A. Defendant Ulsan Tax Office’s Head of Ulsan Tax Office against the Plaintiffs:

1) On April 9, 2008, the portion exceeding 00 won of traffic tax, 00 won of education tax, 000 won of special consumption tax, 000 won of special consumption tax, and 000 won of education tax imposed on the amount of special consumption tax, 00 won of education tax, 000 won of education tax imposed on the amount of traffic tax, 00 won of special consumption tax, and 00 won of education tax imposed on the

2) On November 12, 2008, the portion exceeding KRW 000 of the traffic tax, KRW 00 of the education tax imposed on the amount of the traffic tax, KRW 000 of the special consumption tax, KRW 000 of the education tax imposed on the amount of the special consumption tax, KRW 00 of the education tax imposed on the amount of the traffic tax, KRW 00 of the education tax imposed on the amount of the traffic tax, KRW 00 of the special consumption tax

3) On January 6, 2009, each imposition disposition of the traffic tax of KRW 000, the education tax of KRW 000, the traffic tax of KRW 000, and the education tax of KRW 00,000, which is imposed on traffic tax.

4) On January 9, 2009, each disposition of imposition of the traffic tax of KRW 000, the education tax of KRW 000, the traffic tax of KRW 000, and the education tax of KRW 00,000, which is imposed on the traffic tax, has been revoked; and

B. Defendant Ulsan Metropolitan City Mayor:

Each disposition of imposition of driving tax of 000 won on April 23, 2008 exceeds 00 won, and the portion of driving tax of 00 won on November 26, 2008 exceeding 00 won shall be revoked.

2. The defendants' remaining appeals are dismissed, respectively.

3. Of the total litigation costs, 80% is borne by the Plaintiffs, and the remainder is borne by the Defendants.

Each disposition of imposition of KRW 00 in total amount of traffic tax (including traffic, energy and environment tax), KRW 000 in total amount of education tax, KRW 000 in total amount of education tax, and KRW 000 in total amount of driving tax on the plaintiffs, as shown in attached Table 2. Each disposition of imposition of KRW 00 in total amount of traffic tax (including traffic, energy and environment tax) shall be revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

The reasons for this part are as follows, except for the addition of Section 1.(a)(d)(4) to this part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and the corresponding column for the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows.

A. Plaintiff XX Co., Ltd. is a company that has engaged in petroleum refining business, etc. before dividing the portion of petroleum refining business, as seen below. Plaintiff XXA Co., Ltd. (formerly changed from “P Energy Co., Ltd.” on January 4, 2011) is a company established by dividing the portion of petroleum refining business from Plaintiff XX Co., Ltd. around July 2007. The Plaintiffs sold petroleum products after fixing crude oil through the aforementioned division, and reported and paid the special consumption tax, traffic tax, education tax, and driving tax on the supply of petroleum products to the head of Ulsan Tax Office.

D. The Defendants’ imposition disposition and the plaintiffs’ appeal procedure

4) Meanwhile, the detailed details of the additional tax due to the nonperformance of payment among each of the dispositions of this case are as shown in the attached Table 3.

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The parties' assertion

1) The plaintiffs

The Defendants made each of the instant dispositions in accordance with Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, which is unlawful for the following reasons.

A) In the case of this case, where the amount of tax is collected because the gas station’s oil supply certificate is forged and the traffic tax is illegally refunded, Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act, Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8827 of Dec. 30, 2006) or Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8827 of Dec. 31, 2007) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8827 of Dec. 31, 2007), Article 17(8) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 20(7) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the case of this case. In this case, “employer” should collect the amount of tax refund from “employer for non-use purpose”, and thus, the disposition of this case is unlawful.

B) In addition, under Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, it violates the principle of self-responsibility under the Constitution to purify the traffic tax, etc. refunded from the Plaintiffs who are not negligent or responsible for illegal distribution of tax-free petroleum for agriculture.

2) Defendant Ulsan District Director

A) As traffic tax is a tax by return and payment method, a taxpayer shall submit a monthly tax base return along with an application for traffic tax refund pursuant to Article 7 of the Traffic Tax Act, and thereby, the tax base and tax amount to be paid in the month are determined by deducting the amount of refundable tax, etc. from the calculated tax amount, the tax authority need not separately verify and determine whether the taxpayer’s application for refund of traffic tax satisfies the requirements for refund. If the error or omission was verified in the tax standard and the details of the return of the tax amount, the tax authority may rectify the amount of erroneously reported tax base and tax amount under Article 9 of the Traffic Tax Act, such as other tax by filing a tax return method, regardless of whether the Plaintiffs’ intentional or negligent involvement. Accordingly, each disposition of this case is lawful as it is collected after ex post rectification under Article 9 of the Traffic Tax Act.

B) In addition, the Plaintiffs performed their duty to report the tax base, including the instant traffic tax, under their own responsibility, and corrected the relevant tax amount due to error in the details of the report, and thus, cannot be deemed to contravene the principle of self-responsibility. Moreover, the supply certificate of duty-free oil is a document that can be easily prepared if the official seal of the president of the NACF, which is affixed to the lower end, is forged without any separate function to prevent forgery and alteration. However, the supply certificate of duty-free oil is a document that can be easily prepared if the official seal of the president of the NACF, which is attached to the lower end, is assigned serial numbers on the right upper corner of the supply certificate of duty-free oil, preventing double issuance, etc., and the recipient is required to sign and seal the issuance ledger, and the latter is required to keep and manage the gas by verifying the quantity of oil by kind. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are deemed to have failed

3) Defendant Ulsan Metropolitan City Mayor

In Article 196-16 of the Local Tax Act, a person liable for payment of driving tax under Article 3 of the Traffic Tax Act provides that a person liable for payment of driving tax shall be the person liable for payment under Article 3 of the Local Tax Act, and Article 29 of the Local Tax Act provides that the time when the liability for payment of driving tax comes into existence shall be the time when the liability for payment of traffic tax (traffic, energy and environment tax) that serves as the tax base is established

(b) Related statutes;

The reasons for this Court to this part are as stated in the corresponding column of the judgment of the first island.

(c) Fact of recognition;

The reasons for this Court to be stated in this part are as stated in the corresponding column for the judgment of the first instance.

D. Determination

1) As to the application of a disposition-based statute

A) Whether Article 17(8) (or Article 15(2)) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 20(7) (or Article 18(2)) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act shall apply mutatis mutandis

Article 17(8) (or Article 15(2)) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 20(7) (or Article 18(2)) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the legal relationship in which the traffic tax, etc. deducted or refunded for the same reason as the instant case is collected pursuant to Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act. As such, Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, which the Defendants used as the basis for each of the instant dispositions, are not likely to be applied, and thus, whether each of the instant dispositions is unlawful.

According to Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, the collection of traffic tax which is deductible and refunded under paragraph (1) of the same Article is subject to the Traffic Tax Act according to the relevant goods. Article 106-2(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 715, Dec. 3, 2006; hereinafter referred to as "the former Special Consumption Tax Act or the former Special Consumption Tax Act") provides that the exempted tax amount shall be collected if the goods are not used for the relevant purpose or are transferred within 5 years from the date of "the entry of the goods into the country as tax exemption". In full view of this, Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that "the former Special Consumption Tax Act or the former Special Consumption Tax Act shall apply mutatis mutandis only to cases where the petroleum products under paragraph (2) of Article 106-2 of the same Act are not used for the original purpose or are transferred after "the former "the latter", "the latter" means the latter "the latter" of the Special Taxation Act or the former Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 208(amended by Act No. 167). 20-20-16.

In this case, it cannot be viewed that the entry into the gas station which is controversial.

However, as seen earlier, Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act cannot be applied to this case. Accordingly, Article 17(8) of the former Traffic Tax Act or the former Special Consumption Tax Act (or Article 15(2) of the former Traffic Tax Act) and Article 20(7) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act (or Article 18(2) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act) can not be applied mutatis mutandis to this case (other provisions before it was amended by Act No. 827 of December 31, 2007). However, Article 106-2(12) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8827 of December 31, 2007) provides that "the provisions of Article 113(3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20135 of May 26, 200) are also applicable mutatis mutandis to the presumption of tax abatement or exemption under Article 20(3) of the former Special Taxation Act.

B) Whether Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act are applied

The head of Ulsan District Tax Office has taken each of the dispositions in this case based on Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, and thus, whether Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 11(1) of the former Special Consumption Tax Act can be applied to the legal relationship in which traffic tax, etc. is deducted or refunded due to the same cause as in this case (hereinafter in this case, the relevant provisions of the former Traffic Tax Act and the former Special Consumption Tax Act are almost the same in terms of its contents and structure, and thus, the former Traffic Tax

(1) In light of the provisions of the former Traffic Tax Act, Article 7 (1) of the former Traffic Tax Act provides that "the taxpayer shall submit to the head of the tax office having jurisdiction over the manufacturing place a return stating the light value of the goods taken out from the manufacturing place, calculated tax amount, amount of tax unpaid, exempted tax amount, refunded tax amount, tax amount, etc. by the end of the following month," and Article 9 (1) of the same Act provides that "if the return under the provisions of Article 7 is not submitted or there is an error or omission in the details of the return, the head of the tax office or customs office shall determine

Under the principle of no taxation without law, the interpretation of the tax law shall be interpreted in accordance with the text of the law, barring any special circumstances, and it shall not be permitted to interpret or analogically without any reasonable reason. In addition, if the language and text of the law consists of relatively clear concepts, it is no longer necessary or limited to use other interpretation methods. However, Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act only provides that the subject of the decision of correction is "tax base and tax amount" and does not provide for the reasons for the decision of correction as "tax base and tax amount pursuant to Article 7," and Article 7(1) provides that the subject of the report shall be "calculated tax base and tax amount / tax unpaid, deducted tax amount, refunded tax amount, and tax amount to be returned" (Article 9 of the former Traffic Tax Act also provides that the taxpayer shall submit the tax base and tax base and tax amount by kind of goods sold or taken out, without tax base and tax amount without tax payment, deduction, refund tax amount, tax amount payable, etc. by the end of the following month, or that the head of the competent tax office or customs office may not report or rectification.

Therefore, it conforms to the legal text of Articles 7 and 9(1) to interpret that the head of the competent tax office may make a decision of correction pursuant to Article 9(1) in cases where there are errors in the calculated tax amount, unpaid tax amount, exempted tax amount, refunded tax amount, and paid tax amount (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du6858, Jul. 12, 2012).

(2) As to this, the Plaintiffs asserts that the refund procedure of traffic tax must be separately decided by the tax authority, other than the application for refund by the taxpayer, so that it is irrelevant to the report of tax base under Article 7 of the Traffic Tax Act and the determination of tax liability thereby, it cannot be subject to the decision of correction under Article 9 of the Traffic Tax Act, and that there should be separate provisions in the law in order to collect the refunded traffic tax.

The so-called "tax refund" means the tax amount determined to be refunded under each tax-related Act because the State was legally paid or collected but there is no justifiable reason to hold it thereafter. In particular, the tax refund under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act is due to a reduction or exemption recognized mainly for political reasons, and the issue of whether such tax refund occurs shall be determined by whether the requirements for refund under each tax-related Act are satisfied.

Article 113(3) and (1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the procedures for deduction and refund of the amount of tax incidental to the tax exemption system for petroleum products for agriculture under Article 106-2 of the same Act. The provisions applicable mutatis mutandis to the instant case under Article 113(3) and (1) of the same Act are Article 17(2) and (5) of the former Traffic Tax Act and Article 24 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. According to the above provisions, where the goods or raw materials for which traffic tax has already been paid or is yet payable fall under any of the following subparagraphs, the amount of tax already paid shall be refunded as prescribed by the Presidential Decree (Article 17(2)). In this case, any person intending to obtain deduction or refund under paragraph (2) of the same Article shall prepare the documents prescribed by the Presidential Decree and submit them to the head of the competent tax office along with the report of traffic tax exemption under Article 7 within 6 months from the date on which such a cause occurs (Article 17(5) of the same Act).

In addition, even if the system of the former Traffic Tax Act is established, the application for refund is accompanied by the application for tax base return, and there is no provision that the head of tax office shall determine the amount of tax to be refunded, and the plaintiffs' assertion that the tax office should make a separate decision on the application for refund of taxpayers

Meanwhile, Article 51(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that the head of a tax office shall immediately determine the amount of refund as a national tax refund when there is a tax refund. However, the amount of refund has been lawfully paid or collected but the State has no justifiable reason to hold thereafter, and thus, the amount of refund is immediately fixed according to the requirements for refund under each tax-related Act even if the tax office did not make a decision of refund. Furthermore, the provision on the determination of national tax refund under Article 51 of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides for the procedures for refund of the tax authority as an internal administrative procedure with regard to the national tax for which the tax payer’s claim for refund has already become final and conclusive. Thus, as alleged by the snow company, the tax authority should separately determine the amount of refund as to the taxpayer’s application for refund, and even if the tax authority in this case

C) Sub-determination

Therefore, the tax authorities should be deemed to be able to collect the traffic tax refunded in cases where there is any error or omission in the amount of traffic tax refundable pursuant to Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs' assertion that the disposition was made in this case without any grounds for disposition is groundless.

2) Whether it violates the principle of self-responsibility under the Constitution

The former Traffic Tax Act provides that traffic tax shall be imposed on gasoline and substitute oil similar thereto (Article 2); Article 3 provides that the person who manufactures and takes out the goods shall be liable for tax payment (Article 7); and Article 7 provides that the person liable for tax payment shall impose the amount and price of the goods that are taken out from the manufacturing place each month and the amount of refund (including the amount of refund tax). In addition, the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that traffic tax shall be reduced or exempted in cases where the farmer, fisherman, etc. prescribed by the Presidential Decree fall under the "petroleum for use in agriculture, forestry or fisheries as determined by the Presidential Decree" (Article 106-2). Accordingly, according to the above provision, the requirements of Article 106-2 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act that provides for traffic tax reduction and exemption shall meet the requirements of Article 106-2 of the same Act, and

However, as to whether the traffic tax refunded by the Plaintiffs satisfies the requirements of Article 106-2 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, the Plaintiffs were entitled to the traffic tax along with a forged tax-free oil supply certificate submitted by OOO oil stations, etc., and the fact that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the traffic tax refund because the tax-free oil amounting to the refund amount was not used for agriculture or fisheries, and that the Defendant imposed the traffic tax that was refunded accordingly, as seen earlier.

Therefore, the disposition in this case is an authorized number of traffic tax that was returned to the Plaintiffs, who were the shipmentr of the taxable goods, on the ground that the pertinent goods were used for agriculture, and that the pertinent goods were not carried in for agriculture and carried out, and thus, it does not violate the principle of self-responsibility under the Constitution (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2009Du14972, Oct. 27, 201; 201Du6858, Jul. 12, 2012).

3) Whether the imposition of additional tax in bad faith is legitimate

A) In order to facilitate the exercise of taxation rights and the realization of tax claims, additional tax under tax law is an administrative sanction imposed under the conditions as prescribed by individual tax law in cases where a taxpayer violates various obligations, such as a return and tax payment, without justifiable grounds, and thus, it is unreasonable for the taxpayer to be aware of such obligations, and thus, it is unreasonable for the taxpayer to be reasonably present or to expect the performance of his/her obligations to the party concerned, etc., if there are justifiable grounds that make it unreasonable for the taxpayer to be unaware of such obligations, such as where there are circumstances that make it unreasonable for him/her to expect the performance of his/her obligations (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Du4089, Apr. 1

B) According to the above evidence and the purport of the whole oral argument, the following circumstances are revealed. In full view of this, it is reasonable to deem that there is a justifiable reason not to mislead the plaintiffs into the negligence of their duty.

(1) The instant certificate of tax-free oil supply was issued in writing without the function to prevent the above and alteration, and it was easy for any person to form and alter the form using a computer, and the official seal of the head of the local agricultural cooperative can be forged and forged on the certificate of supply. Until the distribution of petroleum is denied, there was no mutual verification as to whether the requirements for tax-free oil are satisfied between the tax authority, including traffic tax, and the agricultural cooperative, which is the management agency of tax-free petroleum, and there was no system for preventing illegal distribution (for this reason, the Commissioner of the National Tax Service revised the notice of tax-free oil on July 1, 2008 to build a computer system for sharing information on tax-free oil between the tax office and the agricultural cooperative).

In such circumstances, it seems difficult to expect the Plaintiffs to verify the above-mentioned and modified tax-free oil supply certificates (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Da1548, Apr. 2, 2011).

(2) The Plaintiffs received at least 100,000 certificates of tax-free oil in the name of the head of a local agricultural cooperative issued by approximately 1,000 local agricultural cooperatives each year, and the comparison of certificates of tax-free oil supply was practically difficult. The audit results of the Board of Audit and Inspection also found that the relevant agricultural cooperative storage that issued certificates of tax-free oil supply in the process of tax-free oil reduction and exemption was practically impossible to verify the forgery of the certificates of tax-free oil supply.

(3) The Defendants asserted that among the instant certificate of tax-free oil supply received by the Plaintiffs, the name of agricultural cooperatives located outside the location of the gas station was located, and that some of the gas stations whose operation period was less than one year was less than one year, which forged the certificate of tax-free oil supply, could have been verified if the Plaintiffs paid due attention.

However, in light of the fact that the supply of free oil for agriculture is mainly carried out by the supply of free oil for agriculture to the tank glass at a place in need of agricultural use, and the sale outside the region of the gas station may occur in normal transactions, the forged quantity of this case is not concentrated in a specific gas station, and approximately 11 gas stations are distributed to approximately 11 gas stations, as seen in the above paragraph (2), and it is practically difficult to confirm the confirmation of the supply of free oil for agriculture submitted to the Plaintiffs and the confirmation of the supply issued by the local agricultural cooperatives with 1,000 nationwide, as seen in the above paragraph (2), it is difficult to view that the circumstances alleged by the Defendants alone are insufficient to deem that the Plaintiffs erred by neglecting the confirmation of the supply of free oil for agriculture.

(4) The Plaintiffs do not have any pecuniary gain in relation to the amount of tax refunded on the basis of the above-mentioned and modified certificate of tax-free oil supply (in this respect, it is different from the ordinary procedure of tax rectification that a taxpayer would own money equivalent thereto by failing to pay taxes and bring profits to his/her property gain by holding it in relation to the amount of tax refund).

(5) There is no circumstance to deem that the Plaintiffs participated in the relevant structure of the certificate of tax-free oil supply, and so long, the Plaintiffs are merely the victims of fraud against the operator of the gas station that forged the certificate of tax-free oil supply [in criminal cases similar to the instant certificate of tax-free oil supply (Supreme Court Decision 2009Do5795), the oil company deemed the victims of fraud].

(6) The Tax Tribunal rendered a decision to the effect that the imposition of additional tax for failure to file a return should be revoked on the ground that there is a justifiable reason not to prove that the Plaintiffs failed to verify the forgery of the certificate of supply of duty-free oil. However, the tax Tribunal also imposes administrative sanctions such as additional tax for failure to file a return, and there is no reasonable ground to treat both in the instant case differently (the Defendant asserts that the penalty tax for failure to file a return is a kind of statutory interest imposed upon delay of tax payment, and thus, it should be imposed regardless of the reasons attributable to the Plaintiffs. However, since the penalty tax for failure to file a return is applied at a rate of 11% per annum higher than the civil statutory interest rate, it is difficult to regard it as legal interest merely because it is difficult to regard it as a statutory interest. Thus, the Defendant’s above assertion cannot be accepted.

4) Sub-committee

Among the disposition in this case, the imposition of principal tax, such as the traffic tax, is lawful and unlawful. Accordingly, the part of the imposition of the traffic tax, 1.00 won, 00 won, 1.00 won, 00 won, 1.00 won, 1.00 won, 1.00 won, 1.00 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 1.00 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 3.0 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.0 won, 200 won, 1.00 won, 3.0 won,

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is in error with some different conclusions, the part of the appeal by the defendants shall be accepted, and the part against the defendants who ordered revocation in excess of the above recognition scope among the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants corresponding to the revoked part shall be dismissed, and the remaining appeal by the defendants shall be dismissed as it is without merit. It