logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 서울고등법원 2020.12.17. 선고 2020누37316 판결
업무정지처분취소
Cases

2020Nu37316 Revocation of business suspension

Plaintiff-Appellant

A

Attorney Ansan-hwan et al., Counsel for the defendant

Defendant Appellant

Guri Market

Law Firm Multidoz. (Law Firm Multidoz.)

Attorney Kim Jong-chul

The first instance judgment

Suwon District Court Decision 2020, February 17, 2019Gudan5913 Decided February 201

Conclusion of Pleadings

December 3, 2020

Imposition of Judgment

December 17, 2020

Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1. Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition of six months of business suspension imposed on the Plaintiff on July 16, 2019 shall be revoked. 2. The purport of the appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Quotation 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following parts to be dismissed or added. Thus, the grounds asserted by the defendant in the appeal by this court are not significantly different from those asserted by the defendant in the first instance court, and even if all the evidence presented by the court of first instance and this court are examined, the fact-finding and the judgment of the court of first instance that cited the plaintiff's assertion are justifiable).

A. On the 4th three pages of the first instance judgment, “The judgment was pronounced (the F was appealed by the District Court 2019Na219145)” means that “The F appealed was sentenced to a favorable judgment against F, but F appealed and appealed with the District Court 2019Na219145, and the F appealed with the District Court 2019Na219145, the lawsuit was withdrawn on March 9, 2020.”

B. On 4 pages 4 of the judgment of the court of first instance, the phrase “12 evidence” shall be deemed as “each entry of 12, 17 evidence, the purport of the whole pleadings, and the fact that there is no dispute”.

C. On the 7th page of the first instance judgment (hereinafter “the 7th page”). Following, “The date of the remainder payment or the date of delivery of real estate was indicated as “v. 29 May 29, 2019,” but it is difficult to view the said date as the fixed date in light of the developments leading to the preparation of the instant contract,” and adding “the said date is deemed as the fixed date.”

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance is just, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.

Judges

The presiding judge, judge and deputy judge

Judges Kang Han-sung

Awards and Decorations for Judges

Note tin

1) According to the records, the first instance court rendered a decision to suspend the validity of the instant disposition from August 8, 2019 to the 14th day from the date the first instance judgment was rendered on August 8, 2019.

In fact, the first instance court rendered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff that revoked the instant disposition on February 17, 2020, but additionally suspended the validity of the instant disposition.

the court may recognize the fact that it has not made a decision, and six months have passed since the period of suspension of the above effect as of the date of the date of the closing of argument in the court.

Inasmuch as it is apparent that there exists a benefit of action in the lawsuit of this case, it may be at issue. However, a punitive administrative disposition is determined in that disposition.

The effects have ceased to exist due to the lapse of the period of sanctions, but the effects have been subject to sanctions (hereinafter referred to as "prior sanctions") under the relevant statutes.

In the event that it is prescribed that a future punitive administrative disposition (hereinafter referred to as "after action") should be taken as a ground for increase or a premise, the relevant law;

Pursuant to the order, where there is a concern that a subsequent disposition is subject to an aggravated reason or premise, the prior disposition is practically subject to a prior disposition.

The other party who received the disposition may, even if the period of the sanction prescribed in the disposition has expired, remove such disadvantage through the revocation litigation.

Since the need for protection of rights is sufficiently recognized, there is a legal interest in seeking revocation of a prior disposition (Supreme Court Decision 2003Du203 Decided June 22, 2006).

Supreme Court en banc Decision 1684; Supreme Court Decision 2006Du13312 Decided January 11, 2007; etc.). Article 38(1)7 of the Licensed Real Estate Agents Act provides for the suspension of business

Where a brokerage business is conducted during the period of suspension, the registration of establishment of the brokerage office shall be revoked, and the plaintiff shall be revoked after the period of suspension expires.

The fact that the broker continued to engage in brokerage business does not conflict between the parties, and thus, if the disposition of this case is not revoked, the decision is made by the plaintiff.

The registration of establishment of a brokerage office may be revoked on the ground that he/she/she rendered brokerage services during the period. Accordingly, the instant disposition may be rendered.

Even if the period of sanctions has expired, there is sufficient need to protect the rights to eliminate future disadvantages through the revocation lawsuit of the disposition of this case.

Since the lawsuit in this case is recognized, there are interests in the lawsuit in this case.

arrow