[2] The court's measures in a case where the criminal cannot exercise jurisdiction in a foreign country since the criminal's violation acquired

[3] Whether the prohibition of disadvantageous alteration is against the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration in a case where the appellate court which appealed only the defendant, has increased the amount of penalty by reducing the principal penalty (negative)

[2] The confiscation and collection of the old Foreign Exchange Control Act (amended by Act No. 4447 of Dec. 27, 191) shall be necessary to be confiscated in light of the purpose of Article 36-2 of the same Act. If the criminal cannot be confiscated due to a disability, such as consumption, concealment, damage, loss, etc. of the criminal, or a disability due to its location, it shall be additionally collected. The apartment, which is a violation of the Foreign Exchange Control Act, is located in the French country, and is located in the same region, and it is impossible to confiscate our jurisdiction due to the lack of any agreement, etc. between the French country and our country, because it constitutes a case where it is impossible to confiscate our jurisdiction.

[3] In the application of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, it shall not be considered individually and formally, but shall be considered in whole and determined by the court of appeal, and where the amount of collection is increased by reducing the principal sentence in the appellate court (the 2-year imprisonment with prison labor of the first instance court, which is the 2-year imprisonment with prison labor, the 3-year suspended execution and the 500 million additional collection with prison labor of 2-year suspended execution and 60 million additional collection in the appellate court), it does not go against the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.

1. The incomplete hearing and the violation of the rules of evidence

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the defendant, under the Foreign Exchange Control Act, transferred 40,000 U.S. dollars to the non-indicted 2 who borrowed the name of his employees from August 1989 to October 19 of the same year and transferred 5,000 U.S. dollars continuously with the transfer of 5,00 U.S. dollars to the non-indicted 1, etc. as the addressee, and that the non-indicted 2, who borrowed money from the defendant in Korea, transferred 50,000 U.S. dollars to the defendant's deposit passbook in the name of the defendant established in the Paris National Bank in the French National Bank in the U.S., and had the above non-indicted 1 transfer 50,000 U.S. dollars to the defendant's deposit passbook in the name of the defendant established in the Paris National Bank in the U.S. on October 25, 1989.

The grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.

2. As to the misapprehension of legal principles as to Articles 29 and 35 of the former Foreign Exchange Control Act (amended by Act No. 4447 of Dec. 27, 191)

The "acquisition" of the real estate regulated by Article 29 of the same Act is sufficient to the extent that the resident acquires the actual ownership or the right to dispose of the real estate, and it does not require that the ownership or the right to dispose of the real estate be acquired in his name or in a judicially effective way. According to the evidence cited by the court below, the defendant remitted the foreign currency funds to the non-indicted 1 husband and wife living in France in the above manner, and then he purchased the apartment of this case and completed the registration of transfer by borrowing his name. According to the above facts, the non-indicted 1 purchased the apartment of this case on behalf of the defendant. Thus, the defendant acquired it as the actual owner of the apartment of this case, and even if the sale of the apartment of this case was made in the form between the non-indicted 1 and the non-indicted 1, the non-indicted 1 is treated as the defendant's act. Thus, the defendant cannot be exempted from the criminal liability for the purchase of the apartment of this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles.

3. As to the misapprehension of legal principle as to collection

In light of the purport of Article 36-2 of the former Foreign Exchange Control Act, confiscation or collection under the former Foreign Exchange Control Act shall be required to be confiscated, and if confiscation is not possible due to a disability such as consumption, concealment, damage or loss of the apartment, or a disability due to its location, it shall be collected (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 73Do2625, Jun. 22, 1976; 77Do629, May 24, 197). According to the record, it can be recognized that the apartment of this case in the Paris of the French country has been possessed until now since the acquisition of the apartment of this case in the past 6,100,00 Franc, it shall be confiscated in accordance with Article 36-2 of the former Foreign Exchange Control Act, but since the apartment of this case is in the French country and in the region, it shall be collected in accordance with the Convention on Judicial Cooperation between the French country and the French country and its jurisdiction cannot be exercised.

Therefore, in the same purport, the decision of the court below that made an additional collection of the purchase price of the apartment of this case in Korean won is justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to additional collection

4. As to whether it constitutes a disadvantageous change

The first instance court sentenced the defendant to a penalty of KRW 536,240,00 for three (3) years of suspended execution and a penalty of KRW 536,240,00 for two (2) years of imprisonment, and only the defendant appealed, the lower court reversed the first instance judgment and sentenced the defendant to a penalty of KRW 657,275,00 for two (2) years of suspended execution and one (6) years of suspended execution.

However, in the application of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous change, it is not considered individually and formally, but it is necessary to make a decision by considering overall and substantial consideration (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 97Do1716, Mar. 26, 1998). From this perspective, compared with the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court of first instance, the collection amount is increased to the above extent, in light of the fact that the judgment of the court of first instance reduces one year of imprisonment and one year of suspended execution against the defendant, and that it cannot be said that the collection amount has been changed to the above extent, and therefore, the argument that the judgment of the

Supreme Court Decision 82Do256 delivered on April 13, 1982 and Supreme Court Decision 81Do2685 delivered on May 11, 1982, which points out the grounds of appeal, shall not be an appropriate example in this case, as it differs from this case.

5. In light of the records, there is no other ground of illegality as pointed out in the ground of appeal in the judgment below.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Seo Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)