[소유권이전등기][공1997.6.1.(35),1602]
Whether the change in the name of ownership on the registry before the expiration of the period of prescription for the acquisition of real estate constitutes a ground for suspending the acquisition by prescription (negative)
Even if the title of ownership on the register was changed before the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, it cannot be said that the existing status of possession was destroyed, so it cannot be a ground for suspending prescriptive acquisition.
Article 247 of the Civil Act
[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jong-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-Appellee)
and 8 others (Attorneys Hun-tae et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Jung Ho-ho et al. and one other (Defendant's Counsel for the defendant's Counsel for the defendant-appellant)
Seoul High Court Decision 96Na24103 delivered on December 24, 1996
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the part of the above part of the purchase price of this case which was occupied by the non-party 1, the owner of the real estate on March 25, 1972, and the non-party 1, the non-party 2, who occupied the building without permission and its site on the ground of the non-party 1,633 square meters of 19,000 m29,000,000,000,0000,0000,000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,000,0000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,00).
In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are all acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the possession by autonomy and the succession of possession by autonomous occupant, or in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the non-exercise of right to know.
The issue is ultimately on the premise that the non-party who purchased each part of the possession of this case concludes the sales contract of this case and pays only a part of the purchase price, and thereby did not pay the remaining purchase price, or that each sales contract was rescinded on the grounds that the payment was unpaid, and therefore, it is nothing more than an attack against the judgment of the court below on the premise that the judgment of the court below and the fact that
2. Although the title of ownership on the register was changed before the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition, it cannot be deemed that the existing state of possession was destroyed continuously, so this cannot be a ground for suspending the prescriptive acquisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 75Da2220, 2221, Mar. 9, 1976; Supreme Court Decision 92Da52764, 5271, May 25, 1993), the judgment below to the same purport is just, and there is no need to revise the above Supreme Court precedents. We cannot accept the discussion.
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)