1. A. A. In a criminal trial, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving the criminal facts prosecuted, and the conviction of guilt is based on evidence with probative value sufficient for a judge to have the authenticity of the facts charged to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt. If there is no such proof, even if there is no doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the conviction cannot be judged as guilty (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Do2823, Aug. 21, 2001; 2005Do8675, Mar. 9, 2006).

B. In addition, in a case where the issue is whether to accept money or valuables, the Defendant’s statement that was designated as the recipient of money or valuables denies the fact of receiving money or valuables and there is no objective evidence, such as financial data to support this, the admissibility of evidence is required as well as the credibility that may exclude a reasonable doubt. In determining whether there is credibility or not, it is also necessary to also examine whether there is a concern about the reasonableness, objective reasonableness, consistency before and after the statement itself as well as its human nature, in particular, if there is a suspicion of a crime committed against him/her, and there is a possibility that the investigation may be initiated, or if an investigation is being conducted, there is a possibility that the admissibility of the statement would be denied, and even if there is no possibility that the statement would affect the statement to escape from an imminent place, such as intimidation or return using it, even if the admissibility of the statement does not reach the extent that the evidence is denied (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2010Do1487, Apr. 28, 2011>

Furthermore, in accordance with the above criteria, if the credibility of the statement of a person who asserts that he/she provided money or other valuables over several occasions is denied as a result of the examination in accordance with the above criteria, where the credibility of the statement that he/she provided money or other valuables over several times is revealed, the credibility of the statement that he/she provided money or other valuables over several times shall be deemed considerably weak. Thus, even if the objective circumstances, etc. that make it difficult to believe the remaining part of the statement that he/she provided money or other valuables have not been revealed directly, it shall not be permitted in principle to recognize the rest of the fact that he/she provided money or other valuables only on the ground of the statement of a person who asserts that he/she provided money or other valuables over several times. If it is possible to acknowledge the rest of the statement that received money or other valuables, unlike the part that rejected credibility, there is a special circumstance to resolve reasonable doubts, such as cases where the statement is sufficiently presented to the extent that the grounds for conviction can be established, and sufficiently supported by other evidence that can reinforce the statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do1868.

C. In addition, in light of the fact that the criminal appellate court has the character as an ex post facto trial but also has the spirit of the principle of substantial direct trial under the Criminal Procedure Act, the first instance court, which directly observed the appearance and attitude of the witness in the process of witness examination with respect to the witness supporting the facts charged, judged that the credibility of the witness's statement cannot be acknowledged, shall be deemed to be a case where the first instance court, which rejected the credibility of the witness's statement, is sufficient and acceptable if the appellate court finds that the witness's statement can be acknowledged and that the witness's credibility can be admitted as evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4994, Nov. 24, 2006).

D. Therefore, in a case where the issue is whether to accept money or valuables, where the first instance court found that there is no credibility excluding a reasonable doubt after undergoing a witness examination procedure, etc. with respect to a statement made by a person who provided money or valuables, and the appellate court acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged, the appellate court should not conclude that the first instance court erred in the misapprehension of facts on the ground that the credibility of the statement and the proof of facts against the witness, etc. of the first instance court should not be acknowledged, in particular, if the first instance court’s determination is based on a reasonable ground for the probability of the fact that is not compatible with the provision of money or valuables raised by the first instance court or that is likely to obstruct the recognition of credibility of the statement, and the first instance court’s additional evidence examination result and the appellate court’s additional examination result do not reach the extent to sufficiently resolve such reasonable doubts raised by the first instance court, and in particular, the appellate court’s determination on the credibility of the statement and the evidence of the first instance court should not be found guilty in the remaining part of the statement.

2. We examine the Prosecutor’s grounds of appeal.

A. As to the violation of the Political Funds Act

(1) The lower court determined that there was no error of mistake in the facts alleged by the prosecutor in the judgment of the first instance, which acquitted the Defendant of this part of the charges charged of violating the Political Funds Act, on the grounds indicated below.

(A) According to the first instance court’s reasoning, it is difficult to view that there was a pro rata relationship with the Defendant to the extent that Nonindicted Party 1 did not have enough time to deliver Nonindicted Party 2 only or no more than five minutes of money, ② specific place for receiving money and valuables cannot be specified. ③ In particular, it is difficult to view that Nonindicted Party 1 had a pro rata relationship with the Defendant to the extent that the Defendant could have opened a house by communicating Nonindicted Party 1, and in particular, it is difficult to receive money through a third party (Nonindicted Party 2) who was in a situation where the Defendant was living in the old time after life due to the crime of receiving money and valuables in the past, and (4) the Defendant sent Nonindicted Party 1 to the election campaign site and sent Nonindicted Party 2, and Nonindicted Party 1 did not explain the circumstances at the time of the election campaign site, and there is no possibility that Nonindicted Party 1 might have made a false statement in the process of giving and receiving money, and even if Nonindicted Party 1 made a statement with respect to Nonindicted Party 1’s statement, it appears reasonable and reasonable to acknowledge that the Defendant 1’s statement based on the objective evidence.

(B) Whether a person can be found guilty of this part of the facts charged depends on whether the person himself/herself asserts that he/she is a money provider is able to believe the statement of Nonindicted Party 1.

However, it is doubtful that ① Nonindicted 1 could not accurately memory the date and time of providing money and valuables; ② In the original trial, it is difficult for the lower court to believe that Nonindicted 1’s statement due to entertainment that is entirely different from the previous one; ③ Nonindicted 3’s investigative agency to support Nonindicted 1’s statement is also difficult to believe in the original trial; ④ there is a difference between Nonindicted 1’s statement and Nonindicted 3’s statement regarding the situation at the time of providing money and valuables; ⑤ Nonindicted 1 moved to a woodpool hotel to a woodpool for payment and oiling and settling the payment thereof within 3 minutes, not consistent with the outcome of on-site verification conducted by the lower court, but the premise of the first instance court that deemed that it is impossible for Nonindicted 1 to send money and valuables to Nonindicted 2 to the Defendant without any reasonable doubt or evidence for improvement of the traffic signal system, as seen above, even if it is difficult for the prosecutor to find that there was a lack of reasonable doubt or evidence for improvement in the traffic signal.

Therefore, the conclusion that the first instance court acquitted the Defendant of this part of the facts charged on the basis of the determination of evidence is justifiable.

(2) The ground of appeal on this part is purporting to dispute the fact-finding of the lower court, and it is nothing more than an error of the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. In addition, considering the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination on this part is consistent with the aforementioned legal doctrine, and contrary to what is alleged in

B. As to the part on good offices in March 201

(1) On the grounds indicated in its reasoning as follows, the lower court determined that there is no reasonable doubt that there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge the guilty of the facts charged as to this part of this case’s brokerage acceptance, which was modified at the lower court, and rejected the Prosecutor’s allegation of the grounds for appeal disputing this point.

(A) The first instance court: (a) there was no special friendship relationship between the Defendant and Nonindicted 7 on the date and time indicated in this part of the facts charged; (b) the Defendant had a foodly distance from Nonindicted 8; (c) Nonindicted 8 gave money to Nonindicted 7; and (d) Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8’s expression of money in which Nonindicted 8 gave money to Nonindicted 7; and (e) there was little possibility that Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8 gave money to the Defendant during the first instance court’s oral trial to contain KRW 30 million; and (c) there was no possibility that Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 7’s statement would be false in light of the empirical rule regarding Nonindicted 8’s offering of money to Nonindicted 7 and the Defendant; and (d) there was no possibility that there was any possibility that there was any possibility that there was any further high possibility of giving money to Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8’s prosecutor’s office in the process of investigation; and (e) there was a need to find the Defendant’s statement in the first instance court.

(B) This part of the issue depends on whether it can be found guilty of this part of the facts charged with Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8’s statement that the said person asserts as a money provider.

1) Among the grounds for the judgment of innocence in the first instance court, the question on the part (2) above is insufficient to be considered as grounds for suspecting the credibility of each of the statements made between Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8, which was resolved to a certain extent in the process of examining the evidence by

2) However, the above circumstances relate to the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s statement of facts up to the portion of the charge that Nonindicted 8 gave to Nonindicted 7 the Defendant with money, and there is sufficient evidence that conforms to the part as to whether the Defendant, which is the core part of the charge, actually gave money to the Defendant.

However, the remaining circumstances suspected of the first instance court; ① there is a question whether the Defendant was present at the meeting of Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8 at the meeting of Nonindicted 7, but the specific contents, such as the place where the Defendant was present at the meeting of Nonindicted 7, are different from the contents of Nonindicted 7’s statement or are changed in the court of original trial; ② Nonindicted 8’s statement was changed as to the period when Nonindicted 7 became aware of the amount of money that Nonindicted 7 received from Nonindicted 8; and Nonindicted 7 denied the first statement that the Defendant refused to provide money and used money for personal purposes; ③ changed the contents of the indictment; ③ The facts charged prior to the change in the lower court’s indictment were inconsistent with Nonindicted 7’s statement at the place where the Defendant was asked by Nonindicted 7 and Nonindicted 8, and thus, it was considerably difficult for the Defendant to accept the aforementioned part of the facts charged, including Nonindicted 7’s reply and Nonindicted 8’s statement, and that it was contrary to the objective motive for Nonindicted 8’s withdrawal and its contents.

(2) The allegation in the grounds of appeal on this part is purporting to dispute the fact-finding of the lower court, and is merely an error of the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. In addition, examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination on this part also complies with the aforementioned legal doctrine, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds

3. We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.

A. The summary of this part of the facts charged is that the defendant received a request from the president of the ○○ Savings Bank in the office of the Defendant’s Dongpo District Office around June 2010 to the effect that “The head of the ○ Savings Bank was in the process of investigating ○○ Savings Bank at the ○○ District Prosecutors’ Office, requesting the persons concerned at the prosecutor’s office, so that the investigation into ○○ Savings Bank can be completed well” and received cash KRW 30 million on the same spot.

B. Regarding this, the first instance court, as the sole evidence consistent with this part of the facts charged, determined that it is difficult to recognize the reasonableness and objective reasonableness of the statement itself, such as where there is a possibility that Nonindicted 10 was present in the interview place with the Defendant and Nonindicted 8, and there is no possibility that the Defendant would have made a false statement in favor of Nonindicted 8 in the process of investigation and trial, as well as that it would be difficult to recognize the credibility of the Defendant’s testimony in the first instance court’s statement because it is difficult to acknowledge the credibility of the charges on the grounds that there is no reasonable doubt that there was a false statement in the investigation agency, as long as it is difficult to acknowledge the credibility of the statement of Nonindicted 10 in the first instance court’s statement because it is difficult to acknowledge that there was a false statement in the first instance court’s statement that there was no doubt that there was a false statement in the process of investigation and trial, and that there was no credibility or credibility of the Defendant’s statement in the first instance court’s statement.

On the other hand, the court below found the defendant guilty of this part of the charges on the following grounds: (a) it is difficult to view that the non-indicted 1's testimony was consistent with the non-indicted 8's own testimony and the provision of money and valuables to the non-indicted 10's testimony; and (b) it was difficult to find the non-indicted 8's testimony that the non-indicted 8's testimony was consistent with the non-indicted 10's testimony and the non-indicted 11's testimony to support the non-indicted 8's testimony; and (c) it was difficult to find the non-indicted 8's testimony that the non-indicted 10's testimony and the non-indicted 10's testimony were consistent with the non-indicted 8's testimony and the non-indicted 10's testimony and the non-indicted 8's testimony based on the non-indicted 8's reasonable interview with the non-indicted 1's testimony to the extent that the non-indicted 1's testimony were inconsistent with the defendant's testimony.

C. Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below which found the Defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged differently from the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance that there is no proof of crime, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the

(1) As the Defendant, who was identified as the recipient of money and valuables in relation to the provision and acceptance of money and valuables between the Defendant and Nonindicted 8 (hereinafter “instant facts”), the key issue in this part of the facts charged, denies the fact, there is no objective evidence, such as financial data to support the fact, and Nonindicted 8’s compliance statement, which offered money to the Defendant as direct evidence corresponding thereto, is virtually true, so in order to recognize the instant issue solely by the statement, the said statement must be admissible as evidence, and there is a credibility to exclude a reasonable doubt.

In order to determine whether Nonindicted 8’s testimony offered money to the Defendant could be trusted, the first instance court comprehensively examined the criteria for the rationality, objective reasonableness, possibility of false statements, etc. of the contents of Nonindicted 8’s statement itself, and considered the opposite evidence, as one of the circumstances under which Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 give rise to doubt about the probability of interfering with the recognition of credibility in the process of determining the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s testimony.

On the other hand, the court below held that the credibility of Non-Indicted 10 and Non-Indicted 11's statements based on the premise that the shortage of credibility of the statement made by Non-Indicted 10 and Non-Indicted 11 depends on the defendant's credibility of the statement, and the existence of credibility of Non-Indicted 8's compliance statement, which is a key evidence corresponding to the facts charged, is recognized, and contrary to this, Non-Indicted 8's compliance statement that the defendant alone offered money and provided money, and Non-Indicted 11's statement in favor of the defendant and Non-Indicted 8, which are supporting the above statements, are hard to recognize credibility of the statement made by Non-Indicted 10 and Non-Indicted 11 by comparing and comparing the detailed and detailed statements made by Non-Indicted 8 with each other on the grounds that it is difficult to recognize credibility of the statement made by Non-Indicted 10 and the circumstances after the interview with the defendant and the non-Indicted 8.

However, the key issue of this case is the criminal facts for which the prosecutor must actively prove them, and the respective statements made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 are merely dissenting evidence to impeachment the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s statements supporting the key issue of this case. Thus, it is difficult to recognize the credibility of the respective statements made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11, and it cannot be deemed that the key issue of this case is directly proven by Nonindicted 8’s compliance statement.

In other words, the evidence of conviction against the defendant in a criminal trial is not sufficient to have superior probative value than the opposite evidence. Thus, even if it is difficult or suspected that the credibility of each statement made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11, contrary to the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, such as the judgment of the court below, is difficult to recognize or false in comparison with the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, the circumstance that it is difficult to recognize the credibility of each of the above statements made by the opposing evidence is merely that the defendant, who does not bear the burden of proof as to the facts charged, did not prove the facts that are incompatible with the facts charged. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the credibility of the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, which is the opposite evidence, to the extent that the credibility of the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, who is supporting the facts charged, is recognized to the extent that the credibility of the testimony made by the first instance court is not recognized, if there are reasonable grounds for doubt raised while rejecting the credibility

Thus, the above argument method, which the court below conducted to add credibility to Non-Indicted 8's statements, violates the above legal principles, such as the burden of proof of facts constituting an offense and the degree of proof necessary for finding guilt.

(2) In addition, examining the following circumstances: (a) the first instance court’s suspicion as to the reasonableness or objective reasonableness of Nonindicted 8’s statement on the issues of this case; (b) the process of interview with the Defendant; (c) the possibility of providing money and valuables; (d) the circumstances of refusing to give money and valuables; and (e) the circumstances after meeting, such as return of donations from Nonindicted 8; and (e) the investigation into Nonindicted 8, the first instance court’s suspicion is generally based on objective materials, and thus, has considerable rationality.

Therefore, in order for the court below to recognize that there was an error of misconception of facts in the judgment of the court of first instance and to find the defendant guilty of this part of the charges, it is insufficient to present a probable or doubt that there is some objections to the suspicion raised by the court of first instance, and it should be clearly stated that there is sufficient proof to sufficiently resolve the above reasonable suspicion caused by the court of first instance based on the result of the examination of evidence and the result of the additional examination

However, even after examining the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court did not have deliberated and determined on whether there was such proof. Therefore, it is difficult to view the lower court to have conducted the necessary deliberation in accordance with the foregoing legal doctrine.

(3) In addition, as seen in the above 2.B. B., as to the fact that Nonindicted 8’s statement on the facts charged that Nonindicted 8 provided KRW 30 million to the Defendant on the pretext of good offices around March, 2011 includes the fact that it is inconsistent with the objective facts and the fact that it is difficult to believe the statement to provide such money and valuables, the lower court also recognized it as in the first instance court. Furthermore, even if the said statement was made by Nonindicted 8’s wrong memory, it is not easy to see that the Nonindicted 8’s memory as to the existence of the issue of this case, which was 9 months prior to that date, and Nonindicted 8’s consistent statement based thereon, are more accurate in light of the general rule of experience.

As such, inasmuch as Nonindicted 8’s partial statement is contrary to objective facts or its memory is revealed, the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s statement that offered money and valuables over several times ought to be deemed to have been considerably weak. Accordingly, according to the legal doctrine as seen earlier, even if the objective circumstances, etc. were not revealed as to the part concerning the statement to provide money and valuables, which is the issues of this case, directly, it is not permissible to acknowledge the facts of this case without permission on the sole ground of Non-Indicted 8’s statement. Unlike other statements that rejected credibility, the part concerning Non-Indicted 8’s consistent statement concerning the issues of this case, unlike the part concerning which the non-Indicted 8’s statement on the issue of this case was presented sufficiently to the extent that the grounds for trust can be sufficiently satisfied or that the statement was sufficiently supported by other evidence that can reinforce the credibility, etc. In particular, the first instance court should have determined the credibility of this case’s statement as a reasonable ground for conviction in order to further recognize the credibility of this case’s statement.

However, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court has determined that it is difficult to view the conviction of the charge as to the part of good offices and good offices around March 201, as to this part of the facts charged, and that there is a logical satisfying. Unlike other statements, it cannot be deemed that the part concerning Non-Indicted 8’s consistent statement on the issues of this case is reliable, and that the existence of special circumstances, such as a definite ground for resolving a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is difficult to see that the lower court has deliberated and determined the necessary deliberation in accordance with the legal doctrine as seen earlier.

(4) Furthermore, even after examining the circumstances cited by the lower court in recognizing the credibility of Non-Indicted 8’s statement on the issues of this case, it is not adequate to deem that there is evidence to the extent that there is a special circumstance to acknowledge that the first instance court sufficiently resolved the reasonable doubt raised, and that there is no special circumstance to acknowledge that there is no falsity, exaggeration, or distortion, unlike the statement on the provision of other money and valuables for which the credibility has been rejected, unlike the statement on the provision of money and valuables, and therefore, it is difficult to readily conclude that the first instance court’s judgment was unlawful solely on the basis of Non-Indicted 8’s compliance with

(A) First, even if Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 were excluded from the statement, regarding the issues of the instant case that Nonindicted 8 provided KRW 30 million to the Defendant, there is no objective circumstance supporting Nonindicted 8’s compliance statement, and rather, there appears objective circumstances that may be deemed based on reasonable grounds that the first instance judgment raised concerning the details of the provision of money and valuables or the circumstances after the provision of money and valuables stated by Nonindicted 8.

1) The first instance court determined to the effect that it is difficult for Nonindicted 8 to find out in the office of the local constituency for the National Assembly member of the Defendant’s country where many people have access to the Defendant through Nonindicted 11, to provide money, or to trust the statement in compliance with Nonindicted 8, which was made in money to the office within the office of a member of the National Assembly, to the extent of having to hold an interview with the Defendant via Nonindicted 11, and that it is also acceptable for the lower court to some extent. In light of the fact that the lower court is consistent with this, it is difficult to readily conclude that the first instance court’s suspicion to the same purport is entirely unreasonable even if it is considered that Nonindicted 8, who was in an imminent and imminent situation, was likely to offer money and valuables

2) In addition, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment, Nonindicted 8’s statement made by Nonindicted 14, who performed Nonindicted 8 on the possession of a bank which can be deemed a means of transport, is unclear, and there is no obvious material that Nonindicted 8’s statement is known in addition to Nonindicted 8’s statement.

3) Furthermore, according to the first instance judgment and the reasoning of the lower judgment, it is acceptable to the first instance judgment that it is difficult to make a statement of Nonindicted 8’s compliance because it is not consistent with the facts of the instant case where the Defendant’s behavior received large amount of money as a case of solicitation, and thus, it is difficult to conclude that the lower court did not receive any money from Nonindicted 8 or did not mean that the Defendant received any money from Nonindicted 8 in an open manner or did not return it to the Defendant even in around 2010, when Nonindicted 1, which appears to have been more friendship with the Defendant, in 2010, and Nonindicted 8 tried to deliver it to the Defendant at around 20 million won. Moreover, it is difficult to view that the lower court did not receive any money from Nonindicted 8, on the ground that it did not receive any money from Nonindicted 8’s wife or received any money from Nonindicted 8 in the process of managing it in one of the following circumstances.

In addition, on March 201, which was after the instant interview, Nonindicted 8 asked Nonindicted 15 to arrange South Korea with the Defendant through Nonindicted 15. Even if considering the circumstance that Nonindicted 8 requested the Defendant to meet the financial chairperson, as cited by the lower court, Nonindicted 8’s request to meet the financial chairperson, the first instance court’s decision that it is difficult to believe that Nonindicted 8’s compliance statement is not necessary to request a third party to meet with the intent that if the trust was created by issuing KRW 30 million to the Defendant and receiving assistance from the Defendant, if the trust was created to the Defendant, it would not need to request the third party for the interview with the Defendant. Furthermore, it is more so true in light of the circumstances that Nonindicted 8 requested contact with Nonindicted 7 to meet the Defendant after the instant interview, as revealed in the facts charged regarding good offices and taking measures around March 2011.

4) In addition, the first instance court determined that, at the time of the instant investigation, Nonindicted 8 was in the criminal trial, and the objective facts that were being additionally investigated due to the suspicion of corporate fund embezzlement, etc., as well as the possibility that Nonindicted 8 may have made a false statement on the issues of this case on the basis of the possibility of causing considerable mental and physical burdens during the investigation process of the high strength prosecutorial office. Based on these circumstances, even if the credibility of Non-Indicted 8’s consistent statement cannot be rejected based on these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to raise a question as to whether the credibility of the statement is sufficient, and instead, the prosecutor bears the burden of proof as to the credibility or objectivity of the statement.

(B) In addition, the lower court determined that it was difficult for Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 to believe that Nonindicted 8 was present at the time of the instant interview with Nonindicted 8, because of the detailed reasons, and based on the grounds as to the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s statement on the statement made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11. However, considering the reasoning of the first instance judgment and the reasoning of the lower judgment, the first instance court’s determination that deemed Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11’s statement as evidence for impeachment of the credibility of Nonindicted 8’s statement made in compliance with the first instance judgment is unreasonable, or it is insufficient to readily conclude that there is evidence to the extent that the statement made by Nonindicted 8, despite the judgment of the first instance court, has credibility enough to exclude reasonable doubts.

1) The lower court cited Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 as the primary ground for rejecting the credibility of each statement to the effect that the statements on specific and detailed circumstances after the interview immediately before and after the interview between Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 were inconsistent.

However, since three years have elapsed since the date stated in this part of the facts charged until the date of the first instance court's statement, and at least one year and six months have passed from that time to that of the original court's statement, considering the limitation of memory, it is doubtful whether the credibility of the circumstances, such as the inconsistency in the circumstances concerning the detailed circumstances of the lower court, can be dismissed.

Furthermore, as seen earlier, even if the testimony made by Nonindicted 8 was relatively superior to the testimony made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11, the opposite evidence for the same reason as the judgment of the court below, it is insufficient to view that the aforementioned testimony made by Nonindicted 8, on the grounds of the same reason, led to the extent that it excluded the doubts as to the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, and it is more difficult to view that only the testimony made by Nonindicted 8, on the basis of the compliance with Nonindicted 8, is recognized

2) In addition, Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 stated that they were involved in the instant interview with Nonindicted 10 upon Nonindicted 11’s request. As seen below, the first instance judgment to the effect that it is difficult to deny its credibility because it is difficult to conclude that such statements as impeachment evidence are false later or false statements made upon the Defendant’s request.

A) Even according to the statement made by Nonindicted 8, since Nonindicted 11 had an interview with the Defendant via Nonindicted 11, it seems that Nonindicted 11’s sexual intercourse with the Defendant could be seen that Nonindicted 11 himself/herself was well known, and it is not easy to dismiss the credibility of Nonindicted 11’s statement with Nonindicted 8’s statement that was not directly involved in the process of sexual intercourse with the Defendant.

Rather, even according to Nonindicted 8’s legal statement, Nonindicted 11 and Nonindicted 10 were on the day of the interview with the Defendant, and Nonindicted 11 and Nonindicted 10 were on the day of the interview with the Defendant, and the interview was completed, and thereafter, three persons moved to a restaurant for meals. As such, Nonindicted 8 also recognized the existence of Nonindicted 10, which had been on the part of Nonindicted 11 before and after the interview with the Defendant.

However, as the first instance court pointed out, Nonindicted 8 appears to have given considerable consideration to Nonindicted 10, Nonindicted 11, and Nonindicted 103, as recognized by the lower court, in view of the following: (a) Nonindicted 8’s relation between Nonindicted 8, Nonindicted 11, and Nonindicted 103, and Nonindicted 8’s relation, as recognized by the lower court, did not do so any other way with the auditor, and (b) Nonindicted 10, who was irrelevant to the interview, remains in the Defendant’s office until the interview was completed; and (c) there is no clear reason to accompany Nonindicted 10 until the meeting was completed; and (d) Nonindicted 10, who was led by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 10, were in a place where the restaurant, which was designated as the place of meals, was a place where Nonindicted 10 was the first instance court’s prior to the interview; and (e) in view of the circumstances surrounding the interview, it is naturally unreasonable to deem that the interview was made with the Defendant and Nonindicted 10, at least 10, regarding the above meal.

B) In addition, if credibility can be acknowledged in the statement that Nonindicted 10 arranged for the interview with the Defendant and Nonindicted 8, it would be difficult to view that the first instance court’s decision is unreasonable to naturally determine that Nonindicted 10, the agent of the interview, went to the Defendant’s office, which is the place of the interview, and Nonindicted 13, the assistant of the Defendant’s Posting Office, went to the Defendant’s office at the time of the investigation agency to the first instance trial, taking into account the circumstances that Nonindicted 13, the assistant of the Defendant’s Posing Office, went to the Defendant’

In addition, the contents of Nonindicted 10’s request made by the first instance court and Nonindicted 8, which the Defendant and Nonindicted 8 stated in the lower court, are consistent with the purport of Nonindicted 10’s request that the prosecutorial investigation results on the ○○ Savings Bank were present in the process of the interview with the Defendant and Nonindicted 8, and that if the result of Nonindicted 10’s prosecutorial investigation results were reported to the media, it would lead to a compromise. In this regard, the lower court determined that there was a doubt as to whether this is her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her her she was present in the interview with Nonindicted 10, but rather, it is difficult to view that the part of the lower court’s request made by Nonindicted 8’s her her her her her her 10 her her her her her her her her her

다) 한편 공소외 11은 수사기관에서 진술할 때에는 공소외 10 존재를 진술하지 아니하였는데, 이에 대하여 공소외 11은 수사기관의 조사 당시 공소외 8로부터 ‘공소외 10에 대해서는 진술하지 아니하였다’는 귀띔을 받고 자신도 현직 경찰관인 공소외 10을 보호하기 위하여 그 존재를 말하지 아니하게 된 것이라고 설명하고 있다. 그런데 원심판결 이유에 의하더라도 공소외 11이 수사기관에서 13시간에 가까운 장시간 동안 조사를 받으면서 면담주선자를 비롯한 당시의 정황을 제대로 진술하지 못하였음을 알 수 있고, 한편으로 공소외 11이 수사기관에서 진술할 당시 공소외 8과의 대면 내지 대질을 통하여 면담 당일의 기억을 되살린 정황이 확인됨에도 공소외 11에 대한 진술조서에는 이러한 기재가 전혀 드러나지 아니하여 그 진술증거의 취득과정을 제대로 확인할 수 없음에 비추어 보면, 이와 같은 취지의 상세한 이유를 들어 공소외 11의 증언이 수사기관에서 한 진술 내용과 달라졌다고 하여 신빙성을 부정할 수 없다고 본 제1심의 판단이 불합리하다고 단정하기 어렵다.

Rather, according to the protocol of statement, etc. prepared by the prosecutor, Nonindicted 8, who had had an interview with the Defendant from the investigative agency to the first instance trial, has finished the interview with the Defendant on the day on which the interview took place, and then mentioned only Nonindicted 11 as a scopic person in connection with the interview with Nonindicted 10, and began to state the existence of Nonindicted 10 only after the interview with Nonindicted 10 was made in the first instance trial. However, Nonindicted 8’s oral investigation was conducted on the grounds that Nonindicted 10 was not recorded in the prosecutor’s protocol of statement prepared by the prosecutor, and it was difficult for the prosecutor to accept the fact from the prosecutor’s office, but it was not easy for the prosecutor to have an interview with Nonindicted 10 in the Defendant’s office. However, if the prosecutor did not think that it was particularly important at the time of preparing the protocol of statement to the Defendant, it was an objective and neutral third person before and after the provision of money and valuables to the Defendant, and there was no doubt about the fact that Nonindicted 8 made an investigation as well as an objective and accurate evidence.

D) In particular, the lower court, based on the strong doubt that the aforementioned statements made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 were fabricated after the Defendant’s meeting oil, and cited various circumstances on the grounds of the circumstance, including the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant’s implied part of Nonindicted 10’s existence at an investigative agency; (b) the record of Nonindicted 10’s conversation during the detention house meeting; and (c) the part on the entries in the Defendant’s pocket book.

① However, even upon examining the reasoning of the lower judgment, in light of the aforementioned objective circumstance that can be seen as different from the facts of the instant issue, or the above circumstances that the first instance court held with respect to the credibility of the statement made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11, it is questionable whether the circumstances cited by the lower court on the grounds are likely or potential to be based on the mere fact-finding, not on the basis of objective evidence or specific facts supporting the manipulation of evidence, which is merely based on which the statements made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 were false, or on the grounds of such possibility, it can be said that there is a doubt as to whether it can be said that the statement made in compliance with Nonindicted 8 is con

In the instant case, there is no obvious motive that Nonindicted 10 or Nonindicted 11 made a false statement, or there is no objective reason to support the false statement.

② At the time of Nonindicted 10’s statement in the first instance court, Nonindicted 10 was under criminal trial due to the charge of bribery to himself/herself at the time of being detained in court, and was faced with unstable circumstances that make it difficult to anticipate the outcome of the trial in the future. Therefore, considering the friendly relationship between Nonindicted 10 and the Defendant, Nonindicted 10 appears not to have any difficulty in making a false statement in terms of the fact unfavorable to the investigative agency, and there is no obvious motive to actively make a false statement.

As determined by the court below, although an attorney-at-law who had a significant relationship with the defendant was appointed as his defense counsel after being detained by Nonindicted 10 and had several meetings held before Nonindicted 10 made a statement in the first instance court of this case, the defendant's defense counsel prior to that time is confirmed as well. Meanwhile, the defendant's defense counsel had already attended the defendant and Nonindicted 10 as a witness through his written opinion submitted on December 24, 2012, which was before Nonindicted 10 was detained, before and after the first instance court's preparatory hearing, and the defendant's defense counsel had already been present at the defendant and Nonindicted 8's meeting, and the defendant's defense counsel is also confirmed as having expressed his intention to apply for a witness of Nonindicted 10. In addition, even after examining the above written opinion presented by the court below or pointed out by the prosecutor, it is not sufficient to conclude that the above written opinion was in contact with the defendant under the custody of Nonindicted 10 to make a false statement, and it is not sufficient to conclude that there was any change in the part of the defendant's meeting with the defendant and Nonindicted 8.

③ In addition, in the case of Nonindicted 11, Nonindicted 11 and the Defendant denied the friendly relationship between both Nonindicted 11 and the Defendant, and there is no obvious evidence to know that there was a friendly relationship with the Defendant, other than the statement close to Nonindicted 12’s trend. In relation to the interview between the Defendant and Nonindicted 8, there is no special interest in Nonindicted 11 in relation to the interview between the Defendant and Nonindicted 8. However, it is difficult to find the reason for Nonindicted 10 who falsely created the fact of his involvement, unlike the statement made by the investigative agency, which was committed by Nonindicted 11, who took the responsibility for perjury, while making an

④ Meanwhile, when undergoing an investigation at an investigative agency, the Defendant did not disclose the facts favorable to the Defendant with respect to Nonindicted Party 10’s company attendance. However, there may be doubt as to whether it is reasonable to make the Defendant to have the person who may prove his/her confession, by implied consent, to make himself/herself a mistake.

However, as explained by the first instance court, while the Defendant stated to the effect that the interview with Nonindicted 8 would not be accompanied with detailed memory, Nonindicted 13 made a statement to the effect that “Nonindicted 11 was found in a wooden room with several persons other than Nonindicted 8 in 2010 and was brought into a house office.” In addition, at the end of the protocol of interrogation of a suspect, the Defendant made a statement to the effect that “The Defendant did not make any detailed statements in this prosecutorial investigation,” and the Defendant made a statement to the effect that he did not make any statement to the effect that he did not make any part of the interview with Nonindicted 8, it can be deemed that he made a complete statement that there was any content of reservation without making any statement to the effect that he had the right to refuse to make a statement. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendant did not make any false statement or made any false statement to the effect that he did not make any statement to the Defendant in the investigative agency, in light of such circumstances that the Defendant did not make any false statement with Nonindicted 10 witness or made any false statement.

(C) As can be seen, the lower court acknowledged that all of the circumstances in the first instance judgment, including the aforementioned circumstances, were reasonably explained in order to doubt the credibility of Non-Indicted 8’s testimony on the issues of this case. However, as seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the lower court, on its contrary, appears to have determined the passive and abstract credibility that, although recognizing the probability about various circumstances in the first instance judgment, such circumstances may not interfere with the recognition of the credibility of Non-Indicted 8’s statement, or may be interpreted as a way to reinforce the credibility of Non-Indicted 8’s statement, and ultimately, it is difficult to view that there was evidence to the extent that there was a reasonable doubt about Non-Indicted 8’s statement and there was a special circumstance to recognize the content thereof.

In addition, from among the evidence cited by the court below as evidence to support Nonindicted 8’s statement, Nonindicted 14’s statement was that Nonindicted 8 and Nonindicted 8 took the front of the building in which the Defendant had a defendant’s office on the day of the interview with the Defendant, and that Nonindicted 8 went to the Defendant’s office, and Nonindicted 16’s statement was that Nonindicted 8, an investigative agency, sent Nonindicted 10 at the Defendant’s office to Nonindicted 16, who was an investigative agency, and had stated that Nonindicted 8 went to the Defendant’s office at the Defendant’s office at the prosecutor’s office at the investigation agency after the interview was completed, it is merely that Nonindicted 8 stated that Nonindicted 10 had taken place at the Defendant’s office at the Defendant’s office at the Defendant’s office, and that Nonindicted 10 also went to the Defendant’s office at the

D. Nevertheless, the lower court did not carefully examine and determine whether the credibility of the testimony made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11 can be inferred immediately on the erroneous premise that the credibility of the testimony made by Nonindicted 8 can be displayed immediately on the grounds that it was consistent with the statement made by Nonindicted 10 and Nonindicted 11, and, contrary to the statement made by Nonindicted 8 on the issues of this case and the compliance statement made by Nonindicted 8 on this point, there is sufficient proof to the extent that the first instance court could sufficiently address the reasonable doubt raised by the reasonable doubt, and, contrary to the statement made by Nonindicted 8 on the facts of providing other money and valuables, did not carefully examine and determine whether there are any special circumstances on the part of the testimony made by Nonindicted 8 on the issues of this case, and only on the grounds stated in its reasoning that it is insufficient to recognize it, on the grounds of lack of credibility of the testimony made by Nonindicted 8 on the issues of this case, and concluded that the Defendant received the money from Nonindicted 8 as the facts of this case.

Therefore, such judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the burden of proof of facts constituting an offense, degree of proof necessary for conviction, evaluation of credibility of the statement of the money provider, and ex post facto review of the appellate court, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Therefore, the conviction part of the judgment below is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)