[2] Details of official duties where the State or a local government is liable for damages due to a public official’s breach of official duties, and the standard for determining proximate causal relation

[3] Where the State is liable to compensate the victim for damages due to the negligence by the police officer’s performance of duties, the method of determining the scope of compensation for damages, and whether it is a fact-finding authority to determine the fact-finding or ratio on the grounds for mitigation of liability (affirmative in

[4] Whether the amount of consolation money for emotional distress suffered by a tort is the discretionary matter of the fact-finding court (affirmative)

[5] The legal nature of the bereaved family relief fund stipulated in Article 17(2) of the Crime Victim Protection Act / The purpose of the provisions of Article 20 of the Crime Victim Protection Act, Article 16 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and the relationship between the compensation for damage under the State Compensation Act and the bereaved family relief fund under

[2] If the content of the official duty imposed on a public official is not merely for the public interest or for the purpose of regulating the internal order of an administrative agency, but entirely or incidentally established to protect the safety and interest of an individual member of society, the State shall be liable to compensate for the damage inflicted on the victim by violating the official duty. In determining the existence of proximate causal relation, the State shall comprehensively take into account not only the probability of the occurrence of the general result, but also the purpose of Acts and subordinate statutes and other rules of conduct imposing the official duty, the form of the harmful act

[3] In a case where the State is liable for damages due to a police officer’s negligence in the performance of duties by the police officer, the scope of damages can be limited in light of the principle of fair compensation system, such as the content and nature of the police officer’s duty of care required in the performance of duties, background of the police officer’s breach of duty of care and the manner of violation of duty of care, and objective circumstances or degree involved in the occurrence and expansion of damages to the victim, etc. Furthermore, the determination of facts and proportion of the causes for mitigation of liability belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, unless it is recognized that it is considerably unreasonable in light

[4] The amount of consolation money for mental suffering suffered by tort can be determined by the fact-finding court at its discretion, taking into account all the circumstances into consideration.

[5] Of the crime damage relief fund under the Crime Victim Protection Act, the bereaved family relief fund under Article 17 (2) of the above Act aims at compensating the victim or his/her bereaved family members who died of an act corresponding to a crime that harms human life or body. It is reasonable to view that it is the same kind of money as passive compensation for damages caused by a tort in that it is paid for compensating for losses or losses caused by the above crime.

Meanwhile, Article 20 of the Crime Victim Protection Act provides that "where a victim or his/her bereaved family member is eligible to receive benefits, etc. under the State Compensation Act or other Acts and subordinate statutes on the grounds of a criminal injury subject to relief, no relief fund shall be paid, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Article 16 of the Enforcement Decree of the Crime Victim Protection Act provides that "where a victim subject to relief under Article 16 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "victim subject to relief") or his/her bereaved family member is able to receive any of the following compensation, benefits, etc., a relief fund under Article 16 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "rescue fund") shall not be paid within the scope of the amount to be paid pursuant to Article 20 of the Act," and subparagraph 1 provides that "the amount of compensation for damage under Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act shall be paid in duplicate by receiving both the same kind of benefits at the expense of the State or local government under the State Compensation Act for the same crime."

Therefore, if a victim of a crime subject to relief dies, if a victim of a victim of a crime subject to relief was paid damages for passive damages of a victim of a victim of rescue who died from the State or a local government under the State Compensation Act, the District Council should pay the bereaved family members only the balance calculated by deducting the equivalent amount from the bereaved family relief fund, which is the same kind of benefits, and if the bereaved family members received the bereaved family relief fund from the District Council, the State or the local government should pay the bereaved family members only the balance calculated by deducting the amount of the bereaved family relief fund received from the amount of the bereaved family

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. Judgment on the ground of appeal as to whether to recognize liability for damages

1) The police officers, along with the prevention, suppression, and investigation of crimes, engage in the protection of the lives, bodies, and property of the people, and the maintenance of public peace and order. For the smooth performance of their duties, various authorities are granted under relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Criminal Procedure Act, etc. Thus, police officers performing specific duties may exercise various authorities assigned to them in response to all circumstances and take necessary measures. Such authorities are generally delegated at reasonable discretion based on the professional judgment of police officers. However, in cases where it is deemed that it is considerably unreasonable for police officers to exercise their authority and take necessary measures according to specific circumstances in light of the purport and purpose of granting authority to police officers, non-exercise of such authority is deemed to violate official duties (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da54482, May 8, 1998, etc.).

If the content of a public official’s duty imposed on a public official is not merely for the public interest or for the purpose of regulating the order inside the administrative agency, but entirely or incidentally for the protection of the safety and interest of an individual of the members of the society, the State shall be liable to compensate for the damage inflicted upon the victim by violating such duty to the extent that the proximate causal relation is acknowledged. In determining the existence of proximate causal relation, the State shall comprehensively consider not only the probability of the occurrence of the result, but also the purpose of the statutes and other rules of conduct imposing the duty, the form of the harmful act, and the degree of damage (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Da43466, Feb. 12, 1993; 2007Da38618, Nov. 15, 2007).

2) After citing the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and, in light of the circumstances stated in its reasoning, determined that the Defendant police officers’ failure to take any measures 24 minutes after the time of the instant report by misunderstanding that the instant report is identical to another report prior to the instant report constitutes a violation of official duties by performing official duties considerably unreasonable due to negligence, and that proximate causation exists between the breach of such official duties and the murder case against the victim, and that the relevant police officers could have predicted the occurrence of the instant murder case.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below in light of the records, although the reasoning of the judgment below is somewhat insufficient, the decision of the court below which recognized liability for damages against the defendant is just in accordance with the legal principles as seen earlier, and there is no violation of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the violation of duties due to negligence, proximate causal relation and predictability, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations

B. Determination as to the ground of appeal on limitation of liability and calculation of consolation money

1) In a case where the State is liable for compensating the victim for damages due to a police officer’s negligence in the performance of duties by the police officer under its jurisdiction, the scope of compensation for damages may be limited in light of the ideology of the equitable compensation system, such as the fair apportionment of damages, taking into account all the circumstances such as the contents and nature of the police officer’s duty of care required in the performance of duties, the background leading up to the police officer’s breach of the duty of care and the manner of violation of the duty of care, and the occurrence and expansion of the victim’s damage, and the degree of the objective circumstances involved. Furthermore, fact-finding of the grounds for mitigation of liability and determination of the rate thereof are matters under the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is recognized that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see,

In light of the above legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination as to the facts finding of the first instance court as cited by the lower court on the grounds for mitigation of liability or the Defendant’s rate of mitigation of liability cannot be deemed to be considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal,

2) Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money for mental suffering suffered by tort, a fact-finding court may determine it at its discretion, taking into account all the circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377 delivered on April 23, 199, etc.).

The court below, citing the judgment of the court of first instance, determines the amount of consolation money in consideration of the background of the murder case, the plaintiffs' status, and all other circumstances revealed in this case. In light of the records, the amount of consolation money calculated by the court below is reasonable, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the calculation of consolation money

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. Of the crime victim relief fund under the Crime Victim Protection Act, the bereaved family relief fund under Article 17(2) of the same Act aims at compensating the victim or his/her bereaved family members who died due to an act constituting a crime that undermines human life or body, and it is reasonable to view that it is the same kind of money as the passive compensation for damages caused by a tort in that it is paid to compensate for losses or losses caused by the above crime.

Meanwhile, Article 20 of the Crime Victim Protection Act provides that "where a victim or his/her bereaved family member is eligible to receive benefits, etc. under the State Compensation Act or other Acts and subordinate statutes on the grounds of a criminal injury subject to relief, no relief fund shall be paid, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Article 16 of the Enforcement Decree of the Crime Victim Protection Act provides that "where a victim subject to relief under Article 16 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "victim subject to relief") or his/her bereaved family member is able to receive any of the following compensation, benefits, etc., a relief fund under Article 16 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "rescue fund") shall not be paid within the scope of the amount to be paid pursuant to Article 20 of the Act," and subparagraph 1 provides that "the amount of compensation for damage under Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act shall be paid in duplicate by receiving both the same kind of benefits at the expense of the State or local government under the State Compensation Act for the same crime."

Therefore, if a victim of a crime subject to relief dies, if a victim of a victim of a crime subject to relief was paid a compensation for passive damage by the State or a local government under the State Compensation Act, the District Council should pay the bereaved family members only the balance calculated by deducting the equivalent amount from the bereaved family relief fund, which is the same kind of benefits, and if the bereaved family members received the bereaved family relief fund from the District Council, the State or the local government should pay the bereaved family members only the balance calculated by deducting the amount equivalent to the bereaved family relief fund received by the bereaved family members from the passive amount of the victim of the crime subject to relief.

B. The evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court reveals the fact that the Defendant paid KRW 52,545,380 to Plaintiff 3 and Plaintiff 4, who was the victim’s children on December 2, 2015, after the victim’s death.

Examining these facts in light of the above legal principles, in calculating the amount of damages that the defendant should pay to the above plaintiffs due to the death of the victim, the bereaved family relief fund received by the above plaintiffs should be deducted from the victim's passive damages.

Nevertheless, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the amount of the bereaved family relief fund paid by the above plaintiffs should be deducted from the amount of damages. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the relationship between the bereaved family relief fund under the Crime Victim Protection Act and the claim for damages, and Article 20 of the Crime Victim Protection Act and Article 16 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant as to the property damage of plaintiffs 3 and 4 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The defendant's appeal against plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the remaining appeals against plaintiffs 3 and 4 are all dismissed. The costs of appeal against the dismissed appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench

Justices Kwon Soon-il (Presiding Justice)