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(영문) 수원지방법원 2020.02.03 2019노5638
권리행사방해등
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. In relation to obstruction of one’s exercise of one’s right, there is no entry contract between B and C, and even if there is an entry contract with L, the victim C has no possessory right.

Therefore, the Defendant did not interfere with the victim’s exercise of rights.

B. In relation to the violation of the Automobile Management Act, the Defendant’s act constitutes a justifiable act because it is necessary to urgently recover the instant vehicle as the representative of the owner of the instant vehicle.

C. Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles that found the defendant guilty.

2. Determination

A. “Possession of another person” subject to protection in the obstruction of exercise of right does not necessarily mean possession based on the right to possess. On the other hand, possession in the event of loss of source of right after commencement of lawful title, possession in the event of loss of source of right after commencement of possession, possession until the existence of source of right is discovered through legal procedure, possession in the course of legal procedure, and possession in the course of simultaneous performance defense, etc. that may oppose the existence of source of right, even though the existence of source of right is not apparent, shall be deemed to include all of the possession worth protecting temporarily until dispute resolution through legal procedure. However, it does not include cases where it is apparent that it is possession by a person who is not entitled

(Supreme Court Decision 208Do6578 Decided October 14, 2010). In full view of the evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court, the Defendant asserted that M, the wife of the victim, agreed to receive 30% of the shares B under the name of N, Dong book, and transferred the ownership of the instant vehicle to B. On the other hand, the victim and M asserted that they concluded a land entry contract with B with respect to the instant vehicle, and that the victim and M were the victim and M.

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