206Du11842 Demanding revocation of a decision that constitutes a person of distinguished service to the State.

Plaintiff:

Attorney Choi Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

The Administrator of the Korea Veterans Branch Office

Gwangju High Court Decision 2006 - 322 decided June 22, 2006

June 1, 2007

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 4(1)6 (including diseases caused by official duties) of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Services to the State must have a proximate causal relationship between education and training, the performance of duties, and the injury or disease in order to fall under the category" (including diseases caused by official duties), and the existence of a proximate causal relationship should be proved by the assertion of such proximate causal relationship (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du5617, Sept. 23, 2003, etc.). It is not necessarily necessary to clearly prove that there is a proximate causal relationship between education and training, the performance of duties, and the injury or disease when considering all the circumstances, and it is presumed that there is a proximate causal relationship between education and training, the performance of duties, and the injury or disease in light of all the circumstances. However, it is difficult to see that there is a proximate causal relationship even if the causes, etc. of the outbreak and aggravation in modern medical science are involved not only in education and training or the performance of duties, but also in private life.

2. Comprehensively taking account of the evidence admitted by the court below, it can be acknowledged that the plaintiff was undergoing an operation to cut off the above 3/4 of 1965 at the 116 hospital in the Wolsan Training Center on March 8, 1965, when the plaintiff was admitted to the Wolsan Training Center on March 17, 1965 and was undergoing a new disease training from March 25, 1965, and had a 3/4 medical care for 3/4 medical care for 3/4 medical care for 1965. However, with respect to the long-term situation necessary for the plaintiff to determine the existence of proximate causal relation between the above diversing treatment and the education and training or duty performance received by the plaintiff, there is no evidence to prove that there had been ever been her beds at the time.

Furthermore, according to the records, it is reasonable to view that the above-mentioned surgery has already been suffering from the above tragic, etc., rather than the above tragic, even if the plaintiff had received a strong training after entering the hospital, it is difficult to accept that the above tragic, etc. aggravated the symptoms of the above tragic, etc. to the extent that the above tragic, etc. is needed to undergo the above tragic, or that the above tragic, etc., was conducted when the above tragic, or when the above tragic, etc. occurred, or that the above tragic, etc., should be conducted to the extent that the above tragic, etc. was to be performed to the extent that the above tragic, etc. was to be performed, and even if there was no specific ragic, prior to entering the plaintiff, even if there was no specific lagic, prior to the commencement of training, it is difficult to readily conclude that the plaintiff had been suffering from the above tragic, etc.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the Plaintiff’s disease constitutes an injury during education, training, or performance of duty solely on the ground that the Plaintiff was subject to an active duty enlistment, which was subject to an active duty enlistment, due to a sudden escape and blood transfusion. Thus, the court below erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misapprehending the legal principles on the difference in the performance of duties, or by misapprehending the rules of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Si-hwan

Justices Kim Yong-dam

Justices Park Il-il

Justices Kim Nung-hwan