If the succession of rights is made by the enforcement of the Act on the Change of Jurisdiction of Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Do, Gun, and Gu (Law No. 1172), the nature of the succession of rights.

As long as the real estate in this case was incorporated into the defendant city due to the change of administrative district under Act No. 1172, the defendant city should be deemed to have comprehensively succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Kimpo-gun on the real estate.

Act on Change in Jurisdiction of Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Do, Gun, or Gu (Law No. 1172)

Plaintiff

Seoul Metropolitan Government

Seoul Central District Court (76A148) of the first instance court

Supreme Court Decision 76Da148 delivered on November 9, 1976

1. Revocation of the original judgment;

The defendant shall implement each procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership based on sale on December 29, 1962 with respect to each real estate listed in the attached list to the plaintiff.

2. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. The fact that each real estate listed in the separate sheet is registered in the name of the non-party Kimpo-gun on the original register as it was incorporated from the above Kimpo-gun to the defendant on February 7, 1963 due to the change of administrative district, and the registration of transfer of ownership in the defendant's name was made on the above real estate on January 1, 1963. There is no dispute between the two parties, and considering the whole purport of the pleading in Gap evidence No. 2 (sale Certificate) and Eul evidence No. 3 (Delegation Certificate) as of December 19, 1962, the plaintiff concluded a sales contract to purchase each of the above real estate from the non-party Kimpo-gun, the owner at the time of December 19, 1962, and thereafter, it cannot be acknowledged that the payment of the price was completed in full around that time, and since the defendant's above right succession was incorporated in the Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Do, Gun, and Gu under the jurisdiction over the Change of District of Real Estate Act (No. 17, 1962).

Thus, the defendant, who has completed the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of the above succession of right, has the obligation to implement the registration procedure for ownership transfer on the above real estate between the non-party Kimpo-gun and the plaintiff, unless there are special circumstances.

2. However, the defendant asserts that the real estate in this case was incorporated into the defendant Kimpo-gun as part of the administrative district of Kimpo-gun was specific succession from the defendant Kimpo-gun, and the defendant was not a general successor of Kimpo-gun, and even if the plaintiff purchased it from the above Kimpo-gun, it cannot be asserted as a sale against the defendant who had completed the registration of ownership transfer on February 7, 1963. However, as long as it is recognized that the real estate in this case was incorporated into the defendant city due to the change of administrative district under Article 1172 of the above Act, the defendant Si shall be deemed to have comprehensively succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Kimpo-gun as to the real estate, and even if the ownership transfer registration based on the succession of the defendant's name was made, the defendant cannot be exempted from the obligation of the registration of ownership transfer to the plaintiff succeeded

In addition, since the plaintiff purchased the real estate in this case for a period of 10 years from January 29, 1962, the plaintiff asserted that the extinctive prescription has expired and that the claim has expired since the expiration of the extinctive prescription period. Thus, in this regard, even if the plaintiff requested the management of the real estate in this case to the non-party 1 who cultivated the real estate in this case through the non-party 2, and the non-party 1 was merely an obligatory claim and thus becomes the object of the extinctive prescription period, if the purchaser uses and benefits from the delivery of the object, the above purchaser cannot be deemed to be above the right in light of the reason for the existence of the extinctive prescription system, and in this case, the purchaser's right to claim for registration should not be interpreted to be free from the extinctive prescription period different from other claims. In full view of the purport of the testimony and pleading of the non-party 1 in this case, the plaintiff purchased the real estate in this case from the non-party 1 in this case, and the non-party 1 did not have been aware of the above facts.

According to the above facts, since the plaintiff purchased the real estate of this case from spring of spring of spring of spring of spring of 1965, the non-party 1, who was illegally occupied the real estate of this case, occupied the plaintiff for the plaintiff, and there was no objection from the defendant, the above real estate should be viewed as being delivered at least to spring of spring of spring of spring of 1965, since the plaintiff's right to claim for the registration of this case does not go against the extinctive prescription, and the above defendant's defense that the extinctive prescription has expired shall also go back to that of the reasons.

In addition, the defendant argued that since he possessed the above real estate in peace and openly with the intention to own it from February 7, 1963 after completing the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant, he acquired the ownership after the completion of the ten-year prescription. However, the fact that the plaintiff purchased the real estate from the Kimpo-gun and transferred it in spring on 1965, which had already been occupied until now, is nothing more than evidence to deem that the defendant occupied the above real estate with the intention to own it for the period otherwise asserted. Thus, the above defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. Thus, the defendant is obligated to perform the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the real estate in this case to the plaintiff on December 29, 1962. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for this lawsuit is reasonable and accepted. Thus, since the judgment of the court below is unfair, and the plaintiff's appeal is reasonable, the judgment of the court below is revoked, and the total costs of the lawsuit are borne by the defendant who has lost the judgment.

[Attachment]

Judges Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Judge)