Whether the judgment becomes final and conclusive when the judgment was rendered on the constructive confession by being served with false address with the knowledge of the fact that it is an absentee.

If a judgment was rendered in favor of an absentee by intentionally allowing the document of lawsuit to be served with a false address with the knowledge of the fact that the absentee was an absentee, such judgment cannot be deemed to have become final and conclusive because it was not served lawfully. Therefore, registration made by a final and conclusive judgment shall be recorded as the cause invalidation.

Article 366 of the Civil Procedure Act

65Da853 decided Jul. 6, 1967 (Supreme Court Decision 1636, Decision 366(2)974 decided May 9, 1978)

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and 7 others

Seoul Central District Court (70 Ghana12028) in the first instance trial

The plaintiff's claim is revoked and dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

With respect to the Plaintiff on the 54th 10-1 site in Nam-gu, Seoul, Seoul, the Plaintiff: (a) on February 6, 1960, Defendant 1: (b) on March 24, 1959, the registration of transfer of ownership, Defendant 2, 3, 4, and 5, on February 6, 1960, which was made by the court on March 24, 1959; (c) on February 23, 1959, the registration of transfer of ownership by Nonparty 1, who was made by the court on February 23, 1959; (d) on September 2, 1960, the registration of transfer of ownership, which was made on September 2, 196 by the court on September 25, 196; and (e) on the receipt of the registration of the establishment of a mortgage by the court on March 30, 196; and (e) on the receipt of the registration of the establishment of a mortgage by the court on May 37, 30, 30.

Defendant 6 Company delivered 54 square meters to the Plaintiff, and paid 186,300 won per month from the day following the day on which the instant case was brought to the time of delivery of the same site.

The defendants' attorney is seeking the same judgment as the disposition.

1. On 54 square meters per Jung-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government, Jung-gu, Seoul Metropolitan Government

(A) On September 29, 1923, the registration of initial ownership is made with two net Nonparty 2.

(B) On March 26, 1927, after the transfer of ownership was made on April 10, 1926 on the part of the deceased Nonparty 3 (Plaintiff’s father).

(C) The trust agreement between Defendant 1 (the deceased Nonparty 2's son) and the above tin on the site was terminated on March 24, 1959, and the trust agreement between Defendant 1 and the deceased Nonparty 1 (the deceased Nonparty 4's son) was terminated on February 23, 1959, and the trust agreement between Defendant 1 was terminated on February 23, 1959 (this decision is based on the premise that the deceased Nonparty 4 trusted the title of this case to the deceased Nonparty 2, and that the trust title was transferred to the deceased Nonparty 3), and the ownership transfer registration was received again from the deceased Nonparty 3 on February 6, 1960 by Nonparty 1 through the ownership transfer registration under subparagraph 379 of the same court.

(D) On September 22, 1960, the receipt of the same court No. 31665, Defendant 6’s transfer of ownership due to sale on September 22, 1960

(E) On November 20, 1969, the fact that the registration of creation of a mortgage was completed on the 19th of the same court's receipt of the same court No. 30350 on November 20, 1969, for the establishment of a mortgage on the 19th of the defendant 7 bank, and for the establishment of a mortgage on the 19th of the same month on the 19th of the same court's receipt of the same court,

(f) Nonparty 1’s death on March 10, 1970 and inheritance of the property to Defendant 2 (Namnam), Defendant 3 (C), Defendant 4 (C), and Defendant 5 (V) is not a dispute between the parties.

2. The plaintiff's legal representative was owned by the above 54 square meters and succeeded to the plaintiff. The defendant 1 and the deceased non-party 1 were judged as deceased by the above 1 (C) declaration of disappearance and the registration of transfer of the above site was made under their own name against the deceased non-party 3. Therefore, the defendants' legal representative cannot be viewed as retroactively lose the effect of the final judgment issued before the declaration of disappearance. Thus, the plaintiff's legal representative's declaration of disappearance cannot be viewed as a valid registration of the above 2, 3 (each family register copy), 5, 6 (each judgment), 107, Dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-Appellee-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-

3. The Defendants’ legal representative argues, even if the registration of Defendant 1 was made by a judgment without validity as the Plaintiff’s assertion, that the ownership of Nonparty 4 was originally held by the deceased Nonparty 2, the deceased Nonparty 1’s decedent, and that the trust name was changed under Defendant 1’s title to the deceased Nonparty 2, the deceased Nonparty 3, and that the trust name was terminated, and therefore, the trust name was changed under the name of Nonparty 3, the deceased Nonparty 1’s decedent. Since the trust contract was terminated, it should be deemed unlawful in the form of the registration, the registration of Defendant 1 and the following registrations are all asserted to be valid in accordance with the substantive legal relationship. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the instant land was owned by Nonparty 4, who was trusted with Nonparty 3 through Nonparty 2

The Defendants’ legal representative explained the reasons for the above title trust, and purchased this case’s land on behalf of Defendant 1 on around 50 years before the deceased Nonparty 2, but Defendant 1 was the third dynamics’ name in waste walls, and later, changing the name of the trust to the deceased Nonparty 3 was intended to use it as a collateral to receive a loan from the deceased Nonparty 4’s children, the deceased Nonparty 13, the deceased Nonparty 14, and the deceased Nonparty 3’s house.

However, according to the whole purport of Gap evidence Nos. 8-1 through 9 (each copy of the deceased's evidence No. 15,16), Eul evidence No. 4,5,7 (each transcript of the family register), Gap evidence No. 18 (Evidence), and the former purport of the parties' pleadings, the deceased non-party No. 4 was 39 years old, and the deceased non-party No. 20 years old, and the deceased non-party No. 4 were 5 years old, and the deceased non-party No. 4 was the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 4 were the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 3 were the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 3 were the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased non-party No. 1 and the deceased-party No. 1 and the deceased No. 31 were the land. 9.

Therefore, it is difficult to believe the result of Defendant 1’s verification of Defendant 1’s statement among the records of the case under title trust (such as evidence No. 1, evidence No. 9, evidence No. 14, and evidence No. 18 (each protocol of examination of witness), evidence No. 5-14, and evidence No. 6 (each protocol of examination of witness), and Defendant 1’s examination results in the trial of the party, and evidence No. 72-type No. 21689, and evidence No. 23352, which are the records of the case under title trust (i.e., evidence No. 72-type No. 21689, No. 23352). Thus, the above assertion by

4. Next, the plaintiff, non-party 7, and the deceased non-party 1, who were registered as the plaintiff's deceased non-party 3 on March 28, 1955, are co-ownership of the land of this case, but if disposed of, the plaintiff's non-party 3 and the plaintiff's non-party 1 were agreed to distribute the same site equally if they were disposed of, and thereafter, agreed to dispose of the same site in advance, and the plaintiff sold the site to the defendant 6 on September 23, 1960 to the defendant 6 and received the price 3 decomposition, so there is no land ownership in the plaintiff, and the ownership transfer registration in the defendant 6's name is effective registration that is appropriate for the substance, and even if there was no prior agreement with the plaintiff on the disposal of the land of this case, it is argued that there was a confirmed date after the disposition by the plaintiff.

Nos. 2, 3, and 16 Nos. 2, 21, 2, and 2, 2, and 2, and 3, and 23, each of the above witnesses Non-party 6, 8, and 10 testimony of Non-party 5, 9, and 10 of the above witness testimony of Non-party 72, 21689, 2352 of the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office's above testimony of Non-party 7, 8, 2352, the testimony of Non-party 7, 8, 9, 10, and 1, which are the statements of Non-party 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21, and Non-party 1's testimony, which are the result of the verification by Non-party 6's testimony at the court of first instance and the result of the fact inquiry by the non-party 1's testimony at the court of first instance (excluding the above part of the testimony).

(A) When the non-party 3, the nominal owner of the site of this case, was missing on January 4, 1950, the non-party 12, who was the fraud of the non-party 3, established a store on the site of this year (the previous building on this site was destroyed on June 25) and leased it to the plaintiff's third-party 3 (the non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 13, the deceased non-party 14 and the deceased non-party 3)'s remaining family members' livelihood, including the deceased non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 3, the non-party 1, the non-party 4, the non-party 1, the non-party 7, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the co-party 5's mother and the non-party 1, the non-party 6, the deceased-party 1, the co-party 1, who was the deceased 1, the deceased.

(B) After the death of the non-party 12 (1958), the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 received the court's decision as stated above 1 (c) and entered the non-party 1 in the name of the non-party 1 through the defendant 1. On September 20, 1960, the non-party 1 deposited part of the disposal price of the site in the form of ordinary deposits or fixed deposits in the bank in the name of the plaintiff 7 and the non-party 1 sold it (the part of the disposal price of the site was deposited in the form of ordinary deposits or fixed deposits in the bank in the name of the non-party 7, and around October 28, 1961, the non-party 1 delivered the deposit passbook, certificate, check, etc. to the non-party 7 and the non-party 1 received in the name of the plaintiff 7 and the non-party 7 and the non-party 200, 700, 200 and 708.

On the other hand, approximately KRW 2,00,000 was paid separately to the non-party 15 who was the mother of non-party 7.

In addition, when examining the statement of Nonparty 7 in the above verification records, it is deemed that he collected the money that he received from Nonparty 1 as above from Nonparty 1 as well as the Plaintiff’s share.

(C) On November 15, 1962, the non-party 1 paid 900,000 money to the non-party 7 and the plaintiff on his own house as the balance of the disposal price of the land in this case on the non-party 7 and his other relatives, and at that time, the non-party 7 and the plaintiff were to receive all the disposal price of the land in this case as they are distributed to themselves. In the future, the non-party 1 and the plaintiff did not renew the theory of the land in this case and signed receipts (No. 23) to which the non-party 3, who was the owner of the land in this case, was disqualified on the ground of the non-party 1's declaration of disappearance, and the non-party 1, who was the non-party 6's heir, sold the land in this case on September 20, 196 to the non-party 7 and the plaintiff, who was the non-party 1's heir of the above land, without the plaintiff's prior consent.

The plaintiff's attorney asserted that the above agreement on March 28, 1955 was null and void because it was against the non-party 3's land, but it cannot be said null and void only on the ground that the agreement was established before the plaintiff's inheritance of this case's land.

5. For the above reasons, on the premise that the plaintiff is the owner of the site of this case, each registration entered in front of the name of the defendants, and the claim for delivery of the land and the claim for damages cannot be dismissed. Therefore, the original judgment which differs from this conclusion is unfair, and the defendants' appeal is with merit, so the original judgment shall be revoked. It is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 89 and 96 of the Civil Procedure Act to the burden of litigation costs.

Judge Jeon Soo-chul (Presiding Judge)