2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff,

(a) Codefendants in the first instance trial, Codefendant 2, Ltd., and Codefendant 3 in the first instance trial, jointly and severally, for KRW 725,50,842, and KRW 488,80,728 among them, and for KRW 55,800,000 from May 9, 1985, and for KRW 8,200,00 from May 25, 1985, and for KRW 19% from October 15, 1985 to 10,320,231 from June 17, 1986 to the date of full payment; and

B. The defendants are jointly and severally with the defendants listed in the above paragraph (a) above, 207,285,955 won among the above paragraph (a) above, and 139,657,351 won among them, and 139,657 won from May 9, 1985, and 15,942,857 won from May 25, 1985 to 2,342,857 won, and from October 15, 1985 to 2,948,638 won from June 17, 1986 to the date of full payment.

(c) the co-defendants in the first instance trial, Co-defendants in the first instance trial, and Co-defendants in the first instance trial, jointly and severally 30,969,467 won and 27,68,069 won among them, with 19% per annum from December 17, 1985 to the date of full payment.

D. Co-defendant 3 of the above paragraph (c) above is jointly and severally with the defendants in the above paragraph (c) above, against KRW 13,272,629 and KRW 11,86,315 among them; the defendants are 8,848,419 respectively; and the defendants are 19% per annum from December 17, 1985 to the date of full payment to KRW 7,910,877 among them.

(e) 2,034,95 won and the rate of 19% per annum from April 27, 1985 to the date of full payment for Co-Defendant Co-Defendant Co-Defendant Co-Defendant Co-Defendant Co-Defendant Co., Ltd.; and

G. Co-Defendant 3 of the first instance trial among the amounts described in the above paragraph (e) above is jointly and severally with the Defendant described in the above paragraph (e) above, with 19% interest per annum from April 27, 1985 to the date of full payment, and from April 27, 1985 to the date of full payment.

2. Purport of appeal

The part against the defendants in the judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim against the defendants is dismissed (the court of the first instance accepted the plaintiff's claim against the co-defendant 2, the co-defendant 3, and the co-defendant 6 in the first instance court, but this was excluded from the scope of the first instance trial because the co-defendant 6 in the first instance court did not appeal.)

The following facts are clear in the records, or acknowledged by Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2, Eul evidence 3, Gap evidence 4-1, 2, Eul evidence 1, Eul evidence 2, Eul evidence 6, and the whole purport of the arguments.

A. On October 9, 199, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit with the court of first instance. The court of first instance served the duplicate of the instant complaint on Defendant 1 as “Songnam-si Branch of District Party (hereinafter address omitted),” which is its address, and served on Defendant 2 by means of service by public notice.

B. On March 17, 2000, the court of first instance sentenced the judgment of the court of first instance that accepted the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants, and served the original of the judgment to the Defendants by means of service by public notice, and around that time, the judgment of the court of first instance became final and conclusive in form.

C. On December 30, 199, the Plaintiff transferred to the Reorganization Bank Co., Ltd., and the Reorganization Bank Co., Ltd., on December 28, 2000, to the Intervenor succeeding to the Plaintiff each assigned the claim pursuant to the above-mentioned judgment finalized in the above-mentioned form.

D. On June 12, 2006, the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor filed a lawsuit against the Defendants for the extension of the extinctive prescription against the Seoul Central District Court 2006Gahap49784 (hereinafter “instant subsequent lawsuit”). The said court served a copy of the complaint against the Defendants and a notice of the date for pleading by service, and served the Defendants with the notice of the date for pleading by public notice, and served the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor’s claim against the Defendants on April 27, 2007, and served the original copy of the judgment with the method of service by public notice.

E. According to the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor’s application for a compulsory auction based on the original copy of the judgment of the first instance court of the instant subsequent suit, the Suwon District Court rendered a decision to commence a compulsory auction on August 8, 2011 with respect to the real estate owned by the Defendants, as set forth in No. 9212, Aug. 201.

F. The Defendants were living in a foreign country without knowing the continued fact of the instant subsequent suit and the fact that the judgment of the first instance court was rendered, and Defendant 1 was served with the order to commence a compulsory auction on November 4, 201 by serving foreigners. At that time, the Defendants became aware of the fact that the judgment of the first instance court of the instant subsequent suit was served by service by public notice.

G. Accordingly, on November 9, 2011, the Defendants filed a subsequent appeal against the instant subsequent trial by Seoul High Court Decision 2011Na101904, and the attorney of the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor, during the said appellate trial, submitted a preparatory document along with the copy of the instant first instance judgment on April 26, 2012. The Nonparty, the attorney at the attorney-at-law, who is the Defendants of the instant subsequent trial, served a copy of the said preparatory document and the instant first instance judgment on the same day, and searched the progress of the instant subsequent trial through the search by the Supreme Court.

H. On June 21, 2012, the appellate court of the instant subsequent appeal rendered a judgment dismissing the remainder of the appeal by the Defendants on the grounds that “In the event that the judgment of the first instance court of this case became final and conclusive as the subsequent appeal, etc. was not filed, the defense of refusal of inheritance by the Defendants violates res judicata,” and rendered a judgment dismissing the Defendants’ remaining appeal.

I. The Defendants filed an appeal for the instant subsequent completion on July 3, 2012.

2. Whether the appeal by the defendant 1 is lawful;

Article 173(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that “Any reason for which a party cannot be held liable” refers to a reason why the party could not observe the relevant period even though he/she had been generally required to perform the procedural acts. As such, in cases where the service of documents in the process of a lawsuit was impossible and the service of documents in the process of service by public notice was inevitable as a result, the party is obliged to investigate the progress of the lawsuit from the beginning. Thus, if the party did not know the progress of the lawsuit before the court, it cannot be said that there was no negligence. Such obligation is to be borne, regardless of whether the party was present and present at the date for pleading, whether the party was notified of the date for pleading after the date for pleading, or whether the party was appointed as the legal representative at the date for pleading (see Supreme Court Decisions 86Da2224, Mar. 10, 1987; 97Da50152, Oct. 22, 198; 2004Da16684, Jul. 24, 2004).

In this case, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit of this case with the court of first instance on October 9, 199, and the court of first instance served a duplicate of the complaint of this case on defendant 1 as "Songnam-si Branch of District Party (hereinafter address omitted)," which is the address of this case, and thereafter the court of first instance sentenced the judgment of the court of first instance on March 17, 200, and served the original copy to defendant 1 by means of service by public notice. The above facts are acknowledged as 1. A. B. as of the above 1.B., unless there is any evidence that the delivery of the above address by defendant 1 was unlawful, it is reasonable to view that defendant 1 was aware of the fact that the litigation of this case was commenced by receiving the copy of the complaint of this case, and in such a case, the court of first instance became final and conclusive by allowing the defendant 1 to find out the progress and result of the lawsuit of this case without examining them, and thus, it cannot be viewed that the defendant 1 did not have any result of the appeal of this case as unlawful.

3. Whether the appeal by the defendant 2 is lawful;

A. If a copy of a complaint, an original copy, etc. of a judgment were served by service by public notice, barring any special circumstance, the defendant was unaware of the service of the judgment without negligence. In such a case, the defendant is entitled to file a subsequent appeal within two weeks (30 days if the cause ceases to exist in a foreign country at the time the cause ceases to exist) after the cause ceases to exist (30 days if the cause ceases to exist). Here, the term “after the cause ceases to exist” refers not to the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice, but to the time when the fact that the judgment was served by public notice was ordinarily known, barring any special circumstance, it shall be deemed that the party or legal representative was aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice only when the party or legal representative inspected the records of the case or received new original copy of the judgment by public notice (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da8005, Feb. 24, 2006).

In this case, on November 9, 201, the Defendants filed a subsequent appeal against the Seoul High Court Decision No. 2011Na101904, the Defendants filed a subsequent appeal against the instant judgment. During the said appellate trial, the attorney of the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor submitted preparatory documents attached to the instant judgment on April 26, 2012. On the same day, the Defendants’ legal representative of the instant subsequent suit was served with the aforementioned preparatory documents and copies of the instant first instance judgment, and searched the progress of the instant first instance judgment through the case search by the Supreme Court. The Defendants filed a subsequent appeal on July 3, 2012, which was 30 days after the lapse of 30 days from the Defendants, on the grounds that the Defendants failed to satisfy the requirements of the first instance court’s first instance judgment as recognized by the first 1.1. The Defendants’ legal representative, as well as the parties, and his legal representative, were also included in the instant lawsuit by public notice, and thus, did not constitute Defendant 21.26.

B. As to this, the Defendants asserted that the Defendants’ subsequent supplement period should not be deemed to be the negligence of the Defendants as the parties concerned, and that the subsequent supplement period per the subsequent supplement period per the two or thirty days determined by the parties concerned should be allowed due to the reasons not attributable to the parties. However, even if the parties concerned failed to comply with the subsequent supplement period due to the reasons not attributable to them, the subsequent supplement period is not not not the peremptory period, and even if the parties concerned failed to comply with the subsequent supplement period due to the reasons not attributable to them, it cannot be again acknowledged (see the New Civil Procedure Act (III). The above assertion by the Defendants is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Since the appeal by the Defendants is unlawful, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Judges Choi Jong-su (Presiding Judge)