Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage Case

[158 KCCG 2157, 2008Hun-Ba58, 2009Hun-Ba191 (consolidated), November 26, 2009]

In this case, the Constitutional Court held unconstitutional the portion of Article 304 of the Criminal Act which provides that 'a person who induces a woman who is not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage' is guilty on the grounds that it infringes on men's right to sexual self-determination, right privacy in violation of the principle against excessive restriction.

Background of the Case

Petitioners were respectively indicted for allegedly tricking a woman not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse by falsely agreeing to marry her in violation of Article 304 of the Criminal Act. According to Article 304 of the Criminal Act, a person who induces a female who is not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage or through other fraudulent means (hereinafter, the "engagement fraud"), shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won. Regarding this, the petitioners filed a motion respectively with presiding criminal courts to request for the constitutional review of the said Article during their trials. Petitioners, having been denied the said motion by the criminal courts respectively, filed these constitutional complaints with this Court pursuant to Article 68 Section 2 of the Constitutional Court Act, arguing that the portion of 'a person who induces a woman who is not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage' (hereinafter, the "Instant Provision") infringes on their fundamental rights. The text of the Instant Provision is as follows:

Provision at Issue

Criminal Act (enacted on Sep. 18, 1953 by Act No. 293, and revised on Dec. 29, 1995 by Act No. 5057)

Article 34 (Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage)

A person who induces a female who is not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage or through other fraudulent means, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won.

Summary of the Decision

In a vote of 6 (unconstitutional) to 3 (constitutional, including supplementary opinion by one justice), the Constitutional Court held that the Instant Provision violates the Constitution. The summary of the decision is as follows:

1. Court Opinion

The legislative purpose of the Instant Provision cannot be regarded legitimate for the following reasons: first, it is totally within the realm of privacy for a man to have a sexual relationship with a female partner, against which the state's interference should be as minimal as possible if no coercion or violence is involved. Moreover, such a relationship usually has a tendency to be exaggerated. Therefore, the Criminal Act does not punish a pre-marital sex relationship, and in this regard, there is also no reason to punish the ordinary conduct of inducing a partner into a pre-marital sex relationship. Second, if a woman, after voluntarily deciding to have a pre-marital sex relationship with a man who demands it, later asks the court to punish him arguing her decision was made by mistake, that is an act of denying her own right to sexual self-determination. Also, under the Instant Provision, the subject of protection is limited to women who have no habit of acting obscenely while all other women who have sexual relationships with multiple partners are stigmatized as 'women who are prone to an obscene act' and excluded from the protection, which ends up forcing sexual ideology based on patriarchy and moralism on women. In this regard, the Instant Provision not only runs afoul of the state's constitutional duty to create and maintain a gender equal society (Article 36, Section 1 of the Constitution), but

also denies women's right to self-determination regarding sexual activity under the guise of protecting women, by treating them as not being mature enough to have the capacity to voluntarily make such a decision. Therefore, the right to sexual self-determination to be protected by the Instant Provision goes against women's dignity and value.

As our society has gone through changes in public legal awareness regarding sex and marriage, there seems no pressing need to provide criminal protection for a woman who mistakenly enters into a pre-marital sex relationship with a male partner. It is at the heart of people's privacy to have any kind of sexual or romantic relationships whatsoever and such relationships should be regulated by law only when the private relationships are known to the public and clearly proven to exert an evil influence on society. Also, in modern criminal jurisprudence, there is a growing tendency to avoid criminalizing activities related to people's private lives. Furthermore, the crime of engagement fraud has been abolished in many countries and, for example, Japan, Germany and France have no statutory provision that stipulates such a crime. Also, such criminal punishment, while losing its effectiveness as a penalty imposed by the state, increasingly brings about side effects. Given all the aforementioned aspects, criminally punishing a person who induces a woman into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage fails to follow the rule of appropriateness of means and the rule of the least restrictive means to achieve the legislative purpose.

The Instant Provision excessively restricts men's fundamental rights such as the right to sexual self-determination, the right to privacy, by subjecting sexual relationships within the zone of privacy to criminal punishment. But the public interest of protecting a woman without habit of acting obscenely who enters into sexual intercourse with a cause mistakenly perceived by her, which drastically loses its effectiveness in this modern society, does not seem to outweigh the importance of the infringed fundamental rights. In this regard, it fails to strike a balance between legal interests.

Therefore, the Instant Provision goes against the Constitution, as it excessively restricts men's right to sexual self-determination, right to privacy in violation of the rule against excessive restriction stipulated

in Article 37 Section 2 of the Constitution.

As for the Constitutional Court Decision of 99Hun-Ba40, 2002Hun-Ba50 (consolidated) that declared Article 304 of the Criminal Act to be constitutional on October 31, 2002, is hereby overruled inasmuch as it conflicts with the Holding of this decision.

2. Opinion of Constitutionality of Three Justices

Protection under the Instant Provision extends exclusively to women because it is perceived by the legislators that when a woman induces a man into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, the man's right to sexual self-determination is less likely to be infringed. Considering the physical difference and the ethical and emotional perception gap toward sexual intercourse between men and women, it is hard to conclude that the legislative decision is based on illegitimate gender discrimination, imposes the old patriarchal value of chastity or forces women to keep their virginity before marriage.

Having sexual intercourse with a female partner under pretence of marriage is conduct that infringes on other people's legal interest, going beyond the acceptable boundary of the right to self-determination. Therefore, the Instant Provision cannot be regarded as infringing on the right to sexual self-determination of a man who induces a female not prone to an obscene act into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage. Also, a man's conduct of lying to a woman about marriage without intention to do so does not fall into the category of privacy to be protected by Article 17 of the Constitution. Therefore, as long as a man engages in a wrongful conduct of inducing a woman into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, in spite of the fact that it is the woman's fault for failing to recognize her partner is telling a lie, it is still required to impose criminal punishment on such a conduct.

When a woman files a charge against a man for allegedly deceiving her into having sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, such a case should be regarded as becoming an issue of disturbing social order, beyond the zone of privacy and inherent limitation of fundamental rights. In this stage, therefore, the need to maintain social order is far more important than the need to protect private life of the

parties to the case. Also, when an individual's private life infringes upon other's legal interests, such infringement becomes an issue outside the zone of privacy and inherent limitation of fundamental rights and therefore, such a case should be considered beyond the coverage of protection under Article 17 of the Constitution within this limit. In this regard, punishing a man who commits a crime of engagement fraud does not seem to fail to strike balance between legal interests.

As the Instant Provision is enacted to provide punishment only for a case where a clear causal relationship between the conduct of having sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage and the consent to sexual intercourse and the sexual intercourse is established, thereby being legitimate in its purpose, it cannot be considered as violating the principle of equality.

3. Concurring Opinion to the Opinion of Constitutionality by One Justice

The Instant Provision is not meant to punish the private conduct of sexual intercourse itself, but rather, it is related to a case where a woman, who is damaged by deception or fraud committed by her male partner, actively requests the court to review the case and punish the male partner (engagement fraud is a crime subject to victim's complaint). Therefore, this is simply not a case of relationship of utmost intimacy between man and woman within the zone of privacy any more, but a case in which state intervention can be allowed.

It is still not safe to say that no woman in our society need constitutional or legal protection and consideration any more. Rather, as we understand that there are still a small number of women who need to receive constitutional or legal protection and consideration in our society as ever, it seems too early to repeal the Instant Provision at this point of time.

The Instant Provision only punishes the anti-social conduct of a man who deceives a woman into sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage without true intent to do so, considering her as a mere object to satisfy sensual pleasure. Therefore, simply recognizing the Instant Provision to infringe on the men's right to sexual

self-determination, without consideration of the aforementioned aspect, will result in acknowledging the freedom of deception, fraud or defraudation in sexual relationship, which is clearly unjustifiable and unacceptable.