2. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport;

Korea Water Resources Corporation

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs, including the part resulting from the supplementary participation.

1. Regarding the plaintiffs' common grounds of appeal

A. As a matter of principle, an administrative agency’s disposition of the grounds of appeal regarding the disposition of a government’s basic plan refers to an act under the public law of an administrative agency, which is an act directly related to the rights and obligations of the people, such as ordering the establishment of rights or the burden of obligations with respect to a specific matter, or directly causing other legal effects. Thus, an act that does not directly change the legal status of the other party or related persons, such as internal decision-making by the administrative agency, does not constitute an act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Nu6889, Aug. 20, 199; 201Du111, Apr. 21, 201).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as cited by the court below and the records, "the 4th river master plan of this case" jointly announced on June 8, 2009 by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (hereinafter referred to as "the 4th river master plan of this case") shall be prepared for climate change, natural and human life, creation of national land, balanced regional development and establishment of green growth base", etc. It shall be divided into "the project implemented at the main stream of the 4th river," "the directly connected project implemented at the national river of the 0th river of the fourth river and the main stream," "the joint project implemented by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs," "the development of water resources, diverse concepts of new water resources, new river areas and river management, the plan for the improvement of the water quality of the environment and the implementation of the plan for the improvement of the water quality and the implementation of the plan."

24. The 'final report on the master plan for the master plan for the government of the instant case' contains specific explanation and data about the current status of water management, policy direction, promotion plan by task, lecture implementation plan, investment plan, implementation plan, project implementation plan, future plan' in relation to the basic plan for the government of the instant case, and its contents can be adjusted in the process of designing and executing the plan.

Therefore, in light of the above legal principles, the government basic plan of this case is a plan that presents the basic direction of 'the comprehensive plan formulated to systematically promote the four major river improvement projects and related projects in the surrounding areas' ("the Yeongsanmjin part of this case'). It merely presents the basic direction of the project inside the administrative agency and does not directly affect the rights and obligations of the people. Thus, it does not constitute an administrative disposition.

In the same purport, the lower court was justifiable to have determined that the instant government’s basic plan does not constitute an administrative disposition subject to an appeal litigation. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the disposition of the government’s basic plan and the eligibility for an appeal litigation, contrary to

B. As to the appeal on the part of the claim for revocation of the river execution plan under the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 2009- - 223 as to July 1, 2009 by the head of the Military Construction and Management Administration of Korea

The Plaintiffs filed an appeal against the dismissal of the lawsuit seeking revocation of the above river work implementation plan among the judgment below. However, the grounds of appeal on this part are not stated in the petition of appeal and the appellate brief.

2. As to the grounds of appeal regarding the plaintiffs' standing to sue as to the disposition stated in the separate list of plaintiffs except for the plaintiffs stated in the separate list of plaintiffs

A third party who has filed a suit for revocation on the ground that his/her environmental interests are infringed or are likely to be infringed by the administrative disposition, shall be entitled to sue to prove that his/her environmental interests are the interests individually, directly and specifically protected by the relevant laws and regulations or relevant laws and regulations, i.e., the interests protected by law.

However, in a case where the scope of the right of environmental impact, which is anticipated to be affected by the business, such as the act done by the disposition, is specifically stipulated in the relevant laws and regulations or related laws, residents in the right of influence may expect that the environmental damage would occur directly and seriously due to the relevant disposition. Such environmental benefits are direct and specific interests that are individually protected for each individual, and thus, they may be acknowledged as the legal interests that are actually presumed to have been infringed or threatened to infringe on the environmental interest, barring special circumstances, and thus, they may be recognized as the legal interests protected. On the other hand, residents in the right of influence and other residents shall prove that the environmental interest has suffered or is likely to suffer environmental damage exceeding the limit of tolerance compared to the previous disposition in question (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2006Du330, Mar. 16, 2006; Supreme Court Decision 2007Du16127, Apr. 15, 2010).

The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, acknowledged facts as stated in its holding, and rejected the plaintiffs' standing to sue in the separate list of standing to sue in the judgment of the court of first instance, which is located within the influence expected to be affected by the project, such as the act done by each of the dispositions of this case. The court below rejected the plaintiffs' remaining assertion that standing to sue should be recognized in accordance with individual provisions of each Act, such as the Noise and Vibration Control Act and the Natural Environment Conservation Act, against the plaintiffs living outside of the above influence rights or who are members of the environmental protection organization. The plaintiffs' remaining assertion that the above plaintiffs' standing to sue should be acknowledged in accordance with individual provisions

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the standing to sue of a person who is not the other party to an administrative disposition. This also applies when considering both the

3. As to the grounds of appeal by the plaintiffs in the separate list of standing to sue in the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiffs" in this paragraph)

A. As to the grounds of appeal on the violation of the River Act (1) citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the lower court determined that each of the instant implementation plan cannot be deemed unlawful due to the defect in the procedure for formulating a superior plan.

(A) In light of the long-term comprehensive water resource plan, basin comprehensive water control plan, basic river plan (hereinafter referred to as "along-term plan")’s establishment period and feasibility review period of the plan, and matters to be included in the contents of the plan, etc., the river construction plan was not established following the subsequent establishment of the upper-tier plan, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, or even if the contents of the river construction plan are different from those of the upper-tier plan, such circumstance alone does not make it illegal.

(B) According to the language and text of Article 24(5) of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 11194, Jan. 17, 2012; hereinafter the same), since the formation and operation of the basin management council is discretionary matters, even if the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport did not organize and operate the basin management council, the basin management plan cannot be deemed unlawful.

(2) The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, held that, where the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport approves an implementation plan pursuant to Article 10(1) of the former Korea Water Resources Corporation Act (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter the same) and the lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, consultation with the head of the relevant central administrative agency and the head of the relevant local government pursuant to Article 10(3) of the same Act cannot be deemed to have been conducted separately from the fact that consultation with the head of the relevant central administrative agency

was made.

(3) The reasoning of the lower judgment as above is related to Articles 23 through 25, 28, etc. of the former River Act.

Examining the contents of statutes, relevant legal principles, and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the formulation of superior plans prescribed by the former River Act, legal character, binding force, etc.

Meanwhile, in light of the relevant legal principles and records, it cannot be deemed that there was any defect in the consultation or deliberation procedures by the River Management Committee with regard to the formulation of the comprehensive water control plan for river basin, and there is no defect that deviates from the scope of agency in relation to the notification of the plan for river works, and each of the dispositions of this case cannot be deemed unlawful solely on the ground that the repair model test was not conducted in advance in relation to the installation of beams. Although the lower court did not make an explicit judgment on this, it did not err

B. Ground of appeal concerning the violation of the Construction Technology Management Act

According to Article 21-3 of the former Construction Technology Management Act (amended by Act No. 9848 of Dec. 29, 2009; hereinafter the same) and Articles 38-4 through 38-19 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Construction Technology Management Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21852 of Nov. 26, 2009; hereinafter the same), a contracting authority shall ensure that construction works are carried out in a mutually organic manner in the course of implementation, such as planning, design, construction, execution, supervision, maintenance, and management in order to implement construction works economically and efficiently. For this purpose, the contracting authority shall undergo the process of implementation, such as basic concept, feasibility study, construction plan, basic design, working design, etc. However, Article 38-4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Construction Technology Management Act does not require the implementation process of construction works.

citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the former River Act provides that the former River Act shall establish a flood control master plan (Article 23), a river basin comprehensive water control plan (Article 24), and a basic river plan (Article 25) through the survey of the river basin (Article 16), a floodgate survey (Article 17), a flood damage investigation (Article 21), etc. in connection with the implementation of river works; and the basic river plan (Article 25) shall be amended if necessary after regularly examining the feasibility of each plan. Such provisions of the former River Act are a procedure for examining the necessity, feasibility, appropriateness, etc. of river works, and as such, the above provisions of the former River Act fall under “where special provisions of other Acts and subordinate statutes are stipulated in Article 38-4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Construction Technology Management Act,” as stated in the judgment of the court below, since the technical and economic feasibility and examination of the project of this case were conducted through the process of establishing the basic river plan under the River Act.

Examining the provisions of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, including Article 21-3 of the former Construction Technology Management Act and Article 38-4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Construction Technology Management Act, and the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the subject of the application of the former Construction Technology Management Act. If a disposition was taken, such as approval, without going through such an environmental impact assessment as to the grounds of appeal on the violation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, was unlawful. However, if the contents of the environmental impact assessment were to be completed, even if the degree of the defect is somewhat insufficient, so long as the degree of the defect is not sufficient to achieve the legislative intent of the environmental impact assessment system, the defect is merely one factor to determine whether there was any deviation or abuse of discretion, and it does not necessarily constitute an unlawful disposition such as the pertinent approval (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Du396906, Jun. 29, 200006.

Furthermore, in light of the overall purport of pleadings and the outcome of the examination of evidence, the court determines facts free of charge in accordance with logical and empirical rules based on the principle of free evaluation of evidence, so long as it does not exceed the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, it shall belong to the discretion of the fact-finding court, and the fact-finding court shall bind the court of final appeal (Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Articles 202 and 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). (2) The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, acknowledged facts as stated in its reasoning. The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the initial environmental impact assessment and working design, and did not err by exceeding the bounds of the rules of free evaluation of evidence and exceeding the bounds of the law of free evaluation of environmental impact assessment (Article 8(1) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act and exceeding the bounds of the law of free evaluation of environmental impact assessment).

D. As to the grounds of appeal on the violation of the Korea Water Resources Corporation Act, the lower court determined that (1) the Intervenor’s participation in the project of this case cannot be deemed to be limited to the case where the scope of the project of the Intervenor’s Intervenor (hereinafter “ Intervenor”) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport solely or mainly was completed (interest-making water) upon citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, and that the Intervenor’s implementation of the project of 2, 3, and 6 sections in Yeongsan River pursuant to the disposition of the approval of the execution plan of this case does not exceed the scope of the project under the former Korea Water Resources Corporation Act, and (2) prior to the disposition of each approval of the execution plan for the project of 2, 3, and 6 sections in Yeongsan Seomjin Seari-gu by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport prior to the disposition of the approval of the execution plan for the project of this case, there was no procedural defect in the procedure, and (3) the Intervenor’s participation in the

Relation under Article 9 (1) 1 (d), 11, 10, 26, etc. of the former Korea Water Resources Corporation Act

Examining the contents of the law and the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, misapprehending the legal principles on the scope of the intervenor’

E. (1) According to Article 27 of the former River Act, when the river management agency intends to implement river works, it shall establish a plan for implementation of river works (hereinafter referred to as "river works implementation plan"), as prescribed by Presidential Decree. (3) Meanwhile, when a river management agency establishes or amends a river works plan, it shall be publicly notified as prescribed by Presidential Decree (amended by Act No. 10288, May 17, 2010; hereinafter the same). Under Article 38 of the former National Finance Act and Article 13 of the former Enforcement Decree of the National Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2343, Dec. 12, 2011; hereinafter the same), it is difficult to determine the budget of each of the instant cases based solely on the circumstance that each of the instant dispositions including new projects, the total project cost of which is at least five billion won, or which is beyond three million won, and thus, it is difficult to view that each of the instant dispositions is legitimate for the Defendants to be conducted based on its own review and determination of the budget.

(3) The lower court’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ assertion that each of the dispositions of this case was unlawful, as it was immediately erroneous in the process of each of the dispositions of this case, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of breach of duty of preliminary feasibility study under the former Act on National Re-Governmental Matters. As to the grounds of appeal on deviation from and abuse of discretionary power, the administrative plan was established as an activity standard to realize a certain order at a certain point in the future by integrating and coordinating the relevant administrative means to achieve a specific administrative objective based on professional and technical judgment on administration. As such, only abstract administrative goals and procedures are stipulated in the relevant statutes, and there are no specific provisions regarding administrative plans, if the administrative body does not provide for the contents of the administrative plan, the administrative body has a relatively broad freedom to formulate and make decisions on the specific administrative plan. However, such freedom of formation, not only unlimited but also between the public interest and private interest of the persons involved in the administrative plan and should be fairly compared with each other.

Inasmuch as there are restrictions on the administrative agency’s establishment and decision of the administrative plan, if the administrative agency did not at all balance of interest or omitted matters that should be included in the subject of consideration of the balance of interest, or if the administrative plan’s decision does not meet legitimacy and objectivity even though it was imposed on the subject of consideration of the balance of interest, it is unlawful (Supreme Court Decisions 96Nu8567 Decided November 29, 196; 96Nu8567 Decided November 29, 2012)

1. (See Supreme Court Decision 2010Du5806, Feb. 3, 2016). (2) The lower court acknowledged facts as indicated in its reasoning, citing the reasons of the first instance judgment. (1) In light of the incomplete repair and the current status of the Yeongsan River basin, etc., it is difficult to deny the need to prevent large-scale flood damage on the main stream of Yeongsan River by forecasting flood that may occur in the future and its damage therefrom, and it seems that the Defendants could not be able to prevent flood damage through installation and operation of beams, etc. (2) It is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendants were unable to use water quality improvement in the Yeongsan River basin as well as its long-term demand for the installation of water quality improvement, and it is difficult to readily conclude that there is lack of economic feasibility and similarity between water quality improvement and the installation of water pollution in the river basin and the installation of water quality improvement in the river basin. (3) It is difficult to conclude that there is lack of water quality improvement in terms of the environment of the Republic of Korea, including water pollution from the river.

(3) The part of the ground of appeal disputing such determination by the lower court is merely an error in the selection of evidence and the determination of value of evidence belonging to the free trial of the fact-finding court.

In addition, according to the reasoning of the first instance judgment as cited by the lower court and the evidence duly adopted, ① the creation of an ecological river in eight districts with a total project cost of at least 50 billion won, ② the construction of a bicycle lane in the Nakdong River basin, the construction of a river in the Bogsan Dam and a permanent dam, and the six agricultural reservoir projects, etc., a preliminary feasibility study has been conducted on the total of 17 detailed unit projects, and the benefits and cost ratio (referred to as the economic feasibility if the ratio is greater than 1) as a result of the implementation of the project is more than 0.0 to March 46, 15 projects, and there is no need for a comprehensive feasibility study on the development of the national economy and the implementation of the project, and there is a lack of technological feasibility analysis on the development of the national economy and the implementation of the project through the analysis of the development of the new water quality and the implementation of the project through the analysis of the results of the project from 08 to 70.7.

Examining the circumstances and the reasoning of the lower judgment, including the aforementioned circumstances, as well as the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is acceptable as it is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence by exceeding the bounds of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the defects in the balancing

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party, including the part resulting from participation in the appeal. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Park Poe-young