2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. The Plaintiff is the owner of the 11,578m Mountainous field B forest in Gangseo-gun and C forest 995mm2 (hereinafter “Plaintiff-owned land”). The Republic of Korea is the owner of D forest 235m2, E forest 2,683m2, and F 140m2, adjacent to the Plaintiff’s land (hereinafter “state-owned land”).

B. On February 26, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Korea as Seoul Central District Court 2010Kadan73343, and on October 7, 2011, the Republic of Korea adjusted to the effect that “the passage of 2 meters wide from the land owned by the State to the G Training Center access road located E from Gangwon-gun, Gangwon-do, by December 31, 2011, designated the passage of 2 meters wide from which the passage to the G Training Center access road located E, and confirmed that the Plaintiff had the right to passage.”

C. In addition, on April 11, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for conciliation against the Republic of Korea as Seoul Central District Court 2013 23545, and on June 25, 2013, the Republic of Korea adjusted that the Plaintiff would issue to the Plaintiff a written consent for land use in accordance with the permission for the use and benefit of state property for the establishment of a passage (hereinafter referred to as the “instant coordination”) to the effect that the Plaintiff would issue a written consent for land use in accordance with the permission for the use and benefit of state property for the establishment of a passage along two meters from the place and pattern where the incorporated parts of the attached Form 2 are successively connected to the Plaintiff via the land owned by the State to the Gangwon Changwon-gun-gun-gun.

D. After that, when the Plaintiff became aware of the fact that a road with a width of 4 meters is required to obtain a building permit on the land owned by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff submitted a petition to the effect that “the Defendant would permit the use of a road with a width of 2 meters along with a passage road with a width of 2 meters permitted for the existing use.” On February 18, 2014, the Defendant sent to the effect that “the Plaintiff, on February 18, 2014, the construction of a road with two meters in terms of a slope of 45 degrees as it exceeds the level of 45 degrees, would hinder the securing of road safety, and the current status of the construction of a road does not constitute an idle land that can be permitted for the use as it is for the purpose of ensuring safety, such as preventing collapse as the current situation and the legal aspect does not constitute an idle land that can be permitted as a final and conclusive judgment.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, entry in Gap evidence 1, 2, 6 through 8 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the lawsuit of this case is lawful

A. Defendant’s defense prior to the merits

The defendant's response on February 18, 2014 is merely an expression of the opinion of the administrative agency that "under accordance with a final and conclusive judgment," and since it cannot be deemed an act that affects the legal status of the plaintiff, it does not constitute an administrative disposition that is subject to appeal litigation.

B. Determination

In principle, an expression of intent to file an application with an administrative agency shall be clearly and definitely stated and made in writing. Whether an expression of intent in a document seeking a certain disposition against an administrative agency constitutes an act of filing an application ought to be determined by comprehensively considering various circumstances, such as the content of the document and the process, time, purport, etc. of the preparation and submission (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du6212, 6229, Oct. 23, 2008). In addition, in light of the nature of the disposition of permission to use administrative property, an act of refusing an application for permission to use administrative property also constitutes an administrative disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu105, Feb. 27, 1998).

On November 29, 2013, the plaintiff submitted a petition to the effect that "the defendant, on November 29, 2013, submitted to the defendant a further request to permit the use of two meters wide along the passage route which was permitted for use according to the pertinent adjustment," but on February 18, 2014, the defendant sent to the plaintiff on February 18, 2014 that "if the defendant opens a road with a width of two meters, it would hinder securing road safety, and the current situation does not correspond to idle land permitted to use." As seen above, the defendant's reply as of February 18, 2014 that "the defendant's request to permit the use of the road with a width of two meters wide or more" is rejected, so it is reasonable to view that the defendant's objection constitutes an administrative disposition subject to appeal litigation. Therefore, the defendant's objection to the merits is without merit.

3. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Since the land of this case is not used for administrative purposes, it should be converted into general property. In addition, since the construction of additional two-meter passage on the land of this case does not interfere with the use or purpose of administrative property even if the construction of additional two-meter passage on the land of this case, the disposition of this case which rejected the Plaintiff’s application for permission of use is unlawful by abusing and abusing discretion.

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form 3 shall be as listed in attached Table 3.

C. Determination

1) The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that since the instant land is not used for administrative purposes, it should be converted into general property.

However, Article 40 (1) of the State Property Act provides that "the head of a central government agency shall abolish the use of administrative property in accordance with the criteria prescribed by Presidential Decree," and Article 37 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "where administrative property is not used for administrative purposes, the head of a central government agency shall, without delay, abolish its use in accordance with Article 40 (1) of the Act." Thus, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the land of this case was not used for administrative purposes, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise. Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion on

2) The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the instant disposition rejecting the Plaintiff’s application for permission for use of the instant land was unlawful by deviating from and abusing its discretion, since it does not obstruct the use or purpose of the administrative property even if the Plaintiff additionally opens a road with a width of 2 meters.

However, Article 30(1) of the State Property Act provides that "the head of a central government agency may grant permission for the use of administrative property only to the extent necessary for the purpose of preservation in the case of property for public use, public use, and public use, to the extent not hindering its use or purpose." The permission for the use of administrative property constitutes a dive patent under which an administrative agency grants a specific person the right to use administrative property by an administrative disposition conducted in a superior position with public authority, not by private law, rather than by an administrative agency as the principal agent of private economy (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da31074, Mar. 9, 206). An administrative agency has the discretion to decide whether to grant the permission for the use of State property, by comprehensively taking into account the criteria for the permission for use under Article 30(1) of the State Property Act, the basic principles of administration and disposition of State property under Article 3 of the same Act

However, the following circumstances are revealed in the statement in Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 3; ① the entrance of the first access road to the land of this case does not have a high risk of collapseing the access road even if the access road of this case was opened by additional 2 meters wide, but the entrance of the first access road of this case has a gradient of 8 meters and 35 degrees; the entrance of the second access road has a gradient of 11 meters and gradient of 44 degrees; the entrance of the second access road has a gradient of 35 meters and gradient of the private surface connected to the G Training Institute; the entrance of the third access road has a gradient of 30 meters and gradient of 60 degrees, and if a third access road of this case is opened by additional 2 meters wide, it cannot be ruled out that the defendant refused to grant permission for use of the road of this case on account of securing the safety of the road of this case.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kang Jeong-hee

Judges Jeon Sung

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.