Article 168-8 of the Enforcement Decree of Income Tax Act

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The Defendant’s disposition of imposition of capital gains tax of KRW 000 for the year 2007 against the Plaintiff on September 15, 2009 (which appears to be a clerical error in September 9, 2009) is revoked.

The matters to be explained in this part are as follows: Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since the matters are the same as the part of Part 3 through 14 of the judgment of the court of first instance.

2. The plaintiff's assertion

The matters to be explained in this part are as follows: Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act see the same as Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. Related statutes;

In addition to the addition of the Act and subordinate statutes, the matters to be explained in this part are the same as those of the fifth or sixth parts of the judgment of the court of first instance ("related Acts and subordinate statutes"), so it is accepted in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

4. Determination

A. Articles 104(1)2-7 and 104-3(1)1(a) of the Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009; hereinafter the same shall apply) stipulate that the owner of the farmland who does not reside in the seat of the farmland or does not cultivate the farmland for non-business purpose as prescribed by Presidential Decree shall be regarded as the land for non-business purpose, and subject to heavy taxation at the rate of 60/100.

Article 168-8 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20618, Feb. 22, 2008; hereinafter the same) provides that "farmland for which the owner does not reside in the location of the farmland or does not grow by himself/herself means farmland other than farmland for which the owner is registered as a resident in the same Si/Gun/Gu as the location of the farmland or in a Si/Gun/Gu adjacent thereto, or a person who actually resides in the area within a Si/Gun/Gu adjacent thereto, as defined in Article 2 (5) of the Farmland Act."

Article 2 subparagraph 5 of the Farmland Act provides that "self-gravation" refers to the cultivation of crops or the cultivation of perennial plants, or the cultivation or cultivation of at least 1/2 of farming works with own labor, and the Enforcement Rule of the Farmland Act provides that "self-gravation" means the cultivation of crops or the cultivation of perennial plants by at least 1/2 of the labor force.

The above provisions are subject to heavy taxation at the rate of 60/100 on gains from transfer of farmland, forest land, stock farm land, and land for non-business land and miscellaneous land for the purpose of stabilizing the real estate market by suppressing the demand for real estate speculation and recovering speculative gains by imposing capital gains tax if the land is used as a means of property increase without using it for a productive purpose according to the actual demand.

(b) Each of the statements set forth in Gap evidence Nos. 9, 11, 12, and Eul evidence Nos. 2 to 8 (including each number), the testimony of the court of first instance KimA, and witness OB at the court of first instance by integrating the overall purport of the pleadings, and the circumstances in light of these facts are as follows.

(1) The Plaintiff was engaged in real estate brokerage, etc. from November 14, 2003, prior to the acquisition of the instant land, and even after the acquisition of the instant land, there was 000 won as real estate brokerage, etc.’s profit (income amount of 000 won) and 000 won as income (income amount of 000 won) in 2006.

On March 31, 2006, the Plaintiff transferred the address of 000 U.S. Si, Chungcheongnam-do on March 31, 2006 for the purpose of real estate brokerage, etc. from among the Do holding the instant land, and on May 29, 2006, the Plaintiff transferred the address again to 000-00 U.S. O. Si, Chungcheongnam-do on May 29, 2006.

According to the above circumstances, the Plaintiff appears to have invested a substantial portion of its own labor in the real estate brokerage, etc. during the possession of the instant land, and it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff invested a considerable portion of its own labor in order to cultivate crops or cultivate perennial plants in the instant land.

(2) The time when the Plaintiff acquired the instant land had been in charge of real estate brokerage, etc., and the Plaintiff asserted that the instant land was jointly purchased by the Plaintiff and JinCC, while the Plaintiff was located within the land transaction permission zone and the registration of the conclusion of the sales contract and the transfer of ownership was made in the sole name of the Plaintiff in the litigation related to the purchase price of the instant land (Sacheon District Court 2005Gahap17309).

Of the acquisition value of the land of this case, 000 won was borne by JinCC, and 000 won was loaned to Nonghyup. The Plaintiff transferred the land of this case to 000 won at two and half years from the time of acquiring it, and the transfer margin came to the degree of 00 won.

According to the above circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff intended to cultivate crops or cultivate perennial plants by inserting its own labor in the instant land.

(3) B/3 of the instant land had been cultivated by OB before the Plaintiff acquired the instant land, and the remaining 1/3 of the instant land was planted by fruit trees. However, there was no particular change in the said situation while the Plaintiff acquired and owned the instant land.

According to the above circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff invested a considerable portion of its own labor in order to cultivate crops or cultivate perennial plants on the key land among the instant land.

(4) The Plaintiff asserts that he had cultivated the instant land by means of eco-friendly organic farming law on the key land among the instant land. However, in order to grow the instant land by means of eco-friendly organic farming law, efforts and expenses are more likely to be incurred than ordinary farming due to difficulties in harmful insects and soil management (the testimony of a witness KimA), farming operations, such as grass-beer, drainage maintenance, harvest, etc., asserted by the Plaintiff, were supported by others, such as KimA, and he purchased and spread at his own expense.

According to the above circumstances, since the Plaintiff cultivated the instant land from the key land to the eco-friendly organic farming law, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff had the labor force to put in the farming work. Moreover, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff had the labor force to put in the farming work from the key land among the instant land as its own labor.

C. As seen above, in full view of the Plaintiff’s occupation and profit, the details and current status of acquiring the instant land, and the degree of farming work necessary for a private cultivation, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have engaged in a private cultivation of more than 1/2 of its own labor in the key land among the instant land, and the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have engaged in a private cultivation of more than 1/2 of its own labor in the key land among the instant land, and the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have engaged in a private cultivation of more than 1/2 of its own labor in the key land. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have engaged in

Therefore, the disposition of this case, which applied the heavy taxation rate, is legitimate, considering that the land of this case among the land of this case is also the land for non-business use.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim seeking the cancellation of the part relating to the land of this case among the disposition of this case shall be dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is justified as it is in conclusion, and it is so decided as per Disposition.