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red_flag_1(영문) 대법원 1994. 5. 24. 선고 93므119 전원합의체 판결

[친생자관계부존재확인][집42(2)특,336;공1994.7.1.(971),1827]

Main Issues

A. Whether to allow the adoption of gender after February 11, 1940, when Article 11-2 of the Decree on the Civil and Civil Affairs of Joseon was enforced

(b) Validity of adoption made by a person who has customary male descendants in the old and validity of adoption made by the adopted person without the consent of his parents and the head of family;

(c) Whether the provisions of the Civil Act on the requirements of adoption or on the invalidation and cancellation of adoption are valid

(d) If the adoption is in force, the legality of the litigation for confirmation of paternity or the existence of paternity;

Summary of Judgment

A. Article 11-2 (No. 10, 1939.10, enforced from February 11, 1940) of the Decree on the Civil and Civil Affairs of Joseon (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 1939, Nov. 10, 1939.) stipulates, “The adopted child in the bilateral aid of the steering vessel does not require that the adopted child be equal to that of the adoptive parent. However, in the case of the adopted child, it is clear that the adopted child would be permitted to be the adopted child, unless the adopted child is the adopted child, since February 11, 1940.

B. According to the custom before the enforcement of the Civil Act, only a person who has no male descendant can adopt a child, and also a person to be adopted shall obtain the consent of his/her parents and the head of his/her family, and the adoption that did not meet the requirements was null and void.

C. According to Articles 2 and 18 of the Addenda of the Civil Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 19582, Feb. 22, 1958), in principle, whether the provisions of the Civil Act concerning the requirements for adoption or the grounds for invalidation and revocation of adoption are deemed to have retroactive effect, and whether there are grounds for invalidation or revocation in adoption reported prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Act. However, if adoption has already become effective under the former Act, it shall not affect the validity pursuant to the proviso of Article 2 of the Addenda of the Civil Act. Thus, even if there are grounds for invalidation under the former Act as to adoption reported prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act, if it does not constitute grounds for invalidation under the provisions of the Civil Act, such adoption shall be converted to having retroactive effect. However, if there are grounds for revocation under the provisions of the Civil Act, it may be revoked under the provisions of the Civil Act, and the revocation period shall be counted from the enforcement date of the Civil

D. In a case where the birth report as the father of a child took effect by exercising the function as an adoption report, barring special circumstances such as the need to resolve the adoptive relationship by the dissolution of adoptive relations, the litigation of denial of the existence of legal parent-child relationship by cancelling the entry of the family register is unlawful as it does not have any benefit of confirmation.

[Reference Provisions]

A. Article 877 of the Civil Act; Article 11-2 of the former Joseon Civil Decree (amended by Presidential Decree No. 7, Mar. 18, 1912); Article 870(c) of the Civil Act; Articles 2 and 18 of the Addenda to the Civil Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1358, Feb. 22, 1958); Article 894(d) of the Civil Act. Article 878 of the Civil Act; Article 2(1)4 of the Family Litigation Act; Article 228 of the Civil Procedure Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Order 65Ma1163 decided Apr. 24, 1967 (No. 15?No. 334), 67Ma823 decided Oct. 31, 1967 (Change), 67Da1940 decided Nov. 31, 1968 (No. 16?No. 31) (Change), 68Da1543 decided Nov. 26, 1968 (No. 16 ③No240 decided Mar. 24, 197; 69Da1400 decided Mar. 24, 197 (No. 18 ②254 decided Jun. 30, 197; 197Da19739 decided Jul. 29, 207; 209Da39799 decided Jul. 26, 297; 209Da39797 decided Jul. 319, 2097>

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 et al.

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant’s Attorney Park Jin-jin, Counsel for the defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 91Reu3130 delivered on December 15, 1992

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of the Plaintiff’s Attorney are also examined.

1. The court below declared that the birth report was made by the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were deceased on September 28, 1938. The plaintiff's new birth report was made on behalf of the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 3 were not allowed to be confirmed as the birth report of the plaintiff 9. The non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 had no birth report of the plaintiff 9. The non-party 1 and the deceased non-party 1 had no birth report of the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 9's birth report of the plaintiff 9. The non-party 1 and the deceased non-party 1 had no birth report of the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 9's birth report of the plaintiff 1 and the deceased non-party 2 were their birth report of the plaintiff 1 and the deceased.

2. Article 11 of the Decree on the Civil History of Shipbuilding (Ordinance No. 7 of March 18, 1912) prior to the enforcement of the current Civil Act provides that matters concerning relatives and inheritance shall be governed by custom. According to the previous custom of Korea, the dual-child system is not recognized in principle. However, there was a time when the dual-child system was allowed only for the transfer-child system, but the system was removed as the amended civil law was enforced on April 1, 1915. Thus, it was not legally allowed to adopt the dual-child system from April 1, 1915.

However, Article 11-2 of the Joseon Civil Decree, which was newly established on November 10, 1939 and enforced on February 11, 1940, does not require that the adopted child should be equal to that of the adoptive parent in relation to the adopted child in paragraph (1) of this Article. However, it is clear that the adopted child would be allowed to be adopted by either the adopted child or the other person whose sex is different from the adoptive parent. Thus, from February 11, 1940, only the adopted child would be allowed to be adopted by the adopted child.

Therefore, 65Ma1163, Apr. 24, 1967; 67Ma823, Oct. 31, 1967; 67Da1940, Nov. 31, 1968; 68Da1543, Nov. 26, 1968; 69Meu1400, Mar. 24, 1970; 69Meu67, Jun. 30, 197; 77Da433, Jul. 26, 197; 92Da2939, Oct. 23, 1992; 67Da1539, Nov. 13, 195; 200, the current Civil Act was amended after the date of entry into force of Article 11-2.

3. However, according to the custom prior to the enforcement of the Civil Act, only a person who has no male descendant can be adopted (except where there is any child), or a person who is to be adopted shall obtain the consent of his parent and the head of his family, and any adoption which does not meet the above requirements was null and void. However, according to the facts established by the court below, at the time when the defendant's report of birth was made by the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 2 (the deceased non-party 2, June 20, 193) was already born between the plaintiff who was the principal wife, and there is no evidence to prove that the deceased non-party 1 obtained the consent of his parent and the head of his family. According to the records, at the time of the defendant's report of birth, at the time of the defendant's report of birth, the defendant had already been entered in the non-party 4's family register as his child born out of his marriage. Thus, even if the defendant's consent was given to the adoption, the defendant's consent can not be legally obtained.

Therefore, even if the deceased non-party 1, who was born between the plaintiff and the plaintiff as an intention to adopt the defendant, falsely reported the birth, and there was an agreement between the deceased non-party 1 and the defendant, it cannot be deemed that the adoption was effective between the deceased non-party 1 and the plaintiff at the time of the defendant's report of birth.

4. However, Article 2 of the Addenda of the Civil Act, which entered into force on January 1, 1960, provides that "this Act shall also apply to matters before the enforcement of this Act except as otherwise provided in special provisions." However, this Act shall not affect the effect of the adoption, and Article 18 of the Addenda of the Civil Act provides that "if there are grounds for invalidation under this Act or this Act as before the enforcement date of this Act, it shall be null and void, and if there are grounds for invalidation under this Act, it may be cancelled. In this case, if there are grounds for annulment, the period shall be calculated from the enforcement date of this Act (paragraph 1). Even if there are grounds for cancellation under this Act which constitute grounds for annulment under this Act before the enforcement date of this Act, it shall not be cancelled after the enforcement date of this Act (paragraph 2)." According to each of the above provisions, it shall be interpreted that the provisions of the Civil Act concerning requirements for annulment and cancellation of adoption are retroactive before the enforcement date of the Civil Act, and it shall be interpreted that there are grounds for annulment or cancellation under the proviso to Article 198 of the former Act.

Therefore, even if there were grounds for invalidation under the former Act as to adoption reported prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act, if it does not constitute grounds for invalidation under the provisions of the Civil Act, such adoption shall be converted to the effect retroactively if it was maintained by a pro-friendly communal living relationship following adoption until the enforcement date of the Civil Act. However, if there are grounds for revocation under the Civil Act, it may be revoked under the provisions of the Civil Act, but the period of revocation shall be calculated from the enforcement date of the Civil Act.

However, according to the Civil Act, the adoption requirement does not stipulate that a person to be an adoptive parent shall not have any other male hand, and the adopted person shall obtain the consent of his parent or other lineal ascendant (Article 870(1)). However, even if the adoption violates the provision, it does not constitute a ground for invalidation of adoption, nor is it merely a ground for revocation of adoption (Article 884 subparag. 1). As determined by the court below, as determined by the court below, there was an agreement between the deceased non-party 1 and the defendant who was over 15 years old at the time when the plaintiff and the defendant were reported of birth as the father's intention to adopt the defendant, and even until January 1, 1960 when the deceased non-party 1 and the defendant maintained a de facto adoptive parent relationship, it is effective that the deceased non-party 1 and the plaintiff were adopted as the defendant, and even if they did not obtain the consent of the defendant's parent with respect to such adoption, it shall be deemed that the period of revocation and termination of adoption between the plaintiff and the defendant 16.

5. If so, the deceased non-party 1's birth report as the father's father is deemed to function as an adoption report, and thus, the adoption becomes effective between the deceased non-party 1 and the plaintiff and the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 77Da492, Jul. 26, 197). Therefore, barring any special circumstance such as where it is necessary to resolve the adoptive relation due to dissolution of the adoptive relation, barring special circumstances such as the cancellation of the above family register, the action for confirmation of paternity and existence of the legal parent-child relationship cannot be deemed to be unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 85Meu86, Feb. 23, 198; 89Meu108, Jul. 27, 1990; 91Meu153, Dec. 13, 1991).

Even if the judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the status or the good faith principle in the lawsuit, or by violating the principle of pleading, as seen in the judgment below, the conclusion that the plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit in this case on the ground that the lawsuit in this case is unlawful is justifiable. Therefore

6. Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jong-chul (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1992.12.15.선고 91르3130