[2] In a case where Gap et al., who was mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation team during the Japanese occupation period and was engaged in forced labor in the old Japanese occupation company, sought compensation against the newly established Japanese occupation company after its dissolution, the case holding that the Korean law is the governing law as to the right to claim compensation for damages due to the tort of the old French Heavy Industries company

[3] In a case where Gap et al., who was mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation team during the Japanese occupation period and was engaged in forced labor in the old Japanese occupation company, sought compensation for consolation money against the newly established French Heavy Industries Corporation after its dissolution, the case holding that the old French Heavy Industries Corporation is liable to compensate for the mental damage suffered by Gap et al. due to the unlawful colonial control and anti-human acts directly connected to the Japanese government's implementation of a war of aggression against the Korean Peninsula at the time of its dissolution

[4] In a case where Gap et al., who was mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation department during the Japanese occupation period and was engaged in forced labor at the old Japanese occupation department, sought consolation money against the newly established Japanese occupation company after its dissolution, the case holding that it is remarkably unfair to refuse to pay consolation money to Gap et al. due to the expiration of the statute of limitations and to refuse to pay consolation money against the newly established Japanese occupation company, and thus, it is not permissible as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith

The case holding that the jurisdiction of the court of the Republic of Korea shall not be readily denied on the sole basis of the fact that the Japanese court is more convenient than the Korean court in terms of the geographical, verbal and litigation convenience, and it is difficult for the Republic of Korea court to easily deny the jurisdiction of the court of the Republic of Korea under the Civil Procedure Act, and it is difficult for the Republic of Korea court to request a trial by clearly expressing its intention to have a trial before the Korean court, and considering the objective litigation capacity at the time of the accident, it cannot be seen that the recognition of jurisdiction of the Korean court in light of the fact that the parties to the case and the dispute cannot be seen as significantly prejudicial to the fairness of the parties to the case and the dispute, the evidence in support of the facts alleged by Gap et al. is almost destroyed.

[2] The case where Gap et al., who were mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation department during the Japanese occupation period and was engaged in forced labor in the old Somp Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Gu Sommmmmba"), sought consolation money against the newly established Somba Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. after the dissolution of the above company.

Since the place of tort extends over the Republic of Korea and Japan, the governing law to determine the claim for damages caused by the tort is the law of the Republic of Korea or Japan. If there are several countries that can be the governing law, the court of suspension of the law can choose and determine the governing law by taking into account the degree of relationship with the relevant case, the necessity of protection of the victim's rights, predictability of the applicable law of the perpetrator and the guarantee of the perpetrator's right to defense, etc., and the equity, equity and justice between the parties, and the appropriateness of the judgment, etc., the former Korean law to claim for damages caused by the tort should be the governing law.

[3] The case where Gap et al., who were mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation department during the Japanese occupation period and were engaged in forced labor in the old Somp Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Gu Sommmmmba"), sought consolation money against the newly established Somba Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. after the dissolution of the above company.

The case holding that Gap et al. was responsible for emotional distress and mental distress of the Japanese government due to Gap et al.'s unlawful acts in an extremely dangerous environment where there is a high possibility that Gap et al. would be at the age of 13 and 14, and Eul et al. were at all unable to receive wages, and Eul et al. was at all restricted out of the total mobilization system of the Japanese government's harsh exhibition, and neglected to provide Gap et al. with any safety education or evacuation guidelines, and caused death or injury to Gap et al. due to their remaining time, and continued to work in an inferior environment without providing adequate treatment, rest and compensation after that time, etc., and thus Gap et al. suffered from mental distress and injury to Gap et al. due to such unlawful acts in light of the fact that Eul et al. continued to work in the poor environment without providing them with proper treatment, rest and compensation, etc.

[4] The case where Gap et al., who were mobilized to work in the Japanese occupation department during the Japanese occupation period and was engaged in forced labor in the old Somp Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., sought consolation money against the newly established Japanese occupation company after the dissolution of the above company.

The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Da61381 Decided October 30, 2018 ruled that even if the victims of forced mobilization and labor-related lawsuits were filed in Japan or Korea before the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Da61381 Decided October 30, 2018, it is reasonable to deem that the victims of forced mobilization, such as Gap, etc., in the Republic of Korea, could not exercise their rights objectively in relation to the interpretation of the Agreement on Economic Cooperation and the Settlement of Property and Claims between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and it is reasonable to deem that there was an obstacle that the victims of forced mobilization, etc., such as Gap, etc., were unable to exercise their rights objectively at the time of the filing of the lawsuit, and even if other victims of forced mobilization and labor-related lawsuits were brought before the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Da61381 Decided the above Supreme Court en banc Decision, it is objectively difficult to bring a lawsuit despite the existence of res judicata effect in which Gap et al. lost their rights.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 150,000,000 won with interest rate of 20% per annum from the day following the day of service of a copy of the complaint of this case to the day of complete payment.

Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked, and all the claims of the plaintiffs shall be dismissed.

Preliminaryly, the part against the defendant among the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and all the plaintiffs' claims against the defendant falling under the revoked part are dismissed.

The reasoning for this part of the judgment of the court of first instance is that the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, except that part of the "1. Recognizing facts" in the judgment of the court of first instance is cited by the main sentence of

Around May 194, 194, the first instance judgment, which included in the main text, proposed that a person who wishes to receive a mental work of 419 mental work units, 320-21 women's mental health workers, who had been ordered to receive a mental work of 51 mental work units, 611 units around May 194, and entered into an agreement on the 132 claims agreement (Ⅰ), which entered into force on December 18, 1965, and took place on December 14, 1965, and took place the same day as the agreement on the 132 claims agreement (Ⅰ) meeting minutes of the 16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-16-14 of the case, and deleted the case related to Nonparty 1's inheritance or non-party 1-15-14-6-16-17-17-17-18-17-18-6-17 of the case.

2. Judgment on the main defense of this case

A. The defendant's assertion

Whether to recognize the jurisdiction of a domestic court with respect to a conflict of interest cases shall be determined by cooking in accordance with the basic ideology of ensuring the fairness, propriety, and promptness of trials by the parties to the lawsuit. The fact of the cause of the lawsuit of this case in Japan does not have any substantial connection with the Republic of Korea that occurs in all Japan, and the labor spirit unit was implemented as a policy of the Japanese government at the time, and there was no previous mariti Heavy Industries or the defendant involved in this case. Nevertheless, allowing a Japanese corporation that does not have any branch or business office in the Republic of Korea to file a suit in this case at a Korean court is extremely unfair in light of the fairness, convenience, predictability, etc. of the parties to the lawsuit. In addition, in light of the fact that the defendant is a Japanese corporation, and the place where the plaintiffs asserted is also a Japanese corporation, the Japanese court has international jurisdiction over the lawsuit of this case in terms of the appropriateness, speed, and efficiency of trial. Accordingly, the lawsuit of this

B. Determination

International jurisdiction shall be determined in accordance with the basic ideology of ensuring equity between the parties, the propriety, speediness, and economy of the trial. Specifically, not only personal interests such as equity, convenience, and predictability of the parties to the lawsuit, but also the interests of the court or the State, such as the appropriateness, prompt, and efficiency of the trial and the effectiveness of the judgment, shall also be considered. Whether to protect any of such diverse interests is necessary or not shall be determined reasonably by taking the objective criteria of the substantial relationship between the suspension of law and the parties, and the substantial relationship between the case in dispute and the suspension of law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da59788, Jan. 27, 2005; 2009Da2549, May 24, 2012).

However, although the defendant, a Japanese corporation established under the Japanese law, has its principal office in Japan, considering all the following circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, since Korea has a substantial relationship with the parties to the case and the case in which the dispute was brought, the Korean court has jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the defendant's main defense against safety has no merit.

① As seen earlier, the Plaintiffs’ assertion on the grounds of the claim is that a series of acts, such as deception, intimidation, etc., were committed in an unlawful and organized manner on the Korean Peninsula where Japan illegally occupied and occupied the human resources necessary for the production of war materials, such as the former Pacific War, and supplying them to the Japanese government, at the time of the production of war materials including the military aircraft, constitutes a tort. As such, the Republic of Korea constitutes a tort in which part of the tort alleged by the Plaintiffs was committed, and thus, the Republic of Korea has the territorial jurisdiction right under the Civil Procedure Act in the Korean court. However, in determining whether the parties or the disputed case was practically related to the Republic of Korea, it cannot be denied that the existence of territorial jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Act is still an important factor.

② While the material evidence in Japan supporting the facts alleged by the Plaintiffs in this case was almost destroyed, it does not seem that all survivors, including the Plaintiff, etc., reside in the Republic of Korea, and the examination of evidence is possible only in Japan.

(3) International jurisdiction is not exclusive jurisdiction, but it is difficult for the Japanese court to readily deny the jurisdiction of the Korean court on the sole basis of the fact that the Japanese court is more convenient for the defendant than the Korean court in terms of the geographical, verbal and litigation performance, and the fact that the plaintiffs clearly express their intent to have a trial before the Korean court is claiming a trial shall not be easily open to the contrary. In addition, considering the defendant's objective litigation performance ability, recognizing the jurisdiction of the Korean court may not be deemed significantly detrimental to the fairness between the parties.

3. Judgment on the merits

A. Summary of the plaintiffs' claims

The Japanese government established a long-term plan to secure necessary human resources in the process of performing the war of aggression, such as the Pacific War, during the Japanese colonial era, and mobilized human resources on the Korean Peninsula systematically, and used unlawful methods such as deception and intimidation in the process. In addition, the old-mar Industries, which was in the position of a military contractor during the core period, actively cooperates with the human resources mobilization policy of the Japanese government.

The plaintiff et al. entered a school of higher grade, guaranteed the provision of sufficient wages, etc., which led to the Japanese government's deception or intimidation to support the work spirit team. After arrival in Japan under the labor spirit team, the head of the Gun project chain, who was deprived of freedom against the will of the flight aircraft producer or the Dammon plant, was deprived of forced labor and was not provided with any opportunity or wage for compulsory labor. The above acts of the Japanese government and the acts of the old malut Heavy Heavy Industries, which participated therein, constitute anti-human tort.

Therefore, the Defendant, in fact, succeeded to the obligation of the former Solo Heavy Industries as a juristic person identical to the former Solo Heavy Industries, is obligated to pay 150,000 won for each of the plaintiffs 1, 2, and 4. The deceased non-party 1’s family member, who is the heir, the plaintiff 3, the deceased non-party 1’s own consolation money and 150,000 won for the consolation money which the deceased non-party 1’s family member succeeded from the deceased non-party 1.

B. Determination of the governing law

The governing law that serves as the basis for determining whether a claim for damages based on a tort is established in this case shall be determined by the norm on determination of governing law applicable to legal relations that contain foreign elements in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “low promotional norm”). From January 15, 1962, the former Conflict of Laws (established by Act No. 996, Jan. 15, 1962) enforced between the Plaintiff and the Defendant extending over the period from January 15, 1962. From March 28, 1912, the conflict between the Republic of Korea’s governing law applicable to legal relations that occurred before January 15, 1962, and the pertinent governing law of the Republic of Korea should be determined by the Civil Code No. 21 to the extent that the pertinent law of the Republic of Korea was established at the time of the enactment of the law of the Republic of Korea and the pertinent governing law of the Republic of Korea, and thus, the Plaintiffs, as the governing law of the Republic of Korea’s Civil Code, can be determined by the Civil Code No. 101.

C. Determination as to the establishment of liability for tort of the old unused Heavy Industries

In full view of the aforementioned facts and the purport of the entire arguments as seen earlier, the following facts can be acknowledged. In light of this, the following acts against the Plaintiff, etc. by the former Nitas Industries constitute an unlawful and anti-human act directly connected to the Japanese government’s implementation of colonial rule and the war of aggression against the Korean Peninsula at the time, and it is clear in light of the empirical rule that the Plaintiffs suffered emotional distress due to such unlawful acts. Therefore, the former Nitas Industries is liable to compensate for the emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiff, etc. and the deceased Nonparty 1’s family members due to the death of the deceased Nonparty 1.

① In order to secure human resources necessary for military-related businesses during the process of performing illegal invasion war, such as the Japanese War, the Pacific War, etc., the Japanese government formulated a long-term plan and mobilized human resources systematically as seen earlier, and the old-old Heavy Industries, which was in the core of military-related businesses, actively cooperated with the human resources mobilization policy of the Japanese government and expanded human resources.

② While the Korean Peninsula and Korean people were under the illegal and extreme control of Japan at the time, the Plaintiff et al., without being well aware of the contents and the environment of labor to be faced with Japan in the future, supported by the organized deception, intimidation, etc. of the Japanese government, and had them work in the factory of this case and had them work in the factory of this case.

③ Furthermore, even if the Plaintiff et al. was a female under the age of 13 and 14, he was engaged in dangerous labor in an extremely poor environment where there was a high possibility of causing harm to life and body, and was not paid benefits at all. In addition, the Plaintiff et al. was remarkably detained by the Japanese government’s harsh time of war mobilization and under regular surveillance.

④ In particular, due to the termination of the plant of this case by neglecting without providing the Plaintiff, etc. with any safety education or escape guidelines, the factory of this case was collapsed, and the deceased Nonparty 1 died and the Plaintiff 2 suffered bodily injury. While Plaintiff 2 suffered bodily injury during the accident and work, Plaintiff 2 continued to engage in the work under an inferior environment without providing appropriate treatment, rest, compensation, etc.

D. Determination as to whether the Defendant bears the obligation of the old Heavy Industries

The reasoning for this part of this Court is as follows: (a) the part concerning whether the Defendant bears the obligation of the old Chinese Heavy Industries is identical to that of the part concerning “3-B(2) of the first instance judgment from 23th to 27th 5th ; and (b) such part is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

E. Judgment on the defendant's assertion

1) Determination on the assertion that the plaintiffs' claims were extinguished under the Agreement on Claims

A) Defendant’s assertion

In this case, the right to claim damages asserted by the plaintiffs falls under the outstanding amount, compensation and other claims of Koreans, and is included in the subject of the claim agreement concluded between the Republic of Korea and Japan on June 22, 1965. Accordingly, the right to claim damages claimed by the plaintiffs due to the conclusion of the above claim agreement has already expired.

B) Determination

As examined earlier, the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages in this case is a claim for consolation money against Japanese companies under the premise of a Japanese company’s forced mobilization that was directly connected with the Japanese government’s illegal control over the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the war of aggression, and such claim for consolation money does not constitute the subject of the Agreement on the Claim of Compensation (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Da61381, Oct. 30, 2018). Accordingly, the Defendant’s claim on a different premise is without merit.

2) Determination on extinctive prescription or exclusion period defense

A) Defendant’s assertion

The plaintiffs' right to claim damages expires after the lapse of 20 years from the date of tort alleged by the plaintiffs, regardless of whether the applicable law in this case is the law of the Republic of Korea or Japanese law, and the period of limitation expires and there was no obstacle to the plaintiffs from exercising their rights. Thus, the defendant's claim for the expiration of the statute of limitations does not constitute abuse of rights. Even if there were any obstacle to the plaintiffs' exercise of rights, (i) other forced labor workers filed a lawsuit against the defendant with a court in the Republic of Korea; (ii) around August 26, 2005, or (iii) around August 26, 2005, or at the latest, the public-private joint committee announced the agreement on the right to claim damages by compulsory mobilization of forced labor workers, and (iv) around May 24, 2012, the grounds for exercising their rights became extinct after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in this case within six months from the date of the above Supreme Court ruling.

B) Determination

(1) The law applicable to the termination of the plaintiffs' claim for damages caused by the tort also becomes the law of the Republic of Korea for the same reasons as seen earlier. However, under the current civil law, only extinctive prescription is provided for the claim for damages caused by the tort. Therefore, the defendant's assertion that the limitation period has lapsed on the premise that the Japanese law is the governing law is

(2) Next, we examine the argument that the extinctive prescription has expired.

(A) Relevant legal principles

A claim for damages caused by a tort shall expire by prescription when the victim or his/her legal representative fails to exercise the right for three years from the date on which he/she became aware of the damage or the perpetrator, or when ten years have elapsed from the date on which the tort was committed (Article 766 of the Civil Act). Extinctive prescription does not proceed from the time when a right objectively created and it is possible to exercise the right, and even when it is impossible to exercise the right, “the case where the right cannot be exercised” refers to the case where there is a disability in the exercise of the right, for instance, the non-existence of the period or non-performance of the terms and conditions, etc., and even if the victim or his/her legal representative was unaware of the existence of the right or the possibility of exercise of the right, such cause does not constitute a legal disability (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision

However, the exercise of a debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of the Civil Act. As such, where there are special circumstances, such as where the debtor, prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, made it impossible or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription, acted to make such measures unnecessary, made it impossible for the creditor to exercise his right objectively, or made the creditor unable to exercise his right, or made the debtor believe that the debtor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations, or where there are such special circumstances as where other creditors under the same conditions as the need to protect the creditor or where other creditors receive the repayment of the obligation, etc., making it remarkably improper or unfair to allow the debtor to claim the completion of the statute of limitations as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da72

Ultimately, in the event that a right occurred but there exists a legal disability, such as non-fulfillment of the period or non-performance of the conditions for the exercise of the right, if the legal disability is the starting point of the extinctive prescription only when the legal disability is eliminated, but if it is merely a de facto disability, such as failure to know the existence of the right or the possibility of exercising the right, it shall not affect the running of the extinctive prescription of the right. However, if the de facto disability, which is unable to exercise the right, is objectively difficult to expect the exercise of the right in light of the nature of the right, even if the extinctive prescription period has expired, it is not permissible for the obligor to claim

(B) According to the facts established earlier, the Defendant’s illegal act against the Plaintiff, etc. and the occurrence of damages therefrom occurred before October 1945, which was returned by Plaintiff 1, etc., and it is evident that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit in this case was filed on February 27, 2014, which was ten years after the date of the enforcement of the above 1945 and the current Civil Act (No. 4 January 1, 1960).

(C) However, in light of the following facts and circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the aforementioned evidence and evidence were objectively an obstacle that the Plaintiffs could not exercise the right to claim damages of this case even before the time when the Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit of this case. Thus, the Defendant’s assertion for the completion of extinctive prescription and refusal of the performance of the obligation to compensate for damages due to tort against the Plaintiff et al. is considerably unfair and thus cannot be permitted as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith.

① From June 22, 1965 to the date of establishment of the diplomatic relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea after the illegal act of the former Hanmman Heavy Industries occurred, the diplomatic relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea was severed, and therefore, even if the Plaintiffs were to have been sentenced against the Defendant, it could not be executed even if they were to be declared in the Republic of Korea. Since then, the diplomatic relationship was normalization between Korea and Japan since 1965, but the view that the individual claims of the Republic of Korea against Japan or Japan were comprehensively resolved under the Agreement on Claims in relation to Article 2 of the Agreement on Claims and the provisions of the minutes of the Agreement on Claims, in the situation that all documents related to the Agreement on Claims are not disclosed, in relation to the provisions of the Agreement on Claims, was generally accepted in the Republic of Korea. Moreover, in Japan, the Act on Measures for Property Rights was

② However, as the victims mobilized forcedly mobilized commence to file a lawsuit in Japan, the opinions of the public-private joint committee that the parties did not extinguish the right to claim damages due to any humanitarian illegal act in which the state power of Japan was involved or any illegal act directly connected to the colonial rule was not extinguished by the agreement on claims. On January 2005, the documents related to the agreement on claims in Korea were disclosed to the public in Korea on August 26, 2005, and on August 26, 2005, the opinion of the public-private joint committee was expressed that “The right to claim damages due to any illegal act or any illegal act directly connected to the colonial rule in which the state power of Japan was involved cannot be deemed to have been resolved by the agreement on claims.”

③ However, the content expressed through the news report data at the time of the public-private joint committee was basically not aimed at claiming compensation for Japanese colonial rule. The purpose of resolving the relationship between financial and private claims and obligations between the two countries based on Article 4 of the Large Peace Treaty, and with respect to anti-human tort involving the State power, such as Japanese government and military, such as sexual slavery issues, it shall not be deemed resolved by the claim agreement, and the legal responsibility of the Japanese government remains, and the problem of atomic Koreans and atomic victims shall not be included in the agreement on the claim. As such, there was no specific determination as to whether the right to claim compensation for tort against Japanese military enterprises which were forced mobilization or labor of individual victims was included in the scope of the agreement on the claim. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, even after expressing the opinion of the above public-private joint committee, it shall be deemed that the victim's deposit money was included in the scope of the agreement on the compensation for damages to which the victim had been forced to exercise the right to claim compensation for damages from Japan, and it shall be deemed that it is difficult to exercise the right to request compensation for damages from Japan.

④ The Supreme Court Decision 2009Da22549 Decided May 24, 2012 and Decision 2009Da68620 Decided 209Da68620 Decided that “The Japanese case dismissing a claim for damages against forced mobilization” cannot be approved against the public order and good morals of the Republic of Korea. It should be deemed that the agreement on forced mobilization did not terminate the right to claim damages under the agreement on forced mobilization because it is difficult to view that the claim for damages caused by anti-human misconduct in which the state power was involved or by unlawful act directly connected with colonial do not fall under the scope of the agreement on the right to claim. Even if such right to claim damages falls under the scope of the agreement on the right to claim, it cannot be deemed that the agreement on the right to claim damages naturally terminates only by the agreement on the right to claim, but it cannot be deemed that the agreement on the right to claim damages has been abandoned only by the diplomatic protection of the Republic of Korea, and that the new High Court Decision 2009Da9800 decided September 28, 20007.

A) Each of the above decisions is reversed, and remanded to the lower court. However, according to the judgment of remand, each of the above Supreme Court decisions did not immediately confirm the right to claim damages against the Japanese companies above the forced mobilization victim, and despite each of the above Supreme Court decisions, there were still controversy over whether the compulsory mobilization victim's right to claim damages is included in the scope of the agreement on the right to claim compensation, and whether Japanese companies are liable for damages against the forced mobilization victim (domestic scholars also published a thesis to criticize each of the above Supreme Court decisions), and the Japanese government, which is a party to the agreement on the right to claim compensation, still has maintained the position that the right to claim damages against the anti-human misconduct or illegal acts directly connected to the colonial rule that Japanese government or Japanese companies participated in the past by the agreement on the right to claim compensation has been extinguished.

⑤ In the case of remanding, the judgment of partially accepting the claim for damages of the victims of forced mobilization against the new Japanese Industries Co., Ltd., and the new Japanese Co., Ltd., and the new Japanese Co., Ltd. and the new Japanese Co., Ltd. (the new Co., Ltd.) filed a second appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance on October 30, 2018. The Supreme Court rendered the en banc Decision 2013Da61381 Decided October 30, 2018, which dismissed the appeal of the new Japanese Co., Ltd. (the new Co., Ltd.). Accordingly, the claim for damages against the new Japanese Co., Ltd. (the plaintiff Co., Ltd., the new Co., Ltd., the previous en banc Decision was finalized only after the claim for damages against the new Japanese Co., Ltd., the plaintiff Co., Ltd. (the new Co., Ltd.), which were the victims of forced mobilization, was not included in the legal principle of the Agreement on forced mobilization of Japanese Co., Ltd.

(6) The victims including the Plaintiff et al., were born between around 1920 and around 1930, and the above Supreme Court Decisions 2009Da22549 and 2009Da68620 Decided this ruling, and it seems that it was difficult for them to have had sufficient legal knowledge or to obtain appropriate legal advice in light of their status, education level, etc. Furthermore, the above Supreme Court en banc Decision rendered on May 24, 2012 that there is considerable possibility for the victims to be recognized as right to claim damages against Japanese companies. However, it is difficult to view that the pertinent Japanese companies including the Defendant et al. refused to accept the above Supreme Court en banc Decision and continued legal disputes in the appellate trial and the second instance court, and it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs were unable to exercise their right to claim damages against Japanese victims by way of changes in facts based on each of the above Supreme Court en banc Decision, which was presented by the Defendant et al., the Plaintiffs’ right to claim damages within 100 years prior to the aforementioned legal interpretation and application of the Act.

(D) Meanwhile, Supreme Court Decisions 2009Da22549 Decided May 24, 201, 2009Da68620 Decided that “the victim’s right to claim compensation for forced mobilization had not been extinguished due to the agreement to claim compensation,” the legal issues on whether the plaintiffs’ right to claim compensation for damages of this case is subject to the agreement to claim compensation was organized itself, and accordingly, there may be room to deem that the causes for failure of the victims, such as the plaintiff, etc., were resolved that the victims were unable to exercise their rights objectively, on May 24, 2012.

However, even if the above, if the obligor’s exercise of rights or interruption of prescription was impossible or considerably difficult prior to the completion of prescription, or if an obligee has an objective obstacle to the obligee’s exercise of rights within a reasonable period from the time such circumstance was terminated, the obligor’s defense of the statute of limitations can be avoided. However, denying the validity of the statute of limitations based on the principle of trust and good faith should be limited to exceptional restrictions on the system of the statute of limitations, which is based on the ideology of achieving legal stability, remedy for difficulties in proving difficulties, and sanction for neglect of the exercise of rights. Therefore, the “reasonable period” of the exercise of rights should be limited in a short period equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act, barring special circumstances, barring special circumstances. Therefore, even where it is inevitable to extend the period due to a very special circumstance in individual cases, such period may not exceed three years, which is the short-term statute of limitations under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 16).

In light of the above legal principles, it is difficult to view that the plaintiffs, who are not parties to the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Da22549 Decided May 24, 2012, and 2009Da68620, were able to clearly recognize the above disability caused by each of the above judgments within a short time. As seen earlier, despite each of the above Supreme Court decisions, there is still controversy as to whether the victims of forced mobilization did not immediately confirm their right to compensation for damages to Japanese companies, so whether they are liable to compensate for damages to victims of forced mobilization. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal principles on the application of the Agreement through the en banc Decision on October 30, 2018, and thereby, the right to compensation for victims of forced mobilization became final and conclusive. Thus, even if the plaintiff et al. exercised their right to compensation for damages for the victims of forced mobilization for a considerable period of time than the plaintiff et al.'s exercise of right, the period equivalent to the plaintiff et al.'s exercise of right can be seen.

However, the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on February 27, 2014, before three years have elapsed since May 24, 2012, which was sentenced to the above Supreme Court Decision 2009Da22549 and 2009Da68620 Decided May 24, 2012. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit within a reasonable period, and thus, the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription may be prevented.

(E) Therefore, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

F. Scope of liability for damages

1) The amount of consolation money

The Defendant announced the illegal colonial domination system on the Korean Peninsula and had the Japanese government actively cooperate with the Japanese government in order to promote the expansion of Japanese colonialism, and had the Plaintiff, etc., mobilized through deception, intimidation, etc. engage in forced labor under a thorough plan. Accordingly, the Plaintiff, etc., even though they were under the age of her family members and were deprived of freedom, had the Defendant engage solely in labor in accordance with the schedule and rule enforced by the Defendant until they were deprived of his freedom. Nonparty 1 was forced to engage in harsh labor in a bad and dangerous environment, and Plaintiff 2 was killed of her title and left shoulder, and Plaintiff 2 was injured. The Japanese government led to erroneous perception that many of the mobilized women, who were forced to engage in the military peace division, would be identical with her husband’s military peace division, and thus, there was a concern that Plaintiff 1, 2, and 4 did not lead to a misunderstanding of the past life by being able to lead a normal marriage with her husband.

In full view of the degree of illegality of such harmful act, the circumstances leading up to and degree of involvement of the defendant in such act, age of the plaintiff et al. and period of compulsory labor, intensity of labor, working environment and free suppression, degree of damage and wages, etc., the result and degree of damage suffered by the plaintiff et al. due to the defendant's illegal act, and the defendant's attitude of denying liability until now after the illegal act, equality in similar cases, and other various circumstances shown in the argument of this case, etc., the defendant's family members, which are considered to be paid to the plaintiff et al., as consolation money to the plaintiff et al., the amount of consolation money to be paid by the court of first instance, 150,000,000 won for the deceased non-party et al. during compulsory labor, including the plaintiff et al. al. (However, in case of the deceased non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's death, the compensation money shall not be recognized), and all of the plaintiff et al.

2) The amount of Plaintiff 3’s claim

A) Inheritance relationship following the death of deceased non-party 1

(1) According to the purport of Gap evidence No. 17 and the whole pleadings, the following facts can be acknowledged.

① Nonparty 2 is the father of the deceased Nonparty 1 (hereinafter “the deceased”), the head of family, and Nonparty 3 is the mother of the deceased Nonparty 1 (the mother). Nonparty 4, Nonparty 5, Nonparty 6, Nonparty 7, Nonparty 8, and Nonparty 9 are female siblingss of the deceased, and Nonparty 3 and Nonparty 10 are the deceased’s male siblingss, and Nonparty 11 is the deceased’s male siblingss, and Nonparty 9 (date of birth 1 omitted), and Nonparty 11 was born respectively after the deceased’s death.

② Nonparty 2 died on January 26, 1969; Nonparty 3 died on December 26, 1973; and Nonparty 10 on June 10, 1960.

③ Nonparty 4 was removed from the military register on March 29, 1968; Nonparty 5 on December 3, 1969; Nonparty 6 on September 30, 1961; Nonparty 7 on March 17, 1964; Nonparty 8 on February 16, 1976; and Nonparty 9 on April 30, 1971.

(2) According to the above facts, the deceased died in an unmarried status on December 7, 194, and his father inherited the deceased’s property solely according to the custom of Korea at the time. Thereafter, the non-party 2 died on January 26, 1969, and pursuant to the former Civil Act (amended by Act No. 3051 of December 31, 197), the non-party 3’s lineal descendant, who is the male heir’s lineal descendant 6/21, the non-party 11, who is the male lineal descendant 4/21, the non-party 3, and the non-party 5, the non-party 8, and the non-party 9, the non-party 4, the non-party 6, and the non-party 7, who is a female lineal descendant of the same family register, were inherited at the ratio of the non-party 1/21, the non-party 4, the non-party 15 and the non-party 1/5 of the former Civil Act, respectively.

B) Plaintiff 3’s acquisition of bonds

Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in the statement Nos. 19 and 20, Nonparty 5, Nonparty 7, Nonparty 8, and Nonparty 9 are acknowledged as having notified the Defendant of each of the above assignment of claims through the service of a preparatory document on July 3, 2017, on ① the right to claim damages against the Defendant of the deceased who succeeded to by Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3, ② the right to claim damages against the Defendant due to the death of the deceased who succeeded by Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3, ③ the right to claim damages against the Defendant due to the death of the deceased, ③ the right to notify the Defendant of each of the above assignment of claims is transferred to Nonparty 5, Nonparty 7, Nonparty 8, and Nonparty 9, respectively, and it is recognized that Plaintiff 3 notified the Defendant of each of the above assignment of claims.

C) Calculation of the amount of claims of Plaintiff 3

(1) As seen earlier, the amount of consolation money unique to the Defendant of Plaintiff 3 and Nonparty 5, Nonparty 7, and Nonparty 8 due to the death of the Deceased is KRW 20,00,000 in total, KRW 11) 80,000 in total, as seen earlier.

(2) The amount of consolation money against the Defendant of the deceased inherited by the Plaintiff 3, Nonparty 5, Nonparty 7, Nonparty 8, and Nonparty 9 is the sum of KRW 101,428,50 [=150,00,000 + (a week 12 + (a week 13/21 + a week 13/21 + a week) 2/35) and less than KRW 100. The same applies hereinafter].

(3) The amount of consolation money unique to the defendant of the plaintiff 3 and the non-party 5, the non-party 7, the non-party 8, and the non-party 9 inherited respectively is the total of 13,523,800 won [=20,000 won + (a week 14 + 13/21 + a week 15) 2/35];

(4) The amount of consolation money unique to the defendant of the plaintiff 3 and the non-party 5, the non-party 7, the non-party 8, and the non-party 9 inherited respectively is the total of 12,00,000 won [=20,000 x 16 per week].

(5) Ultimately, the sum of Plaintiff 3’s inherent claim for damages and the claim for damages that it acquired against the Defendant is KRW 206,952,300 (= KRW 80,000 + KRW 101,428,500 + + KRW 13,523,800 + KRW 12,000 + KRW 12,00,000). Accordingly, the Defendant is obligated to pay Plaintiff 3 out of the said amount the amount of KRW 150,00,000 claimed by Plaintiff 3 and its delay damages.

(iii)the initial date of the damages for delay;

The plaintiffs claim damages for delay from the day following the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case against the defendant's obligation to pay consolation money.

In principle, the liability for damages caused by a tort shall be deemed to have occurred at the time of the tort in light of the concept of fairness, even though there is no separate demand for performance. However, in cases where considerable changes have occurred in comparison with the time of the tort, such as the monetary value at the time of the conclusion of arguments, which should be considered in calculating consolation money, due to the lapse of three months between the time of the tort and the time of the conclusion of arguments, the problem of substantial excessive compensation arises in cases where damages for delay are deemed to occur from the time of the occurrence of the tort. Thus, even in exceptional cases, damages for delay caused by a tort shall be deemed to have occurred from the date of the conclusion of arguments at the trial, which is the base date of the calculation of consolation money (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da103950, Jan. 13, 2011, etc.). However, where the appellate court maintains the amount of consolation money determined by the judgment of the first instance court, damages for delay shall arise from the date of the first instance trial, which is the base date of calculating consolation money (see Supreme Court Decision

In light of the above legal principles, from around 1945 to July 7, 2017, which was the date of the end of tort, a long-term period of at least 70 years, and there was a considerable change in the monetary value, etc., and the first instance court determined the amount of consolation money as at the time of the closing of argument in consideration of the situation of such change. Furthermore, as seen earlier, this court maintained the amount of consolation money as determined by the first instance judgment. Accordingly, the Defendant’s delay damages on the compensation for consolation money against the Plaintiffs shall be deemed to occur from July 7, 2017, which is the date of the closing of argument in the first instance court. Accordingly, the part seeking the payment of consolation money from the day following the date of the delivery of a copy of the complaint in this case to July 6, 2017, which is the day before the date of the closing of argument in the first instance court is without merit.

G. Sub-determination

Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay to Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 4 120,000,000, 150,000,000, and 150,000,000, and each of the above amounts to Plaintiff 3 as to each of the above amounts, 5% per annum prescribed by the Civil Act from July 7, 2017 to August 11, 2017, which is the date of the closing of argument in the first instance judgment, and 15% per annum prescribed by the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims shall be dismissed as it is without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is justified as the conclusion is consistent with this, the defendant's appeal shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Choi Jin-hee (Presiding Judge)

1) Article 2 (Retroactive Effect of this Act) Except as otherwise provided, this Act shall also apply to any matter before the enforcement date of this Act. However, this Act shall not affect the effect that has already been made by the former Act.

2) Article 724 of the Civil Act of Japan provides for the three-year short-term extinctive prescription in relation to a tort, and the exclusion period in the latter part of 20 years.

Note 3) (2)(c) of subsection (2)(c) of subsection (2) of subsection (b) below, which is referred to in the Supreme Court Decision 2009Da22549 Decided the first instance court.

4) Article 8(1) of the Addenda to the Civil Act provides, “The right, the prescription period of which under the former Act has lapsed at the time this Act enters into force, shall be deemed to have been acquired or extinguished by the provisions of this Act,” and Article 8(2) of the Addenda to the Civil Act provides, “The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply to the right, the prescription period of which under the former Act has not lapsed at the time this Act enters into force,” and Article 8(4), respectively.

5) It constitutes the judgment of the court below in the Supreme Court Decision 2009Da22549.

6) It constitutes a judgment of the lower court rendered by Supreme Court Decision 2009Da68620.

Jeju High Court Decision 2012Na44947 decided July 10, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2012Na44947 decided July 30, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2012Na4497 decided July 30, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2012Na4497 decided July 30, 2013

8) It constitutes a second instance of the Supreme Court Decision 2009Da68620.

9) The court to which the case was remanded from the Re-appeal Court shall not have the binding force in a case where the court of final appeal is bound by the factual and legal judgment of the court of final appeal for the reason of reversal, or where a new assertion or evidence is submitted in the course of a trial after remand and changes occur in the facts constituting the basis of binding judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da1072, Dec. 14, 1982).

Note 10) See 10 see, e.g., a certified transcript (Evidence A 17-1) 17-10, accurate name is difficult to identify.

11) Since Nonparty 9 was born after the deceased’s death, the deceased’s inherent consolation money is not recognized.

Note 12) Part 13/21 (=6/21 + 2/21 + 1/21 + 2/21 + 2/21 + 2/21 + 2/21) inherited via Nonparty 2

Note 13) Part 2/35 [=2/21 = 9/15 + 1/15 + 2/15 + 2/15 + 15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15] of the part inherited by Nonparty 3 from Nonparty 3 to Nonparty 2]

Note 14) Part 13/21 (=6/21 + 2/21 + 1/21 + 2/21 + 2/21 + 2/21 + 2/21) directly inherited from Nonparty 2

Note 15) Part 2/35 [=2/21 + 9/15 = 4/15 + 1/15 + 2/15 + 2/15 + 15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 1/15] of the part inherited by Nonparty 3 from Nonparty 3 to Nonparty 2]

Note 16) 9/15 = 4/15 + 1/15 + 1/15 + 2/15 + 15 + 1/15)