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(영문) 대법원 1995. 6. 30. 선고 94도1286 판결
[건축법위반,사문서위조,사문서위조행사,허위공문서등작성,허위공문서등작성행사,직무유기][공1995.8.1.(997),2683]
Main Issues

Value of a document with a certificate of personal seal impression issued directly for a specified purpose;

Summary of Judgment

A document prepared on the same seal imprint for a specific purpose, accompanied by a certificate of personal seal impression issued directly by the principal for the specific purpose, shall be deemed legally prepared by the principal or a person delegated with legitimate authority by the principal, barring any special circumstance. Thus, barring any apparent evidence, it shall not be readily recognized as a document forged, unless there is a clear evidence.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 231 of the Criminal Act, Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Escopics

Defendant 1 and two others

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant’s defense counsel (private counsel) and five others

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 93No2747 delivered on April 1, 1994

Text

The part concerning the crime of paragraphs (a) and (b) (1) of the judgment of the court of first instance against Defendant 1 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

All appeals by Defendant 2 and 3 are dismissed.

Reasons

1. Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below accepted the evidence that the court of first instance accepted and adopted the construction permit of the above building, and found the defendant and his mother of the non-indicted 1 guilty on March 198, the non-indicted 1 to change the name of the above building to the defendant's sole name, and the non-indicted 1 to the defendant's employee in blank for the purpose of exercising the name of the building permit of the above building in the Kim Young-type office near the above building (hereinafter referred to as the "written consent"), and submitted a written consent to change the name of the owner of the building (hereinafter referred to as the "written consent") to the defendant and the non-indicted 1's sole change from the defendant and the non-indicted 1 to the owner of the building (hereinafter referred to as the "written consent"), and the name of the non-indicted 1's personal seal impression affixed next to the name, which is the non-indicted 1's right and duty, and submitted a false written consent to change the name of the building and the written consent to the owner.

The judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, as evidence of conviction of the above facts charged, refers to the defendant 1's prosecutor and the court of first instance, part of the witness in the court of first instance, and each of the statements in the prosecutor's office and the court of first instance and the court of first instance. The defendant, since the prosecutor's office and the court of first instance, from the time to the public decision in the court of first instance, obtained a loan for a large amount of new construction cost of KRW 2,00,000 from the construction of the building of this case to the public decision in the court of first instance, the defendant approved the change of the name of the owner to the name of the non-indicted 1 in his own name because it is difficult for the defendant to use the new construction of the building of this case to the non-indicted 1 and the mother, and the certificate of personal seal necessary for the change of the name was also issued directly and consistently denied to the purport that the above written consent was prepared by affixing

According to the records, Non-Indicted 1 stated that he was seated until the Dong office because he was called to be a passenger car by the prosecution, but he did not have the Defendant issued a certificate of personal seal impression or consented to the change of the owner, and that he was aware of the change of the name from Non-Indicted 2, a fraud after the completion of the building in this case. In the court of first instance, the certificate of personal seal impression was issued as Non-Indicted 3, who was the husband, and it is not known that he was aware of the change of name only after the completion of the building. Meanwhile, as at the time of the above prosecutor's statement, Non-Indicted 2 stated that he was aware of the change of name from Non-Indicted 2 after the completion of the building, Non-Indicted 1 was involved in the new construction of the building in question and the sale of the building in the position of management director as the defendant's form of the defendant, and that he did not attend the building in the name of Non-Indicted 1, 190, and then he did not hear the specific change of name of the witness.

However, according to the records, for the purpose of changing the name of the owner of the building in this case, Nonindicted 1’s certificate of personal seal impression submitted by Defendant 1 to the competent authority along with the above written consent shall be issued and delivered directly by Nonindicted 1 without going through his agent, and the purpose thereof shall also be “the name of the owner is specified” (see, e.g., the ledger to issue the certificate of personal seal impression and the trial record No. 474 of the investigation record). The above written consent written by the same certificate of personal seal impression shall be deemed to have been lawfully prepared within the scope of his authority, barring any special circumstances, since it shall not be easily recognized as a forged document unless there is clear evidence.

However, evidence consistent with the fact that Defendant 1 forged the above written consent is only Nonindicted 1 and 2’s statement as seen earlier, but rather, according to the loan certificate (the trial record No. 471) submitted by the Defendant’s defense counsel at the lower court, Defendant 1 becomes the primary debtor even after September 8, 1989, which is the date on which the above written consent was forged, and Nonindicted 4 and 5, who are his wife, become joint and several surety, were to obtain a loan amount of KRW 130,00,00 from the Gelim Mutual Savings and Finance Company. Nonindicted 1, as a special agent, signed and sealed the above written consent form, and submitted his personal seal impression necessary for this case’s use of the above written consent form. On the other hand, according to the record, Nonindicted 1, who had been present at the time of the above alteration of the written consent form on the site of this case, did not appear in the name of Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2, who had been aware of the fact that the above written consent form was forged, Defendant 3’s co-ownership.

Therefore, in light of the fact that Defendant 1’s statement that corresponds to the fact that Defendant 1 forged the above written consent is in conflict with each other due to the ownership dispute over the site and building of this case, it is not consistent with the statement of this case, and the circumstances leading to the statement of this case are not supported by other evidential materials. Thus, it is highly doubtful that the objective credibility of the statement is extremely doubtful. Thus, the court below maintained the judgment of the court of first instance that concluded that the above written consent was forged by the Defendant, which was signed by attaching the certificate of personal seal impression only for the use of the name of Nonindicted Party 1, before his mother and child relationship with Defendant 1 and Nonindicted 1 aggravated with the above written consent prior to the aggravation of his mother and child relationship with Defendant 1, the judgment on the value of evidence or failure to exhaust all necessary deliberation on other evidential materials, such as the certificate of personal seal impression attached to the above written consent or the certificate of borrowed money, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, it is reasonable to further determine the other point of this issue.

2. The defendant 2 and 3's defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below accepted the evidence adopted by the judgment of the court of first instance, and found that the defendant 3, the chief of the Guro-gu Seoul Office, and the chief of the division, conspired with the co-defendant of the court of first instance, received only correction as to the shortage of parking facilities and unauthorized alteration of the use of parking facilities as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, even though the co-defendant of the court below knew that there were various illegal matters, such as lack of parking facilities and unauthorized alteration of the use of parking facilities, etc. after the site investigation into the building of this case, and recognized the use of the letter of usage inspection prepared and submitted to the court below to the effect that it was constructed without the upper limit of the permitted matters, and decided that the defendants' so-called "the above fact-finding and decision of the court below was just, and there was no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the nature of the letter of usage or the process of approval, and by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the preparation of a false public document, which affected the conclusion of the judgment (see all Supreme Court Decision 2008Do17978.7.8.88.

3. Therefore, among the judgment of the court of first instance, the part concerning the forgery of private document and the uttering of private document under Article 1-A of the judgment of the court of first instance against Defendant 1 cannot be maintained as they are. Since each of the above crimes is in the relation of the violation of the Building Act under Article 1-B (1) of the judgment of the court of first instance with the substantive concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act and the single punishment, the part concerning the crime under Article 1-1 (a) and (b) (1) of the judgment of the court of first instance against Defendant 1 among the judgment of the court of first instance is reversed and the corresponding part is remanded to the court of first instance. The remaining defendants'

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)

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