2013Na2024236 Confirmation of Non-existence of Obligation

A Stock Company

B The taking-over of the lawsuit of the corporation

The Bankruptcy Trustee B of the Bankrupt Corporation

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap538575 Decided October 15, 2013

March 11, 2015

April 15, 2015:

1. The plaintiff's appeal and the plaintiff's claim added in the trial are all dismissed. The lawsuit costs after the appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. Purport of claim

It is confirmed that each obligation stated in the separate sheet against the plaintiff corporation B does not exist (the plaintiff extended the purport of the claim by adding the claim for confirmation of the non-existence of the two obligations listed in the separate sheet from the trial).

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. It is confirmed that there is no debt Nos. 1 in the [Attachment No. 1] to the Plaintiff Company B.

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

The Plaintiff is a company whose main business is the import and export of art works, consulting, trade mediation, exhibition, public relations, etc., and C is the representative director of the Plaintiff Company established by the Plaintiff on or around 2002. B (hereinafter referred to as “B”) is a mutual savings bank established by the Mutual Savings Banks Act, and D is the largest shareholder of B, such as holding 23.83% of shares issued as of June 30, 2010, and holding 45.92% of shares issued under the name of a related party, such as his/her spouse. Since he/she assumed office as the representative director on January 21, 2002, he/she comprehensively controlled the overall management of B, such as credit receipt.

1) From August 29, 2008, the Plaintiff borrowed money from B as collateral on several occasions, and on February 26, 2010, the Plaintiff offered as collateral each of the art works as indicated in the table below (the Nos. 15,16,23, and24 as stated by the Plaintiff in the complaint, etc.; hereinafter referred to as “art works” in the order of 15,16,23, and 24 in the order of 15,16, 24 in the order of 2008, and obtained a premium passbook loan from B in the limit of 19 billion won by setting the interest rate of 11% per annum and 19 billion won on February 26, 2011. According to the agreement between the Plaintiff and B, the period of reimbursement on two occasions has been extended to February 26, 2013, and the amount has been reduced to 6.5 billion won.

A person shall be appointed.

2) On August 11, 2010, the Plaintiff offered art works as security to B (the net shall be indicated as 31 to 34 as the Plaintiff entered in the complaint, etc.; hereinafter referred to as "art works") as shown in the table below, and obtained a total of KRW 8 billion from B with the interest rate of 12% per annum and due date of payment as of August 11, 201, and obtained a total of KRW 8 billion with the due date of payment as of August 11, 2011. According to the agreement between the Plaintiff and B, "the loan of this case" was added to the debt of this case as of August 11, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as "the debt of this case"). The details are as shown in the separate sheet.

A person shall be appointed.

(c) Removal of art works by D and the creation of a security against the Solomon Savings Bank;

1) The Financial Supervisory Service conducted a management diagnosis on B on July 201 and around August 201, and issued a management improvement order -12.18% of the BS ratio, and demanded the accumulation of capital increase and allowances for bad debts. D, the representative director of B, was planned to use the art goods provided as security for the instant loan obligations by the Plaintiff and I (hereinafter referred to as “I”), as security for repayment of the principal and interest on the loan, in order to secure the capital increase of B individually, by borrowing money from the Solomon Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as “ Solomon Savings Bank”) or by inducing one capital increase of the solomon Savings Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “ Solomon Savings Bank”).

2) Accordingly, on September 15, 201, D removed the total of five points, including the art works of Nos. 31 and 34 offered by B as security from the Plaintiff, and the total of six points, offered as security by I.

3) After that, around September 201, D borrowed 16 billion won in the name of the Gyeonggi Solomon Savings Bank and Busan Solomon Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Game Solomon Savings Bank and Busan Solomon Savings Bank”) from the Gyeonggi-do Do Solomon Savings Bank, and as a security, D created a pledge on 34th art works, including art works, to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank. In addition, D took part in the capital increase of 14.5 billion won from 1.4 billion won from 1.5 billion won from 1.4 billion won from 1.4 billion won from 1.5 billion won from 1.5 billion won from 201, as an interested party, established a pledge on art works No. 31 as one of the collateral for the repayment of the principal and interest of the investment.

4) On November 201, C agreed that D shall borrow funds from financial institutions, etc. as collateral through N, an employee of the Plaintiff Company, and if the above art works are sold, the sales price shall be appropriated first for the repayment of the loan (Evidence No. 29) and the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank shall have no objection against the acquisition of the security right from D with regard to the art works owned by the Plaintiff, and it shall be confirmed that there is no objection against the above sales price of the secured art works shall be appropriated first for the repayment of the loan to D, and each of the above documents shall be signed with the consent No. 30 (Evidence No. 30) stating that each of the above documents shall be signed with the consent of the Plaintiff on Sep. 21, 201, with the consent of each of the above "written consent of each of the above documents" (hereinafter referred to as "written consent of each of the above documents").

(d) Payment of the purchase price of art works and issuance of false receipts of C;

1) D sent D the purchase price of art goods offered as security to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Mlomon Savings Bank to D. D, D sent this to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Mlomon Savings Bank, and D repaid the above loan’s obligation, and paid C directly the purchase price of art goods offered as security in one capital capital by transferring C to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Mlomon Savings Bank.

2) Accordingly, during the period from February 2012 to April 2012, C sold art goods offered as security to D Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank through auction, etc. The sales proceeds were deposited into the Plaintiff’s Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank account or paid D by cashier’s checks.

3) Meanwhile, on May 16, 2012, C sold the art works by auction No. 31, which was offered as security to one Capital, and on September 18, 2012, D paid the sales proceeds to one Capital. 4) D first issued a receipt under the name of D in relation to the payment of the above art sale proceeds of C, and upon C’s request, C received on February 2, 2012, the term “one billion won (one billion won) with the repayment funds borrowed from B on February 2, 2012, and then issued the receipts under the name of B and the corporate reduction to the Plaintiff by replacing the receipts under the former name of D with KRW 201 billion, KRW 200,000,000,000,000,000,000 won, KRW 201.3 billion on February 10, 2012, KRW 200,000,000,000,000.

(e) The progress of criminal proceedings related to the issuance of false receipts of D;

D As part of the repayment method of D’s loans to Solomon Savings Bank from February 2012 to April 2012, D: (a) if C was commissioned by the Solomon Savings Bank to sell sales proceeds of the said loans to D, it was difficult for C to repay the said loans by delivering D’s sales proceeds to Solomon Savings Bank; (b) in crypt, C was able to obtain protection for repayment of the Plaintiff’s debts later; (c) a false receipt (total amount of KRW 5.988 billion) in the name of B (total amount of KRW 5.6 billion) was issued on eight occasions; (d) the public prosecutor was not aware of the fact that C’s act of incurring property losses equivalent to B; and (e) the Seoul Central District Court was also aware of the fact that C’s act of incurring damages under B’s name and/or 260,000,000,000 won was not found to have been found to have been unlawful by the public prosecutor; and (e) the Seoul Central District Court was also aware of the aforementioned facts charged.

F. On April 30, 2013, on which the lawsuit of this case was pending, the bankruptcy court of Seoul Central District Court 2013Hahap54, and the defendant appointed as the bankruptcy trustee took over the status of the lawsuit of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case of this case, the facts that there was no dispute, Gap's evidence Nos. 6, 7, 9 through 16, 19, 20, 24 through 28, 31, 32, 40, 41, 49, 50 (including the main number; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul's evidence Nos. 2 through 8, the witness D,O, and N's testimony, and the purport of the whole pleadings of the arguments of this case of this case.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's primary argument

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) ① Since D demanded additional security for B and had D seal on the written consent for each of the instant security with the knowledge that it is a document related thereto, the declaration of intent to offer the instant security was made by deceptive act of D, and the Plaintiff lawfully revoked it through delivery of a preparatory document as of January 2, 2014. ② The Plaintiff paid D’s purchase price to D, etc. for art products offered as security for D’s Gyeonggi-do, Busan Solomon Savings Bank, and one Capital, or for its obligation to repay principal and interest on investment. This was made with the Plaintiff’s intent to repay the instant loan to B. Thus, the Plaintiff’s obligation of the instant loan was extinguished as of the same amount. ③ D failed to pay the above purchase price to C, which constitutes an abuse of the power of representation, and the Plaintiff did not know that D abused its authority for the purpose of promoting its own interest. Accordingly, D’s repayment of the instant loan is valid.

2) After selling the art works No. 34 through auction, the Plaintiff issued to D a receipt from D on April 25, 2012, which was received at KRW 770 million, the total purchase price of which was KRW 770 million. Since the Plaintiff’s payment of the Plaintiff’s purchase price had the effect of repayment to the receipt holder under Article 471 of the Civil Act, the above KRW 770 million out of the instant loan was extinguished by repayment.

3) After selling the art works No. 31 through auction, the Plaintiff paid USD 5,99,95 in the United States of America to One Capital, out of the purchase price. ① Since D voluntarily terminated the security contract for the art works No. 31 between the Plaintiff and B, as long as one Capital has provided the above art works as a security against one Capital without knowledge of these circumstances, one Capital would bona fide acquire a pledge for the said art works, and this is similar to the original pledgee having set a pledge against his creditor as the object of the pledged article. Therefore, when the secured claim is extinguished by the execution of the preceding pledge, the principal pledgee’s secured debt should also be applied mutatis mutandis to the said art works within the scope of extinction. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s debt against the above art works shall also be extinguished within the scope of USD 5,99,95 due to the execution of the security right for the said art works. ② One Capital has been paid to the above art works in good faith and the Plaintiff shall be deemed as having the effect of the purchase price for the above art works.

4) Therefore, as seen above, all of the instant loans are extinguished by repayment, and no longer exists.

B. Determination

1) Whether the Plaintiff’s payment of the sales price for art works against the Plaintiff’s game, Busan Solomon Savings Bank, or Han Capital can be seen as the repayment of the instant loan to B

A) Whether the intent to offer the instant security was revoked by fraud

(1) If the authenticity of a disposal document is recognized, the court shall recognize the existence and content of the declaration of intent in accordance with the language stated in the disposal document unless there is any clear and acceptable reflective evidence that denies the contents of the statement (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da67264 delivered on May 13, 2005).

According to the testimony of Gap evidence No. 44, Eul evidence No. 44, Eul evidence No. 1, and Eul evidence No. 1, the aboveO, and N, it was acknowledged that around February 2012, I requested Eul to remove part of the art work offered as security against Eul, the Gyeonggi-do Solomon Savings Bank, or Hang Capital, and C had already ordered Eul to affix the plaintiff's employee N, without directly verifying the consent form of each of the instant security, and had not mentioned any particular reference as to the contents of the above document.

However, in light of the following facts and circumstances, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that the present offer declaration was made through D’s deception, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the offer of this case, solely based on the facts acknowledged earlier, in light of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the respective descriptions of Gap’s 30, 31, 40, 43, 45, 46, Eul’s 3 and 4, and the overall purport of testimony and arguments of the above D,O, and N.

(A) Prior to obtaining the written consent to each of the instant security, D appears to have obtained an oral consent from C on August 30, 201 with respect to the provision of the Plaintiff’s art works as security to the Gyeonggi House and the Solomon Savings Bank and Hang Capital (Evidence No. 47-2 of the Evidence No. 30 of August 30, 201) by visiting C, which was confined to the Seoul House on August 30, 201, not to mention such a conversation, but to record all the conversations between C and D for about about about about 15:00 to 15:25 minutes, since the said interview slip was only one, and it appears that there was no such oral consent. Even if there was no such oral consent, in light of the following circumstances, there is sufficient evidence to oppose the Plaintiff’s assertion of deception.

(B) Each of the instant written consent provides that “The art works of additives have been lent to D, and the Plaintiff has already been lent to D.” As such, each of the instant written consent is premised on the fact that the act of lending art works to D was already conducted at the time of the preparation of the written consent.

(C) While being examined as a witness in the relevant criminal case of D, C stated that the detention center did not have any oral consent as above, C signed a signature on several documents to the effect that it consented to the offer of art goods as security at the Gyeonggi-do Solomon Savings Bank and One Capital Bank after being released from the detention center.

(D) The mere attempt to deceive a non-individual corporation as to the contents of the document by demanding the sealing of a considerable amount of document is not clear, and D also prepared two copies of the written consent to provide each of the instant collateral and delivered one copy to the plaintiff to the plaintiff.3)

(E) On January 3, 2012, C asserts that, for the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank, the Plaintiff sold the art goods offered as security to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank, and deposited the sales proceeds into the Plaintiff’s Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank account and repaid loans to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank. On April 24, 2012, and affixed each seal on the confirmation of the sale of art goods and written responsibility for the collection of the sales proceeds to the same purport (the Plaintiff against this, with the knowledge of the document necessary for the removal of art goods and ordered NN to affix the seal, according to the Eul’s evidence 5-2, the Plaintiff could be recognized as having paid the sales proceeds to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank by the resolution of the board of directors, and it is difficult to deem that there was any error or deception in the process of signing the sales proceeds on his own, and the Plaintiff paid the sale proceeds to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank and the Busan-do Savings.

B) Whether the loan of this case is repaid

The fact that C, from February 2012 to April 2012, 2012, paid to D, etc. the proceeds from the sale of art works offered to B as security for the Plaintiff’s instant loan; D, from February 2, 2012 to April 25, 2012, issued a receipt to C, which received the amount equivalent to the above sales price of art works from February 2, 2012 to April 25, 2012 as the repayment of the Plaintiff’s obligation of the instant loan to B, and recognized as above.

However, in light of the following circumstances, which are acknowledged in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings, the following facts alone are insufficient to deem that the Plaintiff and B agreed to deem that the Plaintiff paid the instant loan by paying the said purchase price to D, etc., or that the Plaintiff paid the said purchase price with the intent to repay the instant loan obligations, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

(1) The debt owed to D Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank is the debt owed to D individual during the process of establishing the capital increase fund of B, and there is no relation to the debt of the instant loan (the party receiving investment in the equity investment of one capital is B, but D is a party to the contract under the name of the party who is an interested in the said equity investment, and as a party to the contract, established a pledge on one capital loan. In fact, D can be deemed as the party who borrowed money from one capital capital.)

(2) Each of the above receipts that D issued to the Plaintiff is not a lawful representative act of D, such as a change from time to time, etc., but merely a false issuance by the Plaintiff in order to keep the possibility of being protected in relation to the repayment of the instant loan. Furthermore, the form is not a regular statement of repayment or deposit certificate used by a financial institution, but it cannot be deemed as a receipt issued by a financial institution, and is the level of documents used for a transaction between individuals.

(3) The Plaintiff was aware of the fact that the art works offered as security B prior to the payment of the above purchase price was released by D, and D was offered as security again to Gyeonggi-do and Busan Solomon Savings Bank, etc., and D was well aware of the fact that the Plaintiff issued a receipt in the name of B, not a receipt in the name of D individual, in each subparagraph, because it would not cause damage to the Plaintiff in connection with the repayment of the obligation. The Plaintiff was also aware of the fact that the Plaintiff paid the other debt to B by means of remittance through another bank. The loan listed in the attached Form No. 2 was made by the method of deposit in the passbook because it was a Mappbook loan, and the loan in the attached Form No. 2 was made by the delivery of the money to the third party or D. Furthermore, the loan in No. 1 was merely repaid at the expiration of the loan period, and there was a difference in the interest rate of 1 and 2 loans at the expiration of the loan period.

(4) B did not treat the Plaintiff’s above payment of the purchase price as repayment of the instant loan, and D also did not enter the money into B, and thus, it cannot be immediately treated as repayment of the instant loan. However, it explained to the effect that it would make receipts to the Plaintiff.

(5) As long as D borrowed money from the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Mlomon Savings Bank in order to raise the price for capital increase, and the art works of this case are offered as collateral, the proceeds from the sale of the art works of this case may not be appropriated for the repayment of D's debt to the Gyeonggi-do and Busan Mlomon Savings Bank, and there is no need for separate financial resources to treat the Plaintiff's debt to be repaid to the extent that the Plaintiff's debt to B was repaid. At the same time, the two debt cannot be fully repaid.

(6) As seen earlier, around November 201, the Plaintiff affixed a seal on the written consent for each of the instant guarantees, and each of the instant written consent states that “where the secured art works are sold, the proceeds shall first be appropriated for the repayment of the borrowed money from another person or other financial institutions, and the amount appropriated for the repayment of the loan shall be 10% interest per annum from the Plaintiff.” Thus, the Plaintiff is also aware that the instant loan obligation against the Plaintiff is not repaid upon the payment of the said written consent for the above art works, but rather, it is the structure that the Plaintiff acquires interest-based claims against D individuals.

C) Whether D’s repayment settlement commitment on the instant loans is valid as an abuse of power of representation

Even if the representative director of a corporation abused his authority for the purpose of pursuing his own interest or a third party's profit regardless of the company's profit, the act committed by the representative director of the corporation shall be effective as an act of the company once again. However, if the other party to the act knew or could have known the intention of the representative director, it shall be null and void against the company (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da3649, Jul. 28, 2005).

However, D's above act constitutes abuse of authority for the purpose of promoting the interest of D individual regardless of the profit-making profit of B, and even if D's loan purpose was to raise the price for capital increase, it cannot be said that D's act could not be realized or it could be sufficiently known that D's act was abuse of power of representation or abuse of power of representation. Thus, D's promise to dispose of the repayment of the loan of this case is null and void against B (i.e., debtor of Capital); since D's actual debtor was a debtor, as long as D's loan purpose was to raise the price for capital increase, D's above act constitutes abuse of power for the purpose of promoting the interest of D individual regardless of B's profit-making profit-making profit-making profit-making profit-making profit-making; and even if D's loan purpose was obviously a foreign individual, it cannot be said that D's actual borrower's repayment of the loan of this case can not be appropriated for the repayment of the loan of this case.

D) Sub-determination

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

2) Whether the payment of the purchase price for art works No. 34 is valid as repayment to B pursuant to Article 471 of the Civil Act

However, even if the Plaintiff was issued a receipt on April 25, 2012, which was the total amount of KRW 770,000,000, out of the purchase price, after the Plaintiff sold the article Nos. 34 through auction, to D, and then received the receipt from D on April 25, 2012, the above receipt was issued by D with falsity even if the Plaintiff did not receive the repayment of the instant loan obligation from the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff also knew such circumstances. Thus, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have the same effect as the repayment of the instant loan, as the payment of the above purchase price was made to the holder of the receipt under Article 471 of the Civil Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit (Article 471 of the Civil Act is a provision on the effect of repayment to the person who only possessed the receipt without the authority to receive it, and it is not applicable to this case).

3) Whether the obligation of the instant loan is extinguished due to the payment of the sales price for art works No. 31 pursuant to the analogical application of the legal doctrine on the former pledge.

On the other hand, Article 336 of the Civil Act provides that a pledgee may transfer a pledged article on his own responsibility within the scope of his own right. It is a pledge created by a pledgee against a creditor by using the pledged article as the object of his own right, and it is based on the original pledge, such as its establishment, scope and extinguishment, etc., which cannot exceed the scope of the original pledge. As above, a pledgee has established a pledge right. In this case, as long as a pledgee takes out the art article No. 31, which is not the pledgee B, as it is the object of the pledge right after taking out the art article No. 31, which is not the object of the pledge right, (the subject of the pledge right established B or the object of the pledge right). One of the domestic works acquired the pledged article in good faith, it cannot be seen that one of them is identical to the original pledge right granted from B, and therefore, it cannot be seen that the Plaintiff’s repayment of the debt of the borrowed article can not be seen as being equivalent to the Plaintiff’s sale of the above art article.

4) Whether the payment of the purchase price for art works No. 31 is valid as repayment to quasi-Possessors of the claim

In light of the fact that the pledge right of Han Capital for the above art works was established regardless of the Plaintiff’s loan obligation, and the Plaintiff also knew that Han Capital had been newly created as a collateral against Han Capital as an individual rather than having been normally set up a pledge right for the above art works, as seen earlier, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone constitutes a quasi-occupant of the loan claim of this case, and it is difficult to view the Plaintiff’s payment of the purchase price as valid as the repayment of the loan of this case pursuant to Article 470 of the Civil Act, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise (the agreement of this case is that each of the security of this case is a lender of the art works, and therefore the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as having been a bona fide negligence).

3. Judgment on the conjunctive assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) After the termination of the security contract between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff, B provided the said art product as security in violation of the duty of delivery, and thereby, B is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages worth KRW 19.58 billion, which is equivalent to the total purchase price of the said art product, since the Plaintiff lost its right to the said art product. Accordingly, the Plaintiff shall offset the said damage claim against the loan claim of this case by setting aside the damages claim of this case.

2) D, as the representative director of B, voluntarily terminated the contract to establish a security for the said art works, and thereby, caused damage to the Plaintiff by providing it as security to the Gyeonggi-do, Busanmon Savings Bank and Hank Capital. Since B, as the user of D, is liable for the damages inflicted on the Plaintiff due to the aforementioned tort, as the Plaintiff is liable for compensating for the damages arising from the said tort, the Plaintiff’s damage claim is set off against the claims for the instant loans by setting the damages claim as the automatic bond.

3) Furthermore, D, as the representative director of D, deceiving the Plaintiff as if he would repay the instant loan as the instant representative director, issued a receipt to the effect that D would have the Plaintiff pay the proceeds of art work to the Gyeonggi-do, Busan Mlomon Savings Bank and Ig Capital, and that it would receive the proceeds of the sale with the repayment of the instant loan. Furthermore, this constitutes a tort since D acquired money from the Plaintiff, thereby constituting a tort, and D’s employer B is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages due to D’s tort, the Plaintiff’s damages claim against B as its automatic bond set off against the instant loan claim.

3) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s loan obligation is set-off against the above damage claim.

It was extinguished.

B. Determination

As seen earlier, D, around September 15, 201, had taken out the secured art product between the Plaintiff and B and offered the said art product as security for obligations, such as loans to the Gyeonggi-do Solomon Savings Bank and Han Capital. However, the Plaintiff consented to each of the instant security on August 30, 201, as well as the Plaintiff expressed his/her intent to offer the instant security even around November 201. As seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff understood or ratified the establishment of a new security right to the said art product by D. Accordingly, it is insufficient to view that B did not return the said art product to the Plaintiff, or that D’s offering the said art product as security to the Gyeonggi-dolololomon Savings Bank, Busan-do, etc., constitutes a tort in relation to the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the foregoing is no longer reasonable.

Meanwhile, as seen earlier, it is difficult to readily conclude that D obtained money from the Plaintiff solely based on the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff, on the ground that D knew that D was aware of the fact that D was to issue a false receipt. Even if D deceptions the Plaintiff, the purport that D’s act of deceiving the Plaintiff, which is an element for employer liability under Article 756 of the Civil Act, is “with respect to the performance of business affairs,” which is an element for employer liability under Article 756 of the Civil Act, shall be deemed to be an act regarding the performance of business affairs without considering the actor’s subjective circumstances when it appears that D’s unlawful act is objectively apparent, or is related thereto (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da61377, Apr. 10, 2014). This doctrine applies to D’s act of converting D’s security established as security against D’s individual’s loan obligations, which would result in the loss of B’s automatic interest, and it is difficult to accept the Plaintiff’s allegation that B’s automatic loan is not related to B’s tort liability.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is all dismissed due to the lack of reason, and the judgment of the court of first instance which dismissed the claim for confirmation of non-existence of obligation No. 1 as stated in the separate sheet 1 is just as it is concluded, and the plaintiff's claim additionally added in the plaintiff's appeal and trial is all dismissed.

The presiding judge, the full-time judge

Judges Gangseo-Appellee

Judges Park Young-ju

1) It is a company established by J as C’s children.

2) All were provided by both the Plaintiff and I as a security for a loan obligation, which was shipped into Korea on or around September 15, 2011.

is the same.

3) With respect to this part, the Plaintiff prepared a written confirmation of each of the instant security services with a reasonable risk without any consideration.

There is no reason to believe that this cannot be viewed as a deception, but the motive for the preparation of each of the security certificates of this case is not that of this case.

Not only the issue of the case, but also the trust relationship between D and D with respect to the secured loan of art, as the plaintiff, and B financial institution

As such, it seems that the Plaintiff did not have any knowledge of a particular risk due to the expectation that he would not return to the Plaintiff.

(c)