[2] The case holding that the act of collecting a bill by itself or the process of managing delegated affairs cannot be deemed as a direct cause to the extent that it would cause a specific set-off period to the mandatary, which falls under the proviso of Article 163 subparagraph 2 (b) of the Company Reorganization Act

[3] The time when the mandatory is obligated to deliver and transfer the collection amount in the delegation of collection of a bill, and whether the request for collection or the presentation of payment itself can be viewed as a specific and direct cause of the mandatory’s occurrence of the above obligation (negative)

[2] The case holding that since in the delegation of collection of a bill, the relationship between the endorser and the endorsee has the nature of the delegation contract, and the money acquired through the processing of the delegated affairs has the duty of due care as a good manager to deliver it to the mandator (Article 684 of the Civil Code), the situation in which the mandatary offsets his claim against the delegating person with the obligation to deliver and transfer the acquired goods as a passive obligation shall be deemed exceptional, and it shall not be deemed that the person entrusted with the collection performs the delegated affairs such as payment of the bill, presentation of the bill, delivery of documents, etc. according to the intent of the delegation, or that even if the contract for the collection was terminated, it shall not be deemed that it is actually difficult to receive the bill from the beginning, and therefore, if the money was lent from the beginning on the basis of the delegation of collection, or the money was used as a means to repay the obligation, the obligor's withdrawal of the delegation, direct collection, or a special agreement not to collect it in duplicate to a third party, it shall not be deemed that the act of collection or set-off of the bill itself constitutes a specific cause.

[3] In the delegation of collection of a bill, the obligation of the mandatary to deliver and transfer the bill does not arise from the request for collection or the request to the third obligor (payment proposal), but from the case where the third obligor is actually paid from the third obligor, the specific occurrence occurs. Thus, the request for collection or the presentation of payment itself cannot be viewed as a specific and direct cause for the occurrence of the above obligation of the mandatary.

A. If a creditor against the company, despite being aware of the so-called crisis situation, has already been applied for the suspension of payment or the commencement of reorganization proceedings of the debtor company, if he/she bears a new debt to the company, but can offset the existing claim by using it as a passive claim, it may result in a failure to achieve the purpose of the corporate reorganization system by preventing the debtor company from doing financial transactions with financial institutions, which are creditors, even after a preservative measure was issued, and thus preventing the progress of raising operating funds. Accordingly, the Company Reorganization Act prohibits a set-off against a debt, which the creditor bears with knowledge of such crisis situation after the critical time such as the suspension of payment or the commencement of reorganization proceedings of the company, and the proviso (b) prohibits a set-off against a debt, which the creditor company or security holder permits a set-off to the extent that it can exceptionally protect the creditor's right of set-off arising prior to the expiration of the crisis situation (hereinafter referred to as "the preceding causes prior to the commencement of payment, bankruptcy, commencement of reorganization proceedings or reorganization proceedings").

The court below stated in Article 9 (1) of the General Terms and Conditions for Credit Transactions incorporated into the terms and conditions for the collection delegation of this case pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Transactions Agreement that "if it is required to perform obligations to banks due to the arrival of time limit or the obligation to repay debts before time limit under Article 7 and other reasons, banks may set off such obligations and debtor's claims against the bank by a written notice, regardless of whether or not the time limit for such claims has expired." However, it is difficult to see that the bank immediately under this provision that there was a legitimate expectation that the obligor's claims against the bank should be the object of collateral from the beginning, and that the application for the purchase of export bills prepared and submitted by Daewoo Motor Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Cable Motor") which is the Plaintiff's reorganization company, will transfer all rights to the above exported goods to another bank at the time of the collection delegation of this case." However, since the agreement to transfer the rights to the export goods to the bank for the collection of the export bill can not be provided as collateral to the Defendants' claims, it constitutes a new bill of exchange agreement.

B. In the delegation of collection of a bill, the relationship between the endorser and the endorsee has the nature of the delegation contract, and the money acquired through the processing of the delegated affairs has the duty of due care as a good manager to deliver it to the mandator (Article 684 of the Civil Code). Therefore, the situation in which the mandatary offsets his claim against his claim against the delegating person with the obligation to deliver and transfer the acquired goods as a passive claim shall be deemed exceptional. It does not change on the ground that the delegated person performs the delegated affairs, such as payment of the bill, presentation of documents, etc. in accordance with the intent of the delegation, or the fact that even if the contract for collection is terminated, it is virtually difficult to receive the bill even if it is difficult to collect the bill, it does not change on the ground that from the beginning, lending money on the premise of recovery of claim due to the delegation of collection, or when the collection was made by the means to repay the debt, the obligor withdraws the delegation, directly collect it, or made a special agreement not to collect it in duplicate to a third party, barring any special circumstance.

In the instant case where there is no ground to view that the delegation of each of the instant collection delegations was made as a means to discharge the Defendants’ obligations, or that there was a special agreement not to withdraw the delegations between the medical automobile and the Defendants, the delegating vehicle may terminate the delegation contract at any time in accordance with the general principles on delegation (Article 689(1) of the Civil Act). The Defendants, the mandatory agent upon termination, lose the authority to perform delegated duties, and even when the Defendants terminated after the presentment of payment of bills, lose the authority to receive bills in relation to the medical automobile. Thus, even if the Defendants terminated after the presentment of payment of bills, the Defendants would lose the authority to receive bills in relation to the medical automobile. Thus, the mere fact that the Defendants sent the export bill and transport documents of this case to the foreign payment bank with the collection delegations prior to the payment suspensions cannot be deemed to constitute a direct cause to cause specific offset against the Defendants.

Therefore, the recognition and determination by the court below that rejected the defendants' assertion that the above circumstances constitute "the causes of the transfer" is correct, and there is no violation of law such as omission of judgment or misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. In addition, the court below did not expressly decide on the defendants' assertion that the execution of collection itself constitutes a specific and direct cause, but in light of the purport of the judgment of the court below, the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that the execution of collection constitutes a cause prior to "the execution of collection", and the above mandatory's obligation to deliver and transfer to the third obligor is not arising from the collection request or the third obligor's claim (the presentation of payment) but is not arising from the third obligor's request or the third obligor's claim (see Supreme Court Decision 63Da423 delivered on September 26, 1963, etc.), and it does not constitute a specific and direct cause for the obligor's occurrence of the above obligation (see Supreme Court Decision 63Da423 delivered on September 26, 1963). Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is correct and there is no

2. Judgment on the third ground for appeal

The court below, based on the evidence of its ruling, found that there was no agreement between the Defendants on October 7, 199 at the time of the commencement of the business improvement work for the Daewoo Motor, but no less than 250 billion won for the Defendant Korea Exchange Bank, and Defendant Korea Exchange Bank provided an additional amount of loans, etc. to the treatment motor vehicle pursuant to the business improvement agreement, and Defendant Korea Exchange Bank provided an additional amount of money to the treatment motor vehicle until February 18, 2002, the amount of the bonds of the Defendant Korea Exchange Bank exceeded 174 billion won, and the amount of the bonds of the Defendant Bank were 413.2 billion won. The Defendants did not enter into a transaction in the form of an export bill of exchange with the treatment motor vehicle to which the Defendants had first been selected as the object of negotiations on preferential acquisition of the imported motor vehicle at the time of the collection of the imported motor vehicle, and there was no violation of the rules of evidence of evidence that the Defendants were not able to obtain treatment from the Defendants bank prior to the collection of the imported motor vehicle due date.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)