All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

Summary of Grounds for Appeal

Around June 30, 2011, the part of the crime of interference with the exercise of rights by the victim D (hereinafter “D”) was committed against the Defendants, and it was impossible for the Defendants to exercise the right of retention with respect to the six generations of Seodaemun-gu Seoul Seomun-gu E-B lending (hereinafter “instant lending”), but the lower court found D guilty of this part of the charges on this part of the charges on the premise that D was the lien holder of the instant lending. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the facts that affected the conclusion of the judgment.

The Defendants, as the owner of the instant Ba, did not constitute the crime of causing property damage on the ground that the Defendants, as the owner of the instant Ba, dismantled the banner and fences, etc. at the entrance of the said Ba, kept them in one of the parking lots of the Bara.

Judgment

"Possession of another person" subject to protection in the obstruction of the exercise of rights in the part of obstruction of the exercise of rights does not necessarily mean possession based on the right to possess. On the other hand, possession where the source of right was lost after the commencement of lawful title, the existence of the source of right is not clear in appearance, and possession until the existence of the source of right is clarified through the legal procedure, and possession at the same time until the settlement of dispute through the legal procedure, such as possession that is worth protecting until the settlement of dispute through the legal procedure, such as possession that is not commencement of possession until the existence of the source of right is clarified, but also possession that may be asserted by the simultaneous performance defense right, etc. However, the possession by

I would like to say.

(See Supreme Court Decision 208Do6578 Decided October 14, 2010, etc.). According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the Defendants entered into a contract with D on May 23, 2009 for construction of the instant loan with D on May 23, 2009, and the Defendants, on January 9, 2010, borrowed money instead of bearing D the full amount of construction funds under the said contract with D on January 9, 2010.