[2] In the case of a river to which Article 10 of the former River Act and Article 9 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act apply mutatis mutandis, the standards for compensation for losses on the land incorporated as a Exclusion (i.e., the amount equivalent to the land rent at the time of incorporation)

[3] Whether a landowner who was incorporated into a non-permanent river may claim compensation for losses from a civil lawsuit against the river management agency directly (negative)

[4] Whether Article 2 (2) of the Addenda to the former River Act applies to the claim for compensation for losses under Article 74 of the same Act (negative)

[2] In light of the contents of restrictions on the right to use and benefit, and the principle of fair compensation under the Constitution, the compensation for losses under Article 74 (1) of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 5893 of Feb. 8, 199) and Article 9 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16535 of Aug. 9, 199) as well as the land owner incorporated into a river area such as the place where the river area is excluded from the river area, the compensation for losses under Article 74 (1) of the same Act due to the incorporation into a non-river shall, in principle, be based on the amount equivalent to the land rent according to the current state at the time of incorporation as the compensation for losses from the limitation of use and benefit as land owner due to the public restrictions.

[3] In a case where land is incorporated into a river area such as the place of exclusion from a river to which this provision applies mutatis mutandis, the land owner shall consult with the river management agency pursuant to Article 74 of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 5893 of Feb. 8, 1999), and if such consultation is not reached or it is impossible to hold such consultation, he/she may immediately file an application for adjudication with the competent Land Tribunal, and if such consultation is not possible, he/she may immediately file an administrative lawsuit against the competent Land Tribunal, and may not claim compensation for losses for civil action against the river management agency by applying mutatis mutandis Article 2 (1) of the Addenda

[4] As long as the owner of the land incorporated into the river area of the mutatis mutandis river cannot claim compensation for damages due to civil action pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the former River Act (amended by Act No. 4161 of Dec. 30, 1989), the extinctive prescription provision under Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the same Act (amended by Act No. 4161 of Dec. 30, 1989) was changed to December 30, 1990, and the expiration date of the extinctive prescription period was changed to December 30, 199, and Article 2 of the Addenda of the amended River Act (amended by Act No. 6065 of Dec. 28, 199) is not applicable.

1. On the first ground for appeal

The purport of Article 74 of the former River Act (wholly amended by Act No. 5893, Feb. 8, 199; hereinafter the same) which was subject to adjudication by the competent Land Tribunal prior to filing an administrative litigation on the compensation for losses is to promote self-control and administrative supervision of administrative authority by having an adjudication agency (administrative agency) review the case in a professional and technical manner, thereby promoting a thorough protection of citizens' rights. Thus, the application for adjudication can be corrected if it is possible to correct the case in writing without strict legal knowledge. Further, the purport of the application for adjudication filed by the applicant who did not have more professional legal knowledge is unclear. In such a case, it is necessary to interpret and process the document so that the applicant's interest can be gained as much as possible (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu14100, Jun. 16, 1995). In light of the above legal principles and records, it cannot be viewed that the judgment of the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the plaintiff's application for adjudication itself.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In light of the details of restrictions on the right to use and benefit from a river (excluding a river excluded pursuant to Article 10 of the former River Act and Article 9 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16535 of Aug. 9, 199) and the contents of the right to use and benefit from a river incorporated into a river area and the principle of fair compensation under the Constitution, etc., the compensation for loss under Article 74 (1) of the same Act following the incorporation into a river excluded by mutatis mutandis application into a river shall, in principle, be based on the amount equivalent to the land rent according to the current status as at the time of incorporation into a land owner, as compensation for loss resulting from the restriction on use and benefit as a land owner (see Supreme Court Decision 9Du5238, Mar. 23, 2001).

In such a case, when the owner of land consults with the river management agency in accordance with Article 74 of the former River Act and fails to reach an agreement, or is unable to reach an agreement, he/she may immediately file an application for adjudication with the competent Land Tribunal in accordance with the result of administrative litigation against the competent Land Tribunal on the adjudication itself, and may not claim compensation for losses from the direct river management agency by applying Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the former River Act mutatis mutandis (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da39441, Dec. 8, 1995; 96Nu1679, Jun. 13, 1997).

As such, insofar as the owner of land incorporated within the river area of the quasi-river could not claim compensation for damages for civil action pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Addenda, the extinctive prescription provision of Article 2(2) of the Addenda of the above case (the above provision was amended by Act No. 4161 of Dec. 30, 1989, and the expiration of the extinctive prescription period was changed to December 30, 1990, and the claim for compensation for losses under Article 2 of the Addenda of the amended Enforcement Rule of the River Act (Act No. 3782 of Dec. 28, 1999) is not applicable, since the expiration of the extinctive prescription period was amended by Act No. 6065 of Dec. 28, 199.

Although the reasoning of the court below is somewhat inappropriate, the provision of extinctive prescription under Article 2 (2) of the Addenda to the former River Act in this case is not applicable. Thus, the court below's rejection of the defendant's assertion that the claim was extinguished by extinctive prescription due to the plaintiff's failure to claim compensation by December 30, 1990, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to extinctive prescription as alleged in the grounds of appeal (the extinctive prescription provision under the Local Finance Act shall apply to the claim for compensation of the rent equivalent to the land rent which occurred each month or each year as a certain land

The Supreme Court Decision cited in the ground of appeal (Supreme Court Decision 97Nu20175 delivered on March 10, 1998) has been modified by the Supreme Court en banc Decision (Supreme Court Decision 98Du15597 delivered on March 15, 2001), and thus, it cannot be invoked in the instant case.

3. On the third ground for appeal

A. The court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's claim of this case is improper since Jeonnam-do acquired the land of this case by prescription, as well as it is not clear at any time whether Jeonnam-do occupied the land of this case, and even if Jeonnam-do commenced the possession of the land of this case in order to implement the Yancheon Gyeongcheon Do, as long as the possession of the land of this case was commenced without legitimate compensation for damages to the real owner, it is reasonable to view that Jeonnam-do's possession of the land of this case is the possession of the owner in the nature of the possessory right, and it cannot be deemed that Jeonnam-do was converted into the possession of another owner around February 13, 1978 or around June 6 of the same year, which is the scheduled date of payment of compensation for Jeonnam-do, and there is no other evidence to support that Jeonnam-do's possession of the land of this case has been converted into the possession of the owner independently before 20 years prior to the date of the lawsuit of this case.

B. According to the records, it was confirmed that, from the time when the Jeonnam-do started the Yancheon Do, he occupied and managed the instant land without permission, and completed the instant river work on February 13, 1978, he decided to compensate for the land, etc. incorporated into the river area including the instant land, with priority given to compensating for the obstacles, and (2) to compensate for the land itself incorporated into the river area by organizing and transferring the desolate river site caused by the river work to the arable at the request of the owners. However, the YY first confirmed that Nonparty 1 was the actual owner and cultivator of the instant land and its obstacles, but the non-party 2 confirmed that the non-party 1 was the de facto owner and cultivator of the instant land and the neighboring residents, who were the de facto owner and cultivator of the obstacles, and the non-party 2 was the de facto owner and cultivator of the instant land and the non-party 1 had the ownership transfer registration for the instant land to the non-party 2 by calculating the difference of the land of this case to 90.

According to the above circumstances, Jeonnam-do transferred the instant substitute land to the substitute land of the instant land by Nonparty 2, who was the actual owner and cultivator of the instant land through the verification procedure, such as the guarantee of neighboring residents, etc., and it cannot be deemed that Nonparty 2 was the actual owner and the cultivator of the instant land, and thus, it cannot be said that Jeonnam-do collected KRW 60,000 from Nonparty 2 on January 7, 1980, the possession of the instant substitute land was converted from the former possession to the independent possession.

However, the plaintiff, on the premise that he is the owner of the land of this case, requested compensation for losses from the incorporation of the land of this case into the Yancheon River Area, but not accepted. Around July 1, 1998, the plaintiff filed an application with the defendant for the adjudication on the amount equivalent to the market price of the land of this case and the amount equivalent to the import revenue for the past ten years from January 1, 1989, but the application of this case was dismissed on September 21, 1998 and filed the lawsuit of this case. The plaintiff delivered the complaint to Jeonnam-do on December 8, 1998, which was the co-defendant of the court below on December 8, 1998. Thus, the prescriptive prescription of Jeonnam-do on the land of this case as the delivery of the above complaint was suspended (refer to Supreme Court Decision 79Da569 delivered on July 10, 197), and Jeonnam-do did not possess the land of this case before the expiration of the prescriptive prescription period from January 29, 198, 198.

C. Although the lower court’s reasoning is somewhat inappropriate, it is justifiable in its conclusion that did not recognize the prescriptive acquisition of Jeonnam-do on the instant land, and thus, this part of the ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)