1. Requests between intervenors of overlapping independent parties;

2. Permission of correction of indication by the party concerned;

3. Whether a request for continuation of a lawsuit may be revoked.

1. In the event that multiple parties participate in a lawsuit, the Intervenor A’s claim against the Intervenor A is unlawful and dismissed, since there is no lawsuit relationship between the parties participating in the lawsuit.

2. The status of a party to a lawsuit shall be fixed at the time of the submission of the complaint and shall not be allowed when the change of the party results in a correction, even if there is an obvious error in the requirement of the complaint.

3. As a legitimate party, the cancellation may not be made unless the party has taken over the lawsuit as a party.

Articles 72, 211, and 227 of the Civil Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] 4290 Guide308 to 311 decided Nov. 20, 1958 (Law No. 7277, 807 Ka552, 602) decided Oct. 22, 1963 (Civil Code No. 245(15), 326 Ka8179 decided Oct. 7, 197, 8175)

Plaintiff, the deceased Nonparty 1’s taking-over of lawsuit

Defendant 1 and one other

Intervenor 1 and 2 other than the Incorporated Foundation

Seoul High Court Decision 4279No873 decided May 1, 200

The judgment of the first instance shall be amended as follows:

Defendant 2 performed the registration procedure on July 31, 4278 with respect to the Plaintiff’s co-ownership right of 2-minutes of co-ownership of the site and building stated in the attached list No. 1, and completed the registration procedure on July 28, 428 with respect to the Plaintiff’s co-ownership right to the Intervenor 1 Incorporated Foundation, and completed the registration procedure on April 28, 283.

Defendant 2 and Nonparty 2 performed the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the cancellation of the trust agreement as of July 31, 4278 with respect to the site stated in the separate sheet No. 2 attached hereto to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff fulfilled the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the donation on April 28, 4283 with respect to the same site as the intervenor 1.

The plaintiff's main claim against the defendant's two names shall be dismissed.

The intervenor's second foundation foundation's request for participation in the incorporated foundation shall be dismissed.

Of the total costs of the lawsuit, the part arising from the claim for participation by the foundation foundation 2 of the intervenor shall be borne by the intervenor, and the part of the lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff and the defendant.

As the purport of prosecution by the plaintiff

(1) Revocation of the original judgment shall be revoked.

(2) On July 31, 4278, the registration procedure for the transfer of 1/2 of the co-ownership right due to the rescission of the trust contract on July 31, 4278, to the Plaintiff as to the land and buildings listed in the

(3) Defendant 2 and Nonparty 2 sought a judgment that they will carry out the procedure for ownership transfer registration due to the cancellation of the trust agreement on the attached list No. 2 to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant was based on the cause of the claim against Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, who was in the position of the principal of Jung-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City’s officer, and thus, it was established on April 10 of the date of establishment of a private school. Since Nonparty 3, among the founders, donated the land indicated in the attached list No. 1 and 2 to the Plaintiff at the time of establishment of the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 4th anniversary of the fact that the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 4th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the 4th anniversary of the 7th anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 7th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the establishment of the 2nd.

피고 2는 당심에서 합식의 소환을 받고서도 변론기일에 출석하지 아니하였으나 출석한 당사자의 변론에 의하면 제1심에서 답변으로 원고 청구기각의 판결을 구하고 본건 부동산은 소외 재단법인 (이름 생략)대학관에 기부하였으므로 원고의 청구에는 응할 수 없다고 진술하였고, 피고 소외 2는 제1심 이래 합식의 소환을 받고서도 각 변론기일에 출석하지 않을 뿐 아니라 답변서 기타의 준비서면도 제출하지 아니하였다. 참가인 1 재단법인은 참가청구취지로서 주문 제2항 내지 제4항 동지의 판결을 구하며 그 참가 이유로서 별지 제1목록기재 부동산중 서울특별시 중구 장교동 (지번 생략) 대 293평은 원래 사립 경성 (이름 생략)학교의 최초의 설립자 중의 1인인 망 소외 3의 소유지로서 동인이 이를 (이름 생략)학교에 기부한 것이며 그 외의 대지건물은 (이름 생략)학교의 교장이던 원고의 선대 망 소외 1이 소외 영진설로부터 기부받은 금원 기타로서 (이름 생략)학교를 위하여 소외 8로부터 매수한 것이고, 별지 제2호목록기재 대지는 소외 9가 소외 10으로부터 매수하여 (이름 생략)학교에 기부한 것이다. 원래 사립 경성 (이름 생략)학교는 단기 4240. 3.에 고 소외 11· 소외 12· 소외 3· 소외 13· 소외 14· 소외 15· 소외 16· 소외 17· 소외 18· 소외 19등 10인이 설립하고 당시의 설립자대표이며 초대교장인 망 소외 3이 그 소유인 전기 대지를 기부하였으므로 동 지상에 교사를 건축하고 초등교육을 하여 오든바 단기 4268.9.13.에 피고 2의 선대 소외 4가 설립자의 지위를 승계하고 금 5만환을 학교에 희사하기로 하여 그 금원으로 토지를 수년에 선하여 순차매수하고 이를 학교에 기부하였은즉 (이름 생략)학교는 동 토지에서의 소산 및 소외 장진설 급 이를 승계한 소외 영진설로부터의 매월 3백원식의 기부금으로 경영하여 왔든 것이고 단기 4273.2.20.에 영진설이 매월의 기부금 대신에 금 10,000원을 기부하였으므로 동 금원과 기타로서 별지 제1목록기재 건물을 매수한 후부터는 오직 동 건물임대료와 토지수확으로 학교경비에 충당하여 왔던 것이다. 이와 같이 별지 제1, 제2호목록기재 부동산은 (이름 생략)학교의 유지경영을 위하여 기부받은 동교 소유물인즉 그 중 서울특별시 중구 장교동 (지번 생략) 대 293평에 관하여서는 단기 4245.12.2. 토지사정시에 전기 최초의 설립자 10인에게 신탁하여 동인등 공유명의로 사정이 되었으나 그 후 동 신탁을 해제하고 소송결과 단기 4278.7.10.에 기 사정증명을 말소하고 전현 소외 4와 소외 1 명의로 신탁하여 소유권보존등기를 경유하였고 제1호목록기재외 기타의 토지건물도 동년 2.23.에 위 양인 명의로 신탁하여 소유권이전등기를 경유하였으며 별지 제2호목록기재 대에 관하여서는 단기 4270.4.9.에 전현 소외 4와 소외 5의 양인 명의로 신탁하여 소유권이전등기를 경유하였다. 이와 같이 본건 부동산을 전기와 같이 2인 내지 3인의 공동 명의로 각각 신탁하여 이전등기 또는 보존등기를 경유한 것은 그 당시의 설립자 소외 4, 교장 소외 1, 전임 교장 소외 5, 찬무회장(유지회장) 소외 6, 기타의 학교관계자 등이 협의하여 학교를 재단법인으로 조직하여 전기 부동산을 그 재단에 편입할 것을 예정하고 그에 대응하여 사재와 구별하여 학교재산을 적당히 보존하고 재단법인설립절차에 편의를 공하기 위한 것이었으며, 그 후 소외 4 및 소외 6은 각각 사망하여 피고등이 각각 그 호주상속인으로 되었은즉 단기 4278.3.경 학교교직원 졸업생대표등 학교관계자는 당시 교장이든 소외 1을 설립자로 정하여 조선총독의 인가를 득하고 동년 5월경에는 다시 참가인 1 재단법인 창립기성회를 조직하여 재단법인 설립차제로 피고등과 소외 1 명의로 신탁되어 있는 전기 부동산 전부를 그 재단에 편입기부할 것을 결정하고 동년 7.31.에 설립자 겸 교장인 소외 1은 피고등에게 그 뜻을 고하여 승낙을 받는 동시에 신탁계약을 해제하고 소외 1 명의로 우 각 부동산의 소유명의를 이전등기 할 것을 상약하고 일방 재단설립절차를 추진중 단기 4283.4.28. 문교부장관의 허가를 얻어 중고등교육을 실시하되 우선 (이름 생략)중학교를 유지경영함을 목적으로하는 참가인 1 재단법인을 설립하고 동년 5.13. 그 설립등기를 경유하였으므로 예정대로 본건 부동산을 동 재단으로 소유명의를 이전하고저 단기 4287.12.4. 별지 제1목록기재 부동산에 대한 소외 1 명의의 공유지분권 2분지 1에 대하여 단기 4283.3.1.자 증여를 원인으로 하는 본 참가인명의로의 소유권이전등기를 경유하였으나 피고 2와 피고 소외 2는 동 피고등 관계부분인 별지 제1,제2호목록기재 부동산에 대한 각 공유지분권이전등기를 이행하지 않고 있으므로 본 참가인은 우선원고( 소외 1은 본소 계류중 사망하여 호주상속인 원고가 승계)를 대위하여 피고등에게 단기 4278.7.31.자 신탁계약해제를 원인으로 하는 원고 명의에의 소유권이전등기를 이행할 것을 구하고 본 참가인은 다시 원고에 대하여 본 참가인 재단법인이 설립된 단기 4283.4.28.자 기부에 인한 소유권이전등기를 구하는 동시에 피고 등에 대한 원고의 본 소청구는 기각함이 상당하다고 진술하고, 환송전 당심의 단기 4283. 민공 제133,134,135,136호 사건판결에 있어 참가인 3의 참가청구는 기각되었는바 참가인 1 재단법인이 참가인 3에 대한 상고를 취하하므로 말미암아 대법원 단기 4290년 민상 제308, 309, 310, 311호 판결이유에 설시되어 있는 바와 같이 참가인 3은 이미 패소확정된 자이라 우 고등법원판결 주문 제4항은 참가인 1 학원에 대하여 참가인 3에게 제1호목록기재 부동산에 대한 공유지분권 2분지 1에 대한 이전등기( 참가인 1 학원이 원고로부터 경유취득한 등기)의 말소를 명한 것이다. 이는 주문 제5항과 함께 참가인 3에 대하여 참가인 2 재단법인에게 주문 제6항의 동 공유지분권이전등기를 이행케 하기 위하여 그 전제적 등기절차를 명한 것에 불과한 것으로 참가인 3의 청구를 인정한 것은 아니다. 그런데 우 대법원판결은 그 이유에서 본소송에 있어 권리참가자 상호간에는 하등 소송관계가 성립되지 않는 것으로 법원은 이에 대하여 판결할 수 없는 것이므로 참가인 3과 참가인 2 대학간에는 소송관계가 성립되지 아니함에도 불구하고 위 고등법원판결이 참가인 3에 대하여 참가인 2 대학 앞으로 본건 부동산의 소유권이전등기절차의 이행을 명하였음은 위법이라 판시하였으며, 따라서 역시 참가인 상호간의 참가인 1 학원에 대하여 참가인 3 앞으로 본건 부동산의 공유지분권이전등기의 말소를 명한 우 고등법원판결주문 제4항도 동 제6항과 함께 위법이므로 파기되어 무효로 귀한 것이라 부연하고 입증으로 경 제1, 제2호증을 제출하고 환송전 당심증인 소외 20, 소외 21, 소외 22 환송후 당심증인 소외 7의 신문을 구하여 갑호 각 증의 성립을 인정하며, 동 제1호증과 원참가인 재단법인 (이름 생략)대학관이 제출한 무 제1호증의 2를 이익으로 원용하는 외에 참가인 2 재단법인이 제출한 기 제8호 각증 중 소외 1 명의로부터 참가인 1 학원 명의로 이전된 것을 이익으로 원용하였다.

The intervenor 1 foundation's original claim for the participation of the intervenor 2 foundation in the intervenor 1 foundation shall be made to 3 intervenors 1, 32, 107, 32, 19, 19, 4, 6, 19, 6, 19, 19, 600, 19, 19, 19, 2, 2, 8, 8, 2, 8, 1, 7, 47, 2, 7, 2, 1, 7, 2, 1, 7, 47, 2, 7, 2, 1, 7, 2, 1, 7, 2, 2, 1, 7, 47, 2, 47, 2, 2, 17, 2, 3, 2, 2, 15, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 4283.

The plaintiff, the transferee of the deceased non-party 1, established the ownership transfer registration procedure under the name of the non-party 1 to the non-party 3 on November 17, 4281 as to the right to co-ownership of 1 minute for each of the above real estate listed in the attached list No. 1 to the non-party 4. The non-party 2, the plaintiff purchased the ownership transfer registration procedure under the name of the non-party 2, the non-party 4, the non-party 2, and the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 4, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 3, the non-party 4, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 4, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 4, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 3, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the title 4.

In addition, prior to the purchase of the land in the Republic of Korea, Non-party 4 managed the same school with the sole power of Non-party 4, and the expense of the water shortage after the purchase has been operated by providing the death of the person.

However, on February 26, 4271, Nonparty 6 died on a short-term 4273, October 19, 4273, and Nonparty 1 died on September 27, 4277, a short-term 4277, a short-term 4277, a short-term 4277, and Defendant 2 succeeded Nonparty 5 to Nonparty 6’s pay-in property to Nonparty 1, respectively. Nonparty 1 did not have any fact that Nonparty 6 was the head of the post-age middle school founder, and Nonparty 1 did not have any confusion in the social order after the sunset by stating that he is one of the persons related to the former. On October 10, 4278, Nonparty 6 closed the school at his own discretion and put the school to the Korea Development Association for use of the school for consumption by forcing the use of the land by force.

The non-party 4 did not have any child other than the intervenor 3 who is the non-party 4, and due to the creation and implementation of the system for the salute in a certain period of time, the defendant 2 was selected as the salute, and the defendant 2 was married between the defendant 2 and the intervenor 3 on February 15, 4275, and was married and married on April 1, 427, and the defendant 2 was the non-party 4's presumed heir at the same time as the intervenor 3 denied.

However, according to Defendant 2’s perception that the degree of credit cannot be sufficiently known, Nonparty 4: (a) transferred property, including the real property, by a will of October 11, 4276 on a short-term basis with respect to the Intervenor 3; and (b) made a will to make the Defendant 2 only inherit the family head; and (c) Nonparty 4 died on October 27, 4277, such as exhibition.

Defendant 2 and Nonparty 4, on July 10, 4280, are on the premise of the existence of a creative weather system, and they are on the legal act that is contrary to the net growth of the household, and naturally null and void from the beginning at the same time as the 8.15 Seas. However, Defendant 2 was on November 7, 4277 following the death of Nonparty 4, and Defendant 2 was on the family registry, and Defendant 2 was on the ground that Defendant 3 was on the part of Nonparty 3 and Nonparty 25, who was on the part of the Intervenor, and was on the part of Defendant 2 against Defendant 2 on July 10, 4280, filed a divorce claim against the Seoul District Court for the confirmation of invalidity of the divorce status, and Defendant 2 was on December 29, 192, which was allowed to file a divorce claim, and Defendant 2 was dismissed.

With respect to the part in favor of the Intervenor 3 in the above judgment, there was no objection between both parties regarding the part in favor of the Intervenor 3, and with respect to the part in favor of the Intervenor, the final appeal was filed by the Intervenor 3, and the Supreme Court rendered on March 4, 4282 that the decision that the former adjustment was invalid from the beginning.

In the same relation as the book, Defendant 2 entered the family register as the head of household by Nonparty 4, but the instrument was null and void, and Nonparty 4’s wife Kim Jong-soo succeeded to the family register at the same time with Nonparty 4’s death, but Kim Jong-soo did not enter the above family register until the time of death of April 6, 4282, and eventually, Defendant 3 succeeded to the family register due to the above Kim Kim Jong-soo’s death.

The Intervenor 3 obtained a ruling of divorce with Defendant 2 as of June 11, 4281, which became final and conclusive as of June 20, 4281. On May 27, 2282, to permit the correction of the family register from Seoul District Court on June 1, 200, to cancel the entry that Defendant 2 had obtained the non-party 4 inheritance on May 27, 201, and to cancel the entry as the head of Australia on June 27, 200, after the correction of the family register was made on June 4, 200, Kim Jong-soo was deceased on the non-party 4's death on June 4, 200, but the registration of ownership transfer transfer was entered on the non-party 2's short-term ownership transfer registration on the non-party 1, 3, as of June 3, 200, which was entered on the non-party 1, 32, as of June 4, 2007.

However, since the intervenor 3 donated all the real estate in this case to the intervenor 2 college based on the short-term 4281 contribution document to the intervenor 4.3.10.3.10, the intervenor 2 college was the intervenor 3, and the intervenor 2 college was the intervenor 3 on the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of the ownership of well-known real estate, so the intervenor 3 is entitled to exercise the claim and the creditor's subrogation right, and the plaintiff's co-ownership right of the real estate in this case belongs to the intervenor 3, and the other parts are entrusted respectively in the name of the deceased non-party 5, non-party 6, non-party 1's heir 2, non-party 24, and the plaintiff et al., respectively., the intervenor 3 sought the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership due to the cancellation of each of the above trust contract on behalf of the intervenor 3, the intervenor 2 and the plaintiff 1 sought the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership due to the plaintiff 1.

This case is very complicated because several parties have succeeded to or withdrawn from the lawsuit for the last year, and the lawsuit relationship between each party to be judged at the present time is complicated due to the Supreme Court's judgment of remand, so it is necessary to first point out that the lawsuit relationship is not clear.

Upon examining the records of the case, the case was originally filed by the plaintiff 1 with the Seoul District Court against the defendant 2, 2, and 24, and then the plaintiff 1 participated as an independent party pursuant to Article 72 (Article 71) of the Civil Procedure Act (Article 71 of the former Act) in the Foundation (name omitted), university officers, the intervenor 2 foundation foundation, and the intervenor 3's third party as the independent party pursuant to Article 72 (Article 71 of the former Act) of the former Civil Procedure Act. The judgment of the court of first instance was prosecuted only by the plaintiff 1 and the defendant died during the party members, and then the plaintiff succeeded to the plaintiff's successor's status (as to the plaintiff 7's transfer claim, the plaintiff 1 foundation was the independent party (as to the plaintiff 7's transfer claim), and the second judgment of the court of second instance was filed by the Supreme Court only by the plaintiff 1, the plaintiff 1, and thereafter, the plaintiff 1's appeal against the intervenor 3 was withdrawn, and the Supreme Court reversed the original judgment.

In such a case, it is clear that the appellate court's judgment of the High Court first priority on the scope of the parties to be determined as a member of the party at present was simply reversed the original judgment, but the original court may judge only the case it had been pending at the time of the judgment by the Supreme Court due to the final appeal, and among them, it is obvious that the appellate court's judgment "the original judgment" was not in the entirety of the second judgment but in the part which was pending at the time of the judgment by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the appellate court's appeal against the second instance judgment such as wartime was filed only by the first private teaching institute of the intervenor at the time of the judgment. Therefore, if only the appellate court's judgment became final and conclusive first due to the final appeal, the scope of the second instance judgment that was reversed

Therefore, when examining the petition of appeal by the intervenor 1 who was bound in the records, the purport that the appeal is filed because the same intervenor is the "Objection to the entire judgment of the second instance." However, the purport that the appeal is to be filed is natural in accordance with the principle of the appeal system in civil procedure, in the judgment of the second instance, that the part which ruled against the intervenor, i.e., the whole part which ruled against the intervenor, i., the part which ruled against the plaintiff, i.e., the part which rejected the claim or declared an obligation, and therefore, it is necessary to again determine the scope of the part which ruled against the intervenor. In comparison with the purport of the appeal by the intervenor 1 and the order of the judgment of the second instance, the part which the intervenor lost can be classified into three parts. Thus, the first part can be classified into three parts. The second part is that the second part of the judgment dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the defendant 3, and the second part is that the plaintiff 1 and the third part of the appeal against the plaintiff 3 is dismissed.

On the other hand, this does not apply to the case where the whole part of the judgment against the plaintiff is to be judged again by the party member. On the premise of this review, according to the Supreme Court's ruling of remand, a third party during the course of a lawsuit is to assert that the right is infringed by the result of the lawsuit, or to join the lawsuit by asserting that the third party is his own right, and that the part of the lawsuit is to be infringed by the result of the lawsuit between the plaintiff and the defendant and the intervenor between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the legal relationship between the intervenor and the plaintiff between the plaintiff and the defendant is established uniformly determined by one decision and that the legal relationship between the parties is not established by one decision, and if the parties are several parties to the lawsuit, the court held that the parties to the lawsuit which was remanded to this case pursuant to the provisions of the proviso of Article 406 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act belongs to the Supreme Court's superior judgment. Accordingly, under these legal premise, the part against the plaintiff 1 of the first instance court is reversed and remanded to the party member again.

The claim against the plaintiff 1 and the plaintiff 2 and the non-party 2 of the plaintiff 1's driving school and the non-party 2 is dismissed, it is evident that the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 2 were included in the part that was reversed and remanded to the party members after the second instance court, which reversed the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff 2 and the non-party 2 due to its anti-private effect, and the judgment of the second instance which reversed the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff 2 and the non-party 2 is reversed and remanded in relation to the non-party 1

The 2nd and the 1nd and the 2nd and the 1nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 1st of the 2nd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 1st of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd of the 3rd

(A) The Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 3 is entirely inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s claim for participation in the Plaintiff’s 1 Institute. In other words, the Plaintiff’s 1 Institute seeking the registration of the transfer of real estate in attached Table 1 subparag. 2 against the Plaintiff, Defendant 2, and Nonparty 2, and there is no claim for participation in other claims against the Plaintiff’s three. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim against the Plaintiff and the 1 Institute for Private Participation exists only for the overlapping part of the Plaintiff’s claim and the 1 Institute for Private Participation, and the result thereof becomes final and conclusive. As such, in relation to the 1 Institute for Private Participation, the second instance judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for participation in the Plaintiff’s 1 Institute for Private Participation, and the second instance judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s main claim against the 1 Institute for Private Participation, is reversed, remanded, and remanded again. However, as to the second instance judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for objection, the Plaintiff’s claim for participation in the 1 Institute for Private Participation has no relation with the Plaintiff, and therefore, it is recognized as it becomes final and conclusive apart from the Plaintiff’s appeal.

(B) Since there is no litigation relationship between the intervenor and the intervenor as to the second instance judgment dismissing the intervenor's claim for intervention by the intervenor 3, the intervenor 1's private teaching institute has a third party's position as to the intervenor 3's claim for intervention, and therefore there is no benefit to seek dismissal of the intervenor 3's claim for intervention. However, since the second instance judgment dismissed the intervenor 3's claim, it cannot be said that the plaintiff 1's private teaching institute was disadvantaged due to the same judgment, and therefore, the plaintiff 1's private teaching institute was not entered within the appeal scope and was withdrawn by the Supreme Court of Korea, and therefore it is out of the scope of the judgment of reversal and transmission by the plaintiff, which is outside of the scope of the Supreme Court's judgment of reversal and transmission by the plaintiff.

Article 3 and Article 2 of the Intervenor’s Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18462, Dec. 4, 287; Presidential Decree No. 18462, Mar. 1, 2283; Presidential Decree No. 2010, Feb. 1, 2007; Presidential Decree No. 2010, Feb. 1, 2007; Presidential Decree No. 2010, Feb. 2, 201; Presidential Decree No. 2010, Feb. 2, 2011; Presidential Decree No. 2010, Feb. 1, 2011; Presidential Decree No. 20130, Feb. 2, 2011; Presidential Decree No. 20130, Feb. 1, 2011).

Along with the fact that the plaintiff, defendant 3, and the intervenor 1 did not relate to the plaintiff, defendant 3, and the intervenor 3, and the result of the plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff.

The issue here is whether two intervenors change the purport of the request for participation in the private teaching institute as stated in the facts column in the trial. However, it is recognized that the new part of the request is only a decrease in the purport of participation if it is examined in detail. In other words, it is consistent with the purport of participation prior to the change (referring to the change in the purport of participation submitted before the remand on August 8, 288) and the previous part of the request for participation except for each purport of participation of the 1 teaching institute and 3 of the intervenors, and thus, it is not possible to dismiss the request for participation in the second part of the case as stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is difficult to acknowledge that the new part of the request for participation in the second part of the case was rejected by the 2nd part of the intervenor, as it is not possible to accept the request for participation in the second part of the case as stated in the judgment of the 2nd part of the intervenor, and it is not possible to acknowledge that there is a new part of the request for participation in the case as stated in the second part of the intervenor.

However, the plaintiff 1 at the time of the filing of the lawsuit prior to the trial on the merits of the case is somewhat doubtful about the legitimacy of the person who died during the trial before the remand and thereafter, it is necessary to first examine this point.

(1) According to the Plaintiff’s application for taking-over of the lawsuit filed on February 29, 200, Nonparty 1 died on September 12, 2006, and his heir applied for taking-over of the lawsuit. ② Since the Plaintiff’s claim for taking-over of the lawsuit cannot be seen as having been filed in the name of Nonparty 1, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1’s legal representative prior to taking-over of the lawsuit, the Plaintiff’s claim for taking-over of the lawsuit cannot be seen as having been filed in the name of Nonparty 2’s new legal representative and thus, the Plaintiff’s new legal representative would not be deemed to have cancelled the Plaintiff’s taking-over of the lawsuit, and the Plaintiff’s new legal representative would not be deemed to have taken-over of the legal representative’s first time after the Plaintiff’s taking-over of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s new legal representative would not be deemed to have taken-over of the legal representative’s first time after the Plaintiff’s taking-over of the lawsuit.

The decision of the first instance court, which is based on the result of the above-mentioned party's judgment, is practical within the above-mentioned range, so it cannot be changed pursuant to Article 386 of the Civil Procedure Act, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the person to whom Articles 96, 89, 93, and 94 of the Civil Procedure Act shall apply with respect to the bearing of the total cost of lawsuit between the parties of the first instance and the first instance.

Judges Cho Jong-gu (Presiding Judge)