The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to Articles 255(1)2, 60(1)5, and 53(1)7 of the Public Official Election Act, a teacher of a private school, other than a teacher under Article 14(1) and (2) of the Higher Education Act, is prohibited from "election campaign" in principle. “election campaign” under Article 58(1) of the Public Official Election Act means all acts necessary and favorable for a certain candidate's election or obtained votes or defeat, and are objectively planned for the purpose of promoting an election or defeat in the election. As such, it is distinguishable from an act of preparing an internal or procedural preparation for a future election campaign or ordinary political party activities; however, in determining whether an act constitutes an election campaign, it should be determined not only on the pretext of such act, but also on the pretext of such act, by comprehensively observing the time, place, method, etc. of such act, and whether such act is an act accompanying an election or defeat in the election of a specific candidate.

(2) In light of the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court, which maintained the reasoning of the lower judgment on October 27, 2011 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do9243, Oct. 27, 201). 2, examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the Defendant, a private school teacher of D Middle School, is unable to engage in an election campaign under the Public Official Election Act even though he/she was unable to engage in an election campaign, at the event of a debate for normalization of school meal services (hereinafter “instant debate”), held on April 15, 2014 at the fourth class lecture of E building (hereinafter “instant debate”) around April 15, 2014.