporarily cancelled the entry prohibition of the plaintiff, thereby visiting the Republic of Korea from June 26, 2003 to June 27, 2003.

On February 2, 2004, the Military Manpower Administration established a system that guarantees departure from the Republic of Korea once a year to maintain the sovereignty during military service, in order for those who have acquired a permanent residence of a foreign country to perform military service without waiver of the permanent residence of a foreign country, who have acquired a permanent residence of a foreign country and were exempted from military service or postponed from military service voluntarily wishing to enlist in the military.

In an interview with the United States on February 2002, Nonparty 1 applied for the right of citizens of the Republic of Korea and his family since they had not resided in Korea, and thereafter, the Military Service Act was revised to have a duty of military service when they stayed in Korea for not less than 6 months. The Plaintiff called the United States upon receipt of a notice from the immigration state of the United States to attend an oath on November 2001, but did not go to the United States. After the receipt of the notice from the immigration state of the United States, the Plaintiff was a female member of the Republic of Korea, and the Plaintiff was a Japanese public performance. The Plaintiff should go to the United States. However, the Plaintiff, upon receiving the notice from the immigration state of the United States, should have to go to the Gun in order to observe the pledge with the citizen state, the Plaintiff stated that “The Plaintiff should have obtained the right of citizens of the Republic of Korea to take an oath,” and the Plaintiff should be considered to be a member of the Republic of Korea, who is a citizen of the Republic of Korea, and then the Plaintiff should make a statement to the second citizen.

The non-party 1 appeared as a witness in this court, and asked the Plaintiff to “Is the U.S. citizenship to take an oath on August 23, 2001.” However, the Plaintiff did not attend the meeting to “Is the Guns to implement the commitments.” On December 2001, the non-party 1 notified the plaintiff of the second U.S. citizenship oath (the date of oath: January 18, 2002) in the name of the conversation with the plaintiff at the time, and notified the non-party 2 of this fact. The non-party 2 was aware of this fact before entering the U.S., but the Plaintiff did not ask the plaintiff directly. The Plaintiff signed the application of Non-party 1 to acquire the U.S. citizenship’s citizenship, and the Plaintiff maintained the interview to the effect that “Is the right to participate in the meeting for the purpose of acquiring the U.S. citizen sovereignty.”

According to the data of the U.S. immigration state, the U.S. citizen authority is notified of the results of the application for naturalization through the preparation and submission of an application for naturalization, the collection and registration of fingerprints, and the interview and so that it can be acquired through the process of attending the model of oath of citizenship.

The Plaintiff’s punishment Nonparty 5 acquired the U.S. citizenship on January 18, 2002; Nonparty 1 on January 30, 2004; and Nonparty 6 on June 23, 2010.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's statements and images, Gap's evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 40, 46, 49, Eul's evidence Nos. 1 and 6, part of the witness's testimony, non-party No. 1's testimony of this court, the cultural broadcasting of this court, the sports Seoul company, the Minister of Justice, the fact-finding with the Minister of Justice, the result of each fact-finding with respect to the defendant's testimony, the whole purport

(B) Determination

Article 11(1) of the former Immigration Control Act (amended by Act No. 7406 of Mar. 24, 2005) provides that the Minister of Justice may prohibit any foreigner who falls under any of subparagraphs 1 through 7-1 and is likely to engage in any conduct detrimental to the interest or public safety of the Republic of Korea (Article 11(1)3), who is highly likely to engage in any conduct detrimental to the economic or social order of the Republic of Korea (Article 3), who is likely to engage in any conduct detrimental to the economic or social order, or who is likely to engage in any conduct detrimental to the good morals (Article 4) or who corresponds to any of subparagraphs 1 through 7-1 and who is deemed inappropriate

The plaintiff is deemed to have applied for the citizenship of the United States before the amendment of the Military Service Act to revoke exemption from military service. Thus, if the plaintiff acquired the citizenship of the United States to live together with his family members in the United States, it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff's acquisition of the citizenship of the United States for the purpose of evading military service is not for the purpose of evading military service. However, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned evidence, i.e., the plaintiff had a plan to pay seven music records around August 6, 2001 to the 20th anniversary of 199 to 200 days after obtaining the citizenship of the Republic of Korea, and the plaintiff was unable to obtain the visa for the purpose of taking an oath against the defendant on January 24, 2002 after obtaining the citizenship of the United States.

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff was enjoying a public figure as a member of the Republic of Korea, and the Plaintiff had considerable influence and influence on the citizens of the Republic of Korea, especially juveniles, on the grounds of the preceding and voluntary activities of ordinary citizens, and was exempted from the duty of military service by means of acquiring U.S. citizenships even though he had been able to faithfully perform the duty of national defense through the media even though he was not based on his own will. If the Plaintiff continues to engage in broadcasting and entertainment activities by entering the Republic of Korea, he could have undermined the morale of the soldiers of the Republic of Korea who have sacrificeed themselves and conducted the duty of military service, weakening the will of performing the duty of military service, and cause a brut of evading the duty of military service to juveniles prior to entering the Republic of Korea. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion constitutes grounds for entry prohibition under Article 39(1) of the Constitution, which may hinder the performance of the duty of national defense, thereby endangering the order of the Republic of Korea, endangering the public safety, social order and good morals, thereby impairing the order of the Republic of Korea.

(3) Whether the principle of proportionality is violated

It is reasonable to view that the State may freely determine the right to prohibit entry of foreigners, which the State considers inappropriate, as an established right in accordance with international law, to prohibit entry of foreigners. Accordingly, Article 11(1) of the former Immigration Control Act provides that the Minister of Justice may order the prohibition of entry of persons corresponding thereto, who are determined to be prohibited from entering the Republic of Korea under each subparagraph of Article 11(1) of the former Immigration Control Act, to prohibit entry of foreigners from a perspective of public interest.

Meanwhile, the immigration control administration is a state administrative action that seeks to promote the national interest and safety by properly controlling and coordinating the entry and departure of foreigners in Korea and foreigners. In particular, considering the fact that matters concerning the entry of foreigners are essential to carry out the functions as a sovereign state and are located in the broad area of policy discretion (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2003Hun-Ma87, Mar. 31, 2005). In determining whether to enter the Republic of Korea with respect to foreigners, the public interest aspect that ought to be emphasized rather than the disadvantage of the parties to be suffered by the decision should be emphasized.

Taking account of the following circumstances revealed by adding up the purport of the entire pleadings, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff violated the principle of proportionality as it is too heavy compared to the public interest to be achieved by the instant measures to prohibit entry. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

(A) The instant entry prohibition measure is aimed at preventing the morale of the soldiers of the Republic of Korea, which might be caused by the Plaintiff’s free entry, from falling under the morale of the soldiers of the Republic of Korea, and from evading military service, and thus, can achieve its purpose by prohibiting the Plaintiff’s entry. Therefore, it cannot

(B) The Plaintiff asserted that the above purpose may be achieved by permitting entry under a condition that restricts the broadcast and entertainment activities, or by prohibiting entry for a specified period. However, considering the social impact and shock that may result in the Plaintiff’s behavior at the time of the instant entry prohibition, the Plaintiff’s free entry itself may undermine the morale of the soldiers in the armed forces. In light of the purpose of the instant entry prohibition measure, at least 10 years have been in violation of the former Military Service Act (amended by Act No. 6749, Dec. 5, 2002) pursuant to Article 71(1) of the former Military Service Act (amended by Act No. 6749, Dec. 29, 2005) and thus, it was necessary to prohibit entry into the Republic of Korea for more than 10 years until the time when the Plaintiff was aged 36 years of age and when the Plaintiff was exempted from the duty to enter the Republic of Korea’s temporary entry permission (amended by Act No. 6749, Dec. 29, 2005).

(C) The Plaintiff asserts that the measure of entry prohibition in this case infringes on the Plaintiff’s dignity and value as human beings and the right to pursue happiness, which must recover honor by impairing the truth and committing a crime against the Republic of Korea. However, even if the Plaintiff did not enter the Republic of Korea, the Plaintiff may have an opportunity to clarify the truth through the press branch of the Republic of Korea or the press of another country, and there is no ground to deem that the truth can be clarified only by entering the Republic of Korea and making a press conference. It is evident that the limited fundamental rights due to the measure of entry prohibition in this case include freedom to visit the country or the natives, and thus, they cannot be deemed as restricting the dignity, value, and the right to pursue happiness as human beings, which are supplementary fundamental rights. Furthermore, considering the fact that the subject of fundamental rights of foreigners against the freedom of entry is not recognized (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hun-Ma502, Jun. 26, 2014).

(D) The purpose of public interest to achieve through the instant measures to prohibit entry is to ensure the performance of the duty of military service by preventing the citizens who bear the duty of military service from undermining their will to discharge the duty of military service, thereby promoting the preservation of territory, promoting the national security of the Republic of Korea, and preventing the act of evading military service by the illegal means, thereby establishing the legal order and discipline of the State. Such public interest cannot be deemed to be less than the disadvantage that the Plaintiff, who acquired the U.S. citizenship for the purpose of evading military service, is unable to visit the Republic of Korea

(E) The Plaintiff did not receive any opportunity to clarify the facts that constitute the grounds for the entry prohibition of this case. ② Although the period of entry prohibition is different from punishment, it was never predicted at all that it would be subject to the measures of entry prohibition on the grounds of acquisition of U.S. citizens’ rights. ③ Since the so-called “Plaintiff’s effect” occurred for those who could be exempted from military service on the grounds of injury or foreign permanent residence due to the instant measures of entry prohibition, the Plaintiff asserts that there is no need for public interest to maintain the Plaintiff’s entry prohibition.

① However, as seen earlier, Article 11 of the Immigration Control Act does not apply to the measures to prohibit entry pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act that provide for the opportunity to present opinions, and the facts objectively revealed alone are likely to undermine the Republic of Korea’s duty of national defense, the preservation of territory, and the compliance order. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that the Defendant needed to give the Plaintiff an opportunity to explain before the measure to the Plaintiff was taken. Furthermore, the Plaintiff, while receiving a notification to prohibit entry into the Republic of Korea, entered the United States upon obtaining permission for overseas travel, acquired the U.S. citizen’s citizenship, and failed to respond to the call after receiving a notification to notify the public duty personnel, was subject to punishment pursuant to the Military Service Act, and as long as the Plaintiff, who had considerable social influence as a famous artist, avoided military service by means of acquiring the U.S. citizen’s right after consenting to the performance of the duty of national defense and compliance order. Furthermore, it appears that the so-called “Plaintiff’s effect” could not affect the legitimacy of the measures to prohibit entry after the instant measure, and rather, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff did not have any duty to exempt from military service for one year or five years.

(4) Whether the principle of equality is violated

The case holding that the plaintiff's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea and the defendant's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea did not constitute a violation of the principle of equality on the ground that the plaintiff's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea does not merely lose the citizenship of the Republic of Korea through the acquisition of U.S. citizen rights and did not release the duty of military service within three days from the date of receipt of the call-up notice, and that the plaintiff did not immediately evade the above duty of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea without justifiable grounds, on the ground that the plaintiff's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea and the defendant's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of the above 4,500 persons subject to the suspicion of evasion of military service due to the renunciation of nationality announced by the press around 205, and that the plaintiff's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's refusal of entry into the Republic of Korea's departure from the Republic of Korea's departure.

(5) Sub-committee

Therefore, the instant disposition is a legitimate disposition, and its validity is maintained even at the time of the instant refusal, and thus, the instant refusal of the Plaintiff’s application for visa issuance on the ground of the instant disposition of prohibition of entry without further review as to whether or not the Plaintiff’s succession to the defects were succeeded to, is in accordance with Article 8(3) of the Immigration Control Act and Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act

3) Whether the discretionary authority is deviates or abused

Article 8(3) of the Immigration Control Act and Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provide that whether the head of an overseas diplomatic mission holds a valid passport when issuing a visa (Article 11(1)), whether the head of an overseas diplomatic mission is not subject to the prohibition or refusal of entry under Article 11 of the Immigration Control Act (Article 11(2)), whether the status of stay under attached Table 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act (Article 3) constitutes the status of stay under attached Table 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act, whether the purpose of entry meeting the status of stay under attached Table 1 of the above Enforcement Decree (Article 4) is proven (Article 5) and whether the head of an overseas diplomatic mission in question is recognized to return to this country within the permitted period of stay under the relevant status of stay (Article 5). The discretion of the head of an overseas diplomatic mission in issuing a visa shall be deemed to refer to the discretionary discretion to refuse to issue the visa even if the above requirements are not satisfied

As seen earlier, as long as the instant measures are lawful and effective, the Defendant cannot determine that the Plaintiff does not constitute the subject of entry prohibition by denying the validity of the instant measures to prohibit entry. As such, the Defendant ought to refuse the Plaintiff’s application pursuant to Article 9-2 subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act without further determination as to whether other requirements for the issuance of the visa are met. In addition, Article 10 subparag. 3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Immigration Control Act provides that when the head of an overseas diplomatic mission intends to issue a visa to a visa controller who allows the Minister of Justice to obtain the visa only after obtaining special approval on the issuance of the visa, the approval of the Minister of Justice should be obtained notwithstanding Article 9, which is the delegation provision of the authority to issue the visa. However, the above provision merely provides that the head of an overseas diplomatic mission would obtain the approval of the Minister of Justice when he/she intends to issue the visa to the visa controller, such as the person subject to entry prohibition, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant refused the Plaintiff’s application without obtaining approval from the Minister of Justice.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment] Relevant Statutes: omitted

Judges Kim Yong-chul (Presiding Judge)