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(영문) 서울고등법원 2015.08.27 2015노1637
협박등
Text

The judgment below

The defendant's case shall be reversed.

Defendant

A candidate for medical treatment and custody shall be punished by imprisonment for six months.

seizure.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. In light of the mental condition, etc. of the Defendant’s case and the applicant for medical treatment and custody (hereinafter “Defendant”), the intent of intimidation cannot be acknowledged, and there is no evidence to deem that the harm and danger notified by the Defendant has reached the victims, and thus does not constitute the elements of intimidation, or the judgment below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of intimidation or in the misapprehension of legal principles.

B. The lower court that declared the medical treatment and custody was unlawful despite the necessity of medical treatment and the risk of recidivism by the Defendant in part of the medical treatment and custody case

C. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (two months of imprisonment and medical treatment and custody) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination on the part of the defendant's case

A. 1) In general, the term “Intimidation” which is required to establish a crime of intimidation under Article 283 of the Criminal Act as to whether a crime of intimidation was committed is likely to cause fear to a person who has become the other party. Whether such threat constitutes a threat of harm or injury ought to be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances before and after the act, such as the offender and the other party’s tendency, surrounding circumstances at the time of notification, relationship and status between the offender and the other party, and degree of friendship. On the other hand, the term “definite” in this context refers to infringing legal interests. Even if the harm or injury does not necessarily infringe on the victim’s legal interests, but rather, if the content of the harm or injury may cause fear to the victim himself/herself (see Supreme Court Decision 201Do10451, Aug. 17, 2012).

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