B. Whether a joint collateral security contract that did not specify the period and scope is null and void

C. The scope of and restrictions on the guarantor's liability for the continuous guarantee contract

B. It cannot be said that the joint and several guarantee contract is invalid merely because the guarantee did not set the period and scope of the future obligation.

C. Although the so-called continuous guarantee contract does not change the scope of the guarantee liability or the guarantee period, the essence of the contract is nothing more than the guarantee contract, so the guarantor is in principle liable for the guarantee of the entire principal obligation at the time of the guarantee. However, if the amount of the principal obligation to be returned to the guarantor’s expense is much more than the scope that the guarantor could have anticipated at the time of the guarantee, and the cause of the continuous guarantee contract is clearly aggravated (in cases where the creditor was unaware of the gross negligence, even if he did not know of the gross negligence), the guarantor’s liability can be limited to the reasonable scope, only in cases where it is acknowledged that there is a circumstance contrary to the good faith principle, such as intentionally expanding the transaction size without any notice or intention, and thus, is contrary to

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

With respect to the First Ground:

Fidelity guarantee, regardless of its name, is a contract in which an employer is to compensate for damages suffered by an employee in an employment relationship, regardless of the name thereof, and the employment relationship refers to at least a broad meaning of command, supervisory relationship, and employee relationship. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined based on the evidence that there was an agreement among the plaintiff and the non-party as a designated intermediary relationship between the plaintiff and the non-party, and determined that the designated intermediary relationship between the plaintiff and the non-party was under a typical employment contract or under a broad meaning of employment relationship. Furthermore, the defendant's joint and several surety scope is merely about the acquisition price of agricultural and fishery products of the above non-party, and it does not relate to other compensation obligations arising from his intention or negligence, and thus, it cannot be viewed as a fidelity guarantee relationship under the Act on Guarantee of Secrecy, on the sole ground that the above joint and several surety relationship continues to occur, do not limit the scope of his responsibility. The court below's findings of facts and judgment are justifiable, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the rules of evidence, or there are no other arguments.

With respect to the second ground:

The decision of the court below that the defendant's guarantee of this case in this case cannot be deemed null and void merely because it did not set the period and scope of the guarantee of this case on the basis of the transaction such as its recognition and the guarantee of this case, is justifiable, and it cannot be interpreted by limiting the defendant's liability of guarantee and the guarantee period solely on the grounds of the assertion.

The precedent is also not appropriate because it differs from this case. The argument is groundless.

With respect to the third point:

The so-called continuing guarantee contract between a creditor and a principal debtor imposes a guarantee liability for an indefinite obligation that may arise in the present and future due to a continuous transaction between the creditor and the principal debtor, even though there is no specific provision regarding the scope of the guarantee liability or the guarantee period, its essence is nothing more than the guarantee contract. Therefore, the guarantor is in principle liable for the guarantee liability for the entire amount of the principal obligation at the time of payment. However, even though the amount of the principal obligation to be returned to the guarantor’s expense exceeds the extent that the guarantor could have anticipated at the time of the guarantee, the obligee may limit the guarantor’s liability to a reasonable extent only where there is a circumstance that the obligee knew, or was gross negligence, of the fact that the principal obligor’s property status substantially aggravated, and intentionally expands the transaction size without any notice or intention, and thus, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff did not notify the Defendant or reduced the maximum amount of credit transaction due to a considerable decrease in the amount of credit, as argued by the Defendant, even though there was no special circumstance that the Plaintiff could have intentionally aggravated the transaction in excess of the scope of the Nonparty’s property status.

Ultimately, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles or by violating the rules of evidence as asserted in the measure that did not limit the scope of the guarantee liability of this case.

The Supreme Court Decision (Law No. 84Meu453 delivered on October 10, 1984) does not change the above view.

The assertion is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-hee (Presiding Justice)