2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

the Gu Office's place of service and place of service

1. Purport of claim

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant confirms that the disposition of imposition of KRW 000 on the plaintiff of X. X. of 1997 is invalid.

The court's explanation on this part is as follows: (a) the part 1-B, (c), (d), and (e) of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is changed as follows; (b) the part 1-B, (c), (d), and (e) is changed as follows; (b) the part 2-D of the judgment of the court of first instance is changed as follows; and (c) the part 7 and 8 of the judgment of the court of first instance are changed as "related Acts and subordinate statutes" of the judgment of the court of first instance as "relevant Acts and subordinate statutes" of the court of first instance as "related Acts and subordinate statutes" of the judgment of the court of first instance; and (b) it is identical to that of paragraphs 1 and 2-B of

B. On 1982, X. 1982, the Plaintiff entered into a pre-sale agreement (hereinafter the instant pre-sale agreement) with the Plaintiff on the nine parcels of land, including each of the instant land, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “nine parcels of land”) with the Plaintiff’s husband to acquire and repay KRW 20,000,000 among the credit payment obligations against AB arising from the Plaintiff’s agency operation, and to ensure the performance of the said obligation, and the Plaintiff’s right to claim transfer of ownership under the provisional registration against each of the instant land, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “the instant provisional registration”) on October 1982, 1982, when the Plaintiff was unable to repay the above obligation by the end of x. 1982, even though there was no declaration of completion of the purchase and sale resolution of the Plaintiff’s 9 parcels of land, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “the instant land”). In order to preserve the right to claim transfer of ownership under the provisional registration.

C. In addition, the Plaintiff agreed with AB to operate the said agency and to add up to KRW 10,00,000 to the credit payment debt of KRW 10,00,000 that may arise from the said transaction to the secured debt of the provisional registration of this case. In addition, the Plaintiff entered into the transaction with AB for about about 10 months, and completed the transaction with AB after having been discharged from the credit payment debt of approximately KRW 10,00,000 for about 10 months.

D. After that, AB filed a lawsuit against the Plaintiff seeking implementation of the procedure for the principal registration of ownership transfer on the ground of the provisional registration of this part of the instant land as Seoul Civil District Court 00 Ma00000, which was based on the provisional registration of this part XX. The Plaintiff filed a counterclaim against AB seeking implementation of the procedure for the cancellation registration of the provisional registration of this case under the above court 00 Ma00000,000, claiming that the provisional registration of this case was completed by AB’s coercion. The above court concluded a contract for the purchase and sale of this case, but it is difficult to recognize the Plaintiff’s assertion that the provisional registration of this case was completed by the AB’s coercion, but all of the Plaintiff’s counterclaim claims were dismissed (hereinafter referred to as the “civil judgment of this case”), and the judgment of this case became final and conclusive around that time.

E. According to the civil judgment of this case, the principal registration of transfer of ownership (hereinafter all hereinafter referred to as the "principal registration of this case") was completed in the future X. XXB on each land of this case.

2. Whether the instant disposition is null and void

A. The plaintiff's assertion

For the following reasons, the Plaintiff asserts that the instant disposition was null and void after the exclusion period for imposition expires.

1) Since there was no agreement between the Plaintiff and AB on accord and satisfaction with respect to each of the instant lands, the time when the procedure for actual settlement is completed in accordance with the legal principles of provisional registration, security Act (hereinafter “Provisional Registration Security Act”) or the weak meaning of transfer for security, is the time of transfer of each of the instant lands (hereinafter “transfer of each of the instant lands”).

2) ① The 1982. XX., the date of the completion of the promise to sell and purchase each of the instant lands, and ② the time of the transfer of this case should be regarded as the time of the transfer of this case, since each of the settlement procedures was completed in X, X, 1983, the date of closing the argument of the instant civil judgment. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 13335, Feb. 2, 1990; Presidential Decree No. 13508, Feb. 2, 1990; Presidential Decree No. 13508, Feb. 2, 1990>

3) Even if the transfer date of the instant case is deemed to be the most late X. 190 during each of the above periods, the instant disposition that the Defendant imposed the transfer income tax on the Plaintiff is unlawful after the lapse of five years of exclusion period of imposition.

B. Determination

Considering the following circumstances, the transfer date of this case is reasonable to deem the transfer date of this case to be X. of 191, when the principal registration of this case was completed, the disposition of this case cannot be deemed to be null and void after the expiration of the exclusion period of imposition. Thus, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

1) Since the Provisional Registration Security Act applies to cases where a promise to transfer other property rights with respect to the return of a borrowed object is made, in cases where provisional registration is made to secure a payment obligation, the Provisional Registration Security Act does not apply (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Da63138, 63145, Oct. 27, 2016). Meanwhile, even in cases where the Provisional Registration Security Act is not applicable, in cases where a creditor completed a provisional registration for the purpose of securing a claim, and the principal registration of transfer of ownership based on the provisional registration is completed as a result of the creditor’s completion of a provisional registration for the purpose of securing a claim, and the debtor’s failure to repay the secured obligation at the maturity date, unless otherwise stipulated, the obligation ceases to exist and the ownership of the real estate is finally attributed to the creditor, and such registration shall also be deemed as a transfer of security with the weak meaning of the procedure for settlement, which is scheduled to be made (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 83Nu661, Dec. 26, 1984). 206

However, there is no circumstance to deem that there was a special agreement between the Plaintiff and Ansan stating that the obligation has ceased to exist if the Plaintiff did not repay the credit payment obligation at the time of maturity, and that the ownership of each of the instant land belongs to AB in a conclusive manner. Therefore, the principal registration of the instant case is completed as the object of collateral security, and thus, it should be deemed as a weak meaning transfer security that

2) Meanwhile, Article 45(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14467, Dec. 31, 1994; hereinafter the same) provides that where an obligor transfers an asset to secure the repayment of an obligation, and a copy of a contract meeting certain requirements is attached to the final return of tax base, such transfer shall not be deemed to have been made. Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that where an obligor violates the requirements of paragraph (1) after concluding a contract on security or appropriating an asset for repayment due to nonperformance of obligation, it shall be deemed that the obligor transfers the asset at that time. Therefore, when the ownership transfer registration is completed for the purpose of security, the obligor cannot submit the final return of tax base attached with a copy of contract under Article 45(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act to the tax office to secure the repayment of the obligation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 79Nu187, Sept. 11, 1979; 200Nu1464, etc.).

3) First, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the Plaintiff submitted the final return on tax base along with a copy of the contract under Article 45(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act concerning the completion of the principal registration of each of the instant land to the tax office.

4) We examine whether the payment has been appropriated for repayment.

① The Plaintiff asserted that at the time of completion of the settlement procedure, only submitted the original copy, etc. of the judgment in the civil case of this case and did not present at all. ② It is difficult to deem that the settlement procedure of this case was completed between the Plaintiff and Ansan at each time of the Plaintiff’s assertion that the ownership of each of the land of this case was transferred at each time of the Plaintiff’s assertion that the principal registration of this case was completed, and cannot be seen as being appropriated for repayment. ③ In order to transfer the security right to properties transferred for the purpose of security right to this case to creditors finally and conclusively by way of settlement of accounts for attribution, the obligee’s appraisal at an appropriate price should be applied to the principal and interest of the secured claim, and if the appraisal value falls short of the secured claim amount, the remaining amount shall be returned to the obligor, or if so, the method of notifying the settlement of accounts for attribution cannot be seen as either oral or written, and the liquidation amount cannot be seen as being less than the secured claim amount. ④ The Plaintiff’s assertion that each of the above real estate of this case belongs to the obligee’s 2016.

5) Ultimately, with respect to the Plaintiff’s completion of the principal registration of each of the instant lands, the Plaintiff did not submit the final return on tax base along with a copy of the contract under Article 45(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act to the tax office. Moreover, around X. of October 1991, the ownership of each of the instant lands was finally transferred to and appropriated for repayment. As such, the instant transfer constitutes a transfer subject to the imposition of capital gains tax, and the time of the instant transfer is X. x. of October 191.

6) Therefore, from June 1, 192, the day following the deadline for filing a tax base of transfer income due to the transfer of this case, the disposition of this case done X, X, which was within the five-year exclusion period of imposition under Article 26-2(1)1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4672, Dec. 31, 1993; hereinafter the same) shall not be deemed unlawful as alleged by the plaintiff.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.