2. The appeal costs are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or are recognized by Gap evidence 3, 4, and 5-1 through 9, Gap evidence 6-1 through 4, Eul evidence 1 and 23, by integrating the whole purport of the pleadings.

A. On March 30, 2001, the plaintiffs acquired the ownership of the second floor above ground 11, business facilities, neighborhood living facilities, neighborhood living facilities, 36.69 square meters (hereinafter "the building in this case") above ground 1163, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Daejeon, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Daejeon, where the location of the defendant is 1163, and registered the real estate rental business. On April 3, 2001, the plaintiffs received the tax invoice stating the value of the 5,61,493,00,000, value-added tax on the 1163, 805, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Daejeon, where the marina industry development corporation (hereinafter "Mama industry") and filed a final tax return exceeding 93,000,000 won, and filed a return on the amount of the input tax for more than 201,39,000.

B. On November 3, 2001, the Defendant: (a) deemed that the acquisition by the Plaintiffs of the instant building is not a supply of goods under a real estate sales contract; (b) deemed that the real estate rental business was comprehensively acquired from the marina industry; and (c) calculated value-added tax as indicated in the details of value-added tax calculation on attached Form 1 by deducting the relevant input tax amount; and (d) issued a disposition to reject the application for refund by the Plaintiffs; and (b) to correct and notify the Plaintiffs of the value-added tax amounting to KRW 17,319,558 for the first period of 201 (hereinafter “instant refund refusal

2. The parties' arguments and relevant statutes;

A. The parties' assertion

In regard to the Defendant’s assertion that the refusal of refund and the disposition of imposition of the instant case are legitimate dispositions in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, the Plaintiffs asserted that the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the instant building from the white industry was the supply of goods pursuant to the real estate sales contract for the following reasons, and thus, the Defendant’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ application for refund and the disposition of imposition of

(1) In light of the fact that there is no express provision regarding the sale and purchase of this case in the sales contract made between the Bama industry and the plaintiffs that all business are taken over and taken over and taken over only some rights and obligations, and that all rights and obligations are not taken over or taken over, and the Bama industry is for the purpose of real estate development, sale and lease business, while the Bama industry only runs the lease business and does not have the identity of the business, the Bama industry does not succeed to the Bama industry, the Bama industry starts the business from the 1,2nd underground after the sale of this case, and the 803th office after the sale of this case used the Bama industry as the 803 office, and therefore there is a difference in the actual use conditions of the Bama industry before and after the sale of this case, it cannot be deemed that the Bama industry was transferred to the plaintiffs as it is in the area of real estate rental business.

The plaintiffs acquired the building of this case from the Bama industry, and paid 495,007,250 won in the balance of set-off of 69,142,050 won for Mamamama industry among the value-added tax of 566,149,300 won on July 24, 2001, and 69,142,050 won for Mamamama industry. The Bama industry reported value-added tax on July 25, 2001 and paid 175,00,000 won out of the amount of value-added tax deposit received from the plaintiffs. Thus, even though the supply of goods should be deemed as the supply of goods pursuant to the proviso of Article 6(2)2 of the Value-Added Tax Act and Article 17(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act, it cannot be deemed a business acquisition merely on the ground that part of the Mama industry did not pay the tax amount.

B. Relevant statutes

Attached 2. The entry in the relevant statutes are as follows.

3. Facts of recognition.

The following facts are not disputed between the parties, or acknowledged by comprehensively considering the following facts: Gap evidence 1-2, Gap evidence 2, 3, 4, Gap evidence 5-1 through 9, Gap evidence 5-1 through 8, Gap evidence 8, 15, 16, 17-1 through 8, Gap evidence 9-1, 13, 14, Gap evidence 18 through 21, Eul evidence 18-2, 3, Eul evidence 4, 8-2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and Eul evidence 1-7, and Eul evidence 11-7.

A. On February 13, 1997, the marina industry was established for the purpose of real estate development business, sale and lease business, etc., and around September 21, 1999, and around July 2, 199, the non-party officer purchased the building and land of this case acquired under the name of the non-party Bama Construction Co., Ltd. from the Korea Special Muma Construction Co., Ltd. on July 2, 199, and operated the lease business from the building of this case after undergoing a completion inspection on February 2, 200.

B. On March 23, 2000, with respect to the instant building in order to discharge the obligation for the payment of the construction cost, the white-tech industry: (a) registered the establishment of a neighboring establishment of the instant building in which creditors amounting to KRW 6,020,000,000 (hereinafter referred to as “bridge life”) and the maximum debt amount; (b) borrowed KRW 4,300,000 from the teaching life, and (c) borrowed KRW 4,300,000 from the teaching life; and (d) on March 24, 2000, the creditor made a registration of the establishment of a neighboring establishment of a mortgage with KRW 400,000 (hereinafter referred to as “bridge Capital”) and the maximum debt amount of KRW 320,00,000, from the pair Capital; and (e) borrowed KRW 1,785,900,000 from the other creditors, including the new non-party iron.

C. On November 17, 200, the above new 300 won for the building of this case, the auction decision of 100 won for the above 300 won for the above 400 won for the above 700 won for the above 500 won for the loan, 100 won for the above 300 won for the above 400 won for the loan, 200 won for the above 50 won for the loan of 300 won for the above 400 won for the loan, 300 won for the above 50 won for the loan of 200 won for the above 700 won for the loan of 400 won for the above 700 won for the loan, 300 won for the above 50 won for the loan of 1,800 won for the above 600 won for the loan, 200 won for the loan of 300 won for the above 1,800 won for the above 600 won for the loan of this case.

D. At the time of purchasing the instant building, the Plaintiffs succeeded to the lessor’s status as to the existing lessee of the instant building, including the obligation to return KRW 500,000,000,000, but, at the same time, most of the lease agreements were maintained as they were, although the lease agreements were re-determined or the amount of deposit was adjusted, they were not employed as the Plaintiff’s employees. On May 16, 2001, the 0ma Industry, 300,000,000,000 won for 50,000 won for 60,000,000 won for 15,000,000 won for 60,000 won for 60,000 won for 60,000 won for 60,000,000 won for 15,000,000 won for 60,000 won for 15,000,0000 won for value-added tax on the instant building, 15,206,01.

4. Determination

A. The meaning of business transfer under the Value-Added Tax Act

Article 6 (6) of the Value-Added Tax Act, and Article 17 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act refers to the transfer of physical and human facilities, rights, and obligations, etc. including business property, to comprehensively transfer the property for business, and to replace only the main body of business while maintaining the identity of the business (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Du7520, Oct. 26, 2001). Whether the business is transferred or not should be determined by each workplace.

B. Whether the transfer of the instant building constitutes the transfer of business

According to the above facts, the plaintiffs acquired the building of this case and comprehensively succeeded to the status of lessor including rental deposit of lessee located in the building of this case. The plaintiffs succeeded to not only 4.3 billion won obligations for school life, but also to the obligations of 00 billion won related to the lease business of this case, such as succeeding to the status of debtor for the establishment of a neighboring mortgage with the future deposit, etc. The 00 billion won is established for the purpose of new construction, sale and lease of real estate, and the plaintiffs are engaged in real estate rental business in the building of this case, and the building of this case is constructed for the purpose of acquiring real estate and constructing real estate rental business. Furthermore, as seen above, the plaintiff's tax invoice of this case can not be deemed as an employee of 00 million won and employees in employment relationship as well as an employee of 00,000 won and 500,000,0000 won and 500,0000,000 won and 75,000,000 won.

(c) Whether the proviso to Article 6 (2) 2 of the Value-Added Tax Act and Article 17 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act apply

As seen earlier, the percentage industry only paid 175,00,000 won out of the output tax amount for the instant building, and the purport of the proviso of Article 6(2)2 of the Value-Added Tax Act, and Article 17(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act is to be deemed the supply of goods, even in cases where the business transferor issues a tax invoice exceptionally, and the tax amount collected from the business transferee is returned and paid by the business transferee. Thus, even in cases where only a part of the tax amount is paid, it cannot be deemed the supply of goods by applying the above exception provisions extensively, and there is no other data to prove that the percentage industry paid the value-added tax on the instant building, which was collected by the Plaintiffs, and therefore, there is no reason to believe that the Plaintiff’s assertion was erroneous in the refusal of refund and the disposition of imposition.

D. Moreover, even upon examining the record, there is no other error in the refusal of refund and the disposition of imposition in this case.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims of this case seeking the cancellation of the disposition on the premise that the refusal of refund and the disposition of this case are illegal, shall be dismissed as all of the claims of this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the first instance is legitimate, and the appeal of this case is dismissed as it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Yong-Hun (Presiding Judge)