[폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등협박)·상해][공2012하,1712]
[1] The meaning of the penalty system under the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act and the scope of the effect corresponding to the final judgment
[2] In a case where the Defendant was indicted of violating the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act by taking a disposition of notification of a penalty as an offense “magak disturbance” under the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act, and paid it by receiving the disposition of notification, and by using excessive (a dangerous object) at a close time and place, which is a dangerous object, driving away from the victim, and threatening the victim to “abrupt away”, the case holding that the payment of a penalty does not have the effect on the ground that the “magak disturbance” and “the act of carrying a deadly weapon,” which are the facts charged
[1] The penalty system under the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act differs from the trial procedure of the court in that it provides special cases for punishment in order to handle the case in a simple, prompt and proper manner without prosecution against a person who pays a certain amount of penalty by providing an opportunity to pay a penalty pursuant to a notification disposition by the chief of a police station prior to the criminal procedure. The scope recognized as effective due to the payment of a penalty is limited to the pertinent offense itself and the offense recognized as identical to the offense indicated in the reason for notification of the penalty. Therefore, even if the act was committed during the same period and at the same place as the offense, the effect of res judicata corresponding to the final judgment does not extend to the prohibition against double Jeopardy corresponding to the final judgment according to the payment of the penalty.
[2] The case holding that in a case where the defendant was prosecuted for violating the Punishment of Violences Act by taking a disposition of notice on a fine by committing an act of "malbling disturbance" under the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act and taking a dangerous object at a close time and place, driving away the victim and threatening the victim to "salbling away", the act of carrying-in intimidation of deadly weapons, which is the charge of violating the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, applied to the defendant, has some overlap in that the place and time of the crime are close to the place of the crime, and both the defendant and the victim are seen to have taken place at the time of the crime, but there are significant differences in the contents, means and manner of the crime, damage legal interests from each act, and the nature of the crime, and in light of the contents, means and attitudes of the act, it cannot be deemed that the act of carrying-in intimidation is included in the course of the act or in the result of the act, or that there is no basic basis to regard it as constituting a crime, and thus, it does not affect the payment of the penalty.
[1] Article 13(1) of the Constitution; Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act (wholly amended by Act No. 11401, Mar. 21, 2012); Articles 298(1) and 326 subparag. 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act; Articles 2(1)1 and 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act; Articles 1 subparag. 25 and 7(3) of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act (wholly amended by Act No. 11401, Mar. 21, 2012); Article 298(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act
[1] Supreme Court Decision 2001Do849 Decided November 22, 2002 (Gong2003Sang, 267) Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4322 Decided April 12, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 738) Supreme Court Decision 2009Do12249 Decided April 28, 201 (Gong201Sang, 1089)
Defendant
Defendant
Gwangju District Court Decision 2012No416 decided May 11, 2012
The appeal is dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. The summary of the facts charged in this case is as follows: (a) around 18:00 on September 26, 2010, the Defendant expressed the attitude that the Defendant would inflict harm on the body of the victims of sound, thereby threateninging the victim co-defendant of the judgment below, who argued the Defendant, to "to kill people" and "to kill people." (hereinafter the omitted) in the same Dong (10cm length, 10cm in knife, 2cm in ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○, and 2cm in width) in his hand. In light of the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted by the court below, the Defendant received a notice from the chief of the competent police station on September 26, 2010 on the grounds that "the Defendant received a penalty for violation of Article 5 of the Punishment Act" and paid the penalty for violation of Article 25 of the Punishment Act on the ground that he was paying the penalty for second offense.
2. The identity of facts charged or facts constituting an offense ought to be determined by taking into account the normative elements, based on the Defendant’s act and the relevant social factual relationship, in mind, with the legal function of the identity of facts (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Do2080, Mar. 22, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 2009Do1249, Apr. 28, 201).
Meanwhile, the penalty system under the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act differs from the trial procedure of the court in that it provides special cases for punishment in order to handle the case in a simple, prompt and proper manner without prosecution against a person who pays a certain amount of penalty by providing an opportunity to pay a penalty pursuant to a notification disposition by the chief of a police station, etc. prior to the criminal procedure. The scope recognized as effective following the payment of penalty is limited to the relevant offense itself and the offense recognized as identical to the offense committed on the grounds of notification of penalty. Therefore, even if the act was committed during the same period and place as the offense, the effect of res judicata corresponding to the final judgment shall not extend to the criminal act committed beyond the identity of the offense (see Supreme Court Decisions 201Do849, Nov. 22, 2002; 2009Do12249, Apr. 28, 2011, etc.).
Examining the above facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, since the act of carrying a lethal weapon, which is the charge of violating the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, is partly overlapped in that the place and time of the crime are close to the place and all of the defendant and the victim appear to have been cut off at the expense of the victim, the act of violation of Article 1 subparag. 25 of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act, which applies to the defendant, is "the act of cutting off the surroundings by a riotous speech or behavior, such as a horse, a theater, a restaurant, or a train, a vehicle or a ship with many people, or carrying them, which is a dangerous object, and thus, the act of intimidation carrying a lethal weapon, which is the charge of the crime of this case, constitutes a crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc., which is a crime of this case, and thus, the contents and means of the act of crime and the form of the act of intimidation are considerably different from that of the crime of this case, and thus, it cannot be seen that there is no benefit and protection of the legal interests of each of the crime of this case, such as harm and order.
The decision of the court below to the same purport is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the identity of factual relations between the above offense and the facts charged in this case or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the effect of
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)