[손해배상(기)][공1993.2.1.(937),431]
(a) The case recognizing a medical malpractice by a doctor on the ground that the second side damage of a fetus, such as the second side blood transfusion of a fetus, is presumed to have been caused by a doctor's negligence at the time of delivery, and that there is no evidence to recognize any infection or ideal of a mother's body or fetus which may otherwise cause cerebral macy through post-delivery, the second side damage of the fetus is presumed to have caused cerebral macy;
B. The meaning of the date when it became known of the tort, which serves as the starting point for extinctive prescription, in the damage claim based on a tort at time between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damage.
C. Where the Plaintiff’s claim is that part of the property and mental damage is claimed on the premise that the amount of the claim is extended according to the result of the physical appraisal in the future, the effect of interrupting prescription due to the institution of the lawsuit (the entire damage claim claimed in the complaint)
(a) The case recognizing a medical malpractice by a doctor on the ground that the second side damage of a fetus, such as the second side blood transfusion of a fetus, is presumed to have been caused by a doctor's negligence at the time of delivery, and that there is no evidence to acknowledge any infection or ideal of a mother's body or fetus which may otherwise cause cerebral macy, if there is no other evidence to prove that the second side damage of a fetus was caused by cerebral ma
B. In a claim for damages arising from a tort at an interval of time between the harmful act and the occurrence of the actual damage, the date of knowing the tort, which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, refers to the date when the damage was lost in an conceptual and dynamic state, but it is not necessary to specifically know the degree or amount of the actual damage.
C. If the Plaintiff’s claim is based on the result of physical appraisal that a part of the property and mental damage is claimed on the premise that the claim amount should be extended, then the interruption of prescription due to an action is clearly effective within the scope of the identity of the damage claim asserted in the complaint, even though it does not constitute a part of the claim.
A. Article 750 of the Civil Act: Article 766 of the Civil Act; Article 168 of the Civil Act
A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da23707 delivered on May 12, 1992 (Gong1992,1831) (Gong1992,1831). Supreme Court Decision 92Da2011 delivered on April 14, 1992 (Gong1992,1598), Supreme Court Decision 91Da41880 delivered on April 10, 1992 (Gong192,1969), Supreme Court Decision 91Da43695 delivered on April 10, 1992 (Gong192,1541)
Plaintiff 1 and four plaintiffs, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee and one other
Defendant School Foundation Law Firm Dong-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant
Daegu High Court Decision 88Na2459 delivered on June 11, 1992
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the occurrence of liability for damages
(1) The facts established by the court below in this case are as follows.
즉 원고 2는 1985.9.20. 출산을 위해 피고 산하 의료원에 입원하였고 그 당시 원고 2는 임신기간 40주 6일로서 분만예정일인 같은 달 14.을 훨씬 지나 있었으나 입원하기 전 임신기간 중 매월 정기적으로 받은 검진과 분만예정일인 1985.9.14.에 받은 검진에서도 원고 2와 태아가 정상이었으며, 위 의료원에 입원직후 위 병원의 1년차 전공의인 소외 1이 원고 2를 진찰한 결과 분만을 앞둔 위 원고의 신체조건은 비숍.에스.스코어(Bishop. S. Score)가 11점으로서 전반적으로 양호한 상태였고 골반검진결과는 골반의 대각 결합선이 정상치인 11.5센티미터를 초과하는 12.5센티미터이며 골반협부에 돌출부위나 골반벽 부분에 폭주도 없었고 천골 부위에도 이상이 없어 정상이었고 태아 역시 정상이었으며 그 몸무게는 3.8킬로그램으로 예상되었다. 원고 2는 위 입원일인 9.20. 09:20경부터 본격적으로 진통이 시작되어 13:00경 자궁입구에 태아의 머리가 보이자 산실로 옮겨져 위 병원의 2년차 전공의인 소외 2가 원고 2의 분만을 담당하게 되었고 소외 1의 진찰결과를 토대로 자연분만을 시도하였으나 산모의 미약진통과 태아의 머리가 커서 분만이 지연되자 흡입기(Vacuum)를 사용하여 소외 1, 같은 전공의인 소외 3과 번갈아 가며 태아를 뽑아내는 소위 흡입분만을 시도하였으나 태아의 머리가 커서 머리만 약간 나오고 완전히 분만되지 않았다. 그런데 위 원고의 골반크기가 정상이긴 하였지만 태아의 머리가 예상보다 커서 이와 같이 분만이 지연되는 경우 난산으로 인해 태아와 산모의 생명과 신체에 위험이 따를 여지가 있으므로, 원고 2의 분만을 담당하는 의사인 소외 2로서는 태아를 안전하게 분만할 수 있는 방법으로서 즉시 전문의에게 보고하여 그의 지시에 따르던가 제왕절개술을 시행하거나, 그것이 여의치 않아 부득이 심슨겸자(Simpson forceps)를 이용하여 태아의 두부를 집어 끌어내는 방법으로 분만을 시킬 경우에도 태아의 두부는 아직 발육중으로 약하고 연하여 분만이라는 특수상황 때문에 약간의 물리적 충격에 의해서도 쉽게 손상될 가능성이 있으므로(충격부위에 따라서는 치명적인 결과가 초래될 수 있다) 이러한 손상이 발생되지 않도록 고도의 주의를 하면서 심슨겸자를 사용해야 할 의무가 있음에도 전문의에게 보고하거나 제왕절개술을 시행하지 않았고, 또한 같은 날 14:30경 소외 1, 소외 3, 같은 전공의인 소외 4의 도움을 받아 심슨겸자를 사용 흡입기와 교대로 태아의 머리를 집어 끌어냄에 있어서 위와 같은 주의의무를 게을리 한 채 분만 직전 약 5분 동안 심슨겸자로 태아의 머리를 꽉 집어 무리하게 끌어낸 과실로 같은 날 15:05경 원고 1이 분만되었으나 머리가 보기 흉할 정도로 일그러져 있었고 그 당시 머리 양쪽 부위에 겸자에 눌린 흔적이 있었으며 원고 1의 두개골 부분이 직경 2센티미터 정도 함몰되었고, 원고 1은 출생 직후 자기 호흡을 하지 못하여 소외 2가 원고 1의 구강내 분비물을 제거하고 산소마스크로 산소를 주입하였으나 여전히 호흡하지 못하여 산소주입튜브를 기관지에 삽입 산소를 주입한 결과 2-3분 후에야 호흡을 시작하였으나 전혀 울지 못하였고 온 몸에 청색증 등의 증세로 상태불량하자 즉시 소아과병동으로 옮겨져 입원가료하게 되었다. 그 다음날인 9.21. 원고 1의 머리 오른쪽에 큰 두개혈종이 발견되었고 원고 1이 안정을 못하고 설치고 불규칙한 호흡을 하며 잦은 발작과 발작하는 동안 사지가 강직되는 등으로 뇌성마비증세를 보이자 당일 원고 1에 대한 두부 엑스레이(X-ray) 촬영과 그 다음날인 9.22. 영남대학교 영남의료원에서 뇌전산화단층촬영을 한 결과 원고 1에게 좌측측두골 두개골골절, 전반적인 뇌부종, 우측전후두정골부근과 좌측후두정골의 두혈종 및 두개내출혈이 있었으며, 원고 1은 위 증세에 대한 치료를 위해 1개월간 보육기(인큐베이터)에서 산소공급 및 투약과 치료를 받고 같은 해 10.21. 퇴원하였지만 그 증세가 크게 호전되지 않고 발육이 부진하는 등 뇌성마비의 증세가 완연히 나타나 1986.6.20. 고려대학교 의과대학 혜화병원에서 검진결과 원고 1의 증세는 뇌성마비로 밝혀졌다. 원고 1은 생후 만 24개월이 지났어도 말은 물론 혼자서 일어나 앉지도 못하고 비트는 등의 뇌성마비증세를 보이고 있는데, 신생아의 뇌성마비의 발생원인으로서는 출산 전 모체의 감염(특히 임신초 3개월간에 있어서의 풍진, 기타 바이러스 감염 등), 방사선조사, 출혈, 중독증, 제대의 이상, 태반의 이상, 모체의 산소결핍상태 등에 기인한 임신중의 무산소증, 모체와 태아의 혈액형 부적합으로 인한핵황달, 태아의 미성숙(특히 미숙아에 있어서는 분만외상을 받기 쉽고 두개내출혈을 일으키기 쉬우며 또한 산소결핍을 일으키기 쉽다) 등이 있고 출산시의 원인으로 비정상분만, 특히 난산 등의 경우 기계적 요인(특히 본건과 같이 겸자 등 기계조작으로 생긴 분만외상으로 인한 두개내출혈 등), 기도의 폐색, 호흡마비양수흡인에 기인한 신생아가사(저산소증) 등이 있고 출산 후의 원인으로서는 두부외상감염, 뇌종양을 들 수 있다는 것이다.
(2) Examining the evidence relations prepared by the court below based on the records, we affirm the above fact-finding by the court below, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete hearing, or error of interpretation of evidence, such as the assertion of the lawsuit.
In light of the above facts, it seems that the damage to the two parts, such as the brain side, the brain side, and the two parts of the two parts found after the birth of the plaintiff 1 was caused by the physical shock and pressure inflicted upon the non-party 2 at the time of delivery by neglecting the above duty of care as to the above recognition, thereby gathering the head of the fetus in an unreasonable manner to be concurrent holding concurrent office. In addition, in this case where the plaintiff 2 and the fetus were diagnosed to be extremely normal even before and after the birth, and there is no evidence to recognize that there was any infection or malfunction of the mother or fetus which could cause cerebral macy, it is presumed that the two parts of the two parts due to the use of the two parts by the non-party 2's unreasonable concurrent office are caused by the plaintiff 1's cerebral macy.
In the same purport, the court below is just in determining that the plaintiffs suffered damages due to the non-party 2's medical negligence is liable to the defendant, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the medical negligence, causation, and burden of proof, such as the assertion of the theory of lawsuit. The grounds for
2. As to the completion of the extinctive prescription
(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiffs' claim for damages against the plaintiff 1's active and passive property damages and extended damages from the plaintiff 1's claim for damages from 1986 August 5, 1986, since it is difficult to view that the defendant's claim was filed by the plaintiff 1's complaint of this case, 5,00,000 consolation money, 2 consolation money, 1,000, 50 consolation money, respectively, from 1,000 won, and 5,00 consolation money, from 1,00,000 won, at the court below's 1,000, it is hard to view that the above defendant's claim for damages against the plaintiff 1's above 1,000 consolation money from 1,000,000 won, 1,0000 consolation money, 2,000,000 won, and 1,000,000,000 later, 14,0.
(2) However, with respect to a claim for damages arising from a tort at an interval of time between a harmful act and the actual damage caused thereby, the date when it became known that the damage, which is the starting point of the extinctive prescription, was lost in a conceptual and dynamic state, was later realized. However, the degree or amount of actual damage should not be clearly known (see Supreme Court Decisions 88Da25168, Jan. 12, 1990; 91Da4180, May 22, 1992; 92Da20111, Apr. 14, 1992).
If the purport of the above 1986.12.23 the above 1986.12.12.23 of the judgment below is clear that the above 1986.12.23 of the body appraisal report remains, but it is difficult for the appraiser to make a judgment as to which degree of the thirical legacy will be made, it is objectively true that the damage caused by the thalthma in the labor ability due to the thalthy after the thalthy is realized, but it is only impossible to clearly understand the degree of the damage in the future. However, if the purport of the above 196.12.12 of the above 1986.12 of the judgment of the court below is that the above 19.12% of the losses caused by the thalthy after the thalthy or after the thalthy cannot be seen as having been known to the above plaintiff.
The judgment of the court below shall not be deemed to have committed an unlawful act that affected the conclusion of the judgment by neglecting the determination of the value of evidence and neglecting the deliberation without disclosing whether the purport of the above physical appraisal inquiry report is meaning any of the above two.
(3) However, according to the records, the plaintiffs are obligated to pay the above plaintiff 5 million won, 24,644,606 won as damages for lost profit and mental damage from the accident of this case to the maximum working age, and one million won as consolation money for the above plaintiff 1. The plaintiff 1 is entitled to pay 5 million won, 3, and 2 million won, respectively, to the remaining plaintiffs. For the convenience of the lawsuit, the plaintiff 1 is claiming 5 million won, 3, and 2 out of consolation money, 5 million won, and 5 million won, respectively, and 50 million won and 50 million won, respectively. The purport of claiming partial payment of damages for the convenience of the lawsuit above is to determine the amount of damages through physical appraisal in the lawsuit due to physical injury, and it is a common example that the plaintiffs' claim for damages from the date of the first instance trial to the part of the plaintiff 1's claim for consolation money, which is part of the plaintiff 1's physical damage claim, based on the premise that the plaintiff 1's claim for consolation and part of the remaining damages.
Ultimately, since the defendant's objection to the extinctive prescription is obvious in the record that there is no reason, even if the reasoning of the judgment of the court below that rejected it is erroneous, its conclusion cannot be justified.
3. As to the opening cost
Examining the results of physical appraisal commission adopted by the court below in accordance with the records, we affirm the measures that the court below judged that the plaintiff 1 suffered from the loss caused by the disbursement of opening expenses per wage for an adult female engaged in urban general labor during his lifetime, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the necessity and limit of opening expenses such as the theory of lawsuit, or in the incomplete hearing, and the theory that it is sufficient for the plaintiff 1 to work as a half-day or a third-day worker without the need to reach a meeting is merely an independent opinion.
4. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)