Whether a person who has sold an automobile and delivered an automobile is the person who operates the automobile for his own sake after only the down payment is received.

In the event that an automobile is sold and the intermediate payment and the remainder payment are delivered without being paid the down payment, the seller is allowed to operate the automobile in the name of the seller until the completion of the registration of change in the name on the register of automobile registration. Therefore, even if there is no de facto relationship with the buyer, the seller is a person who operates the automobile for himself as stipulated in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act.

Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

Inasmuch as Plaintiff 1 and two others are minors, Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff 1 who is the legal representative of a person with parental authority

same-sex machinery industry corporation

Daegu High Court Decision 79Na138 delivered on October 17, 1979

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daegu High Court.

The plaintiffs' grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the evidence of this case, the defendant company delivered this vehicle to the above non-party on January 26, 1978, along with the registration documents for transfer of ownership, and received 1,160,000 won as down payment on the day by selling 4,40,000 won to the non-party co-defendants of the court below on January 26, 1978, and agreed to receive 1,80,000 won as down payment on February 25 of the same year, and 1,40,000 won as late payment and 1,40,000 won as late February 28 of the same year to receive the payment of the above intermediate payment and remaining payment, and the defendant company did not accept the claim of this case by the defendant company for the compensation of this case since it did not complete the transfer of ownership under the name of the non-party to the above non-party despite the defendant company's demand to do so. Thus, the defendant company cannot reject the claim of this case for the compensation of this case to the defendant company.

However, according to the records, at the first pleading of June 2, 1978 (No. 47 of the record) of the court of first instance, the defendant company stated that the defendant company received the remaining purchase price of the motor vehicle after the date of the accident of this case and delivered the registration document to the above non-party at the time of receiving the remaining purchase price of the motor vehicle after the date of the accident of this case, and that the registration document for the transfer of the name was delivered to the above non-party at the seventh pleading of October 20, 1978 (No. 160 of the record, No. 160 of the record) of the first instance court's trial (No. 1978, Oct. 16, 1978, No. 160 of the record) and stated that the registration document for the change of the name was delivered to the above non-party, and it is clear that the defendant received the remaining payment or the remaining payment after changing the initial registration document to the expiration of the registration document.

In addition, as in this case, if the defendant company sold a motor vehicle, received only the sales contract amount, and delivered a motor vehicle before the due date without receiving the agreed intermediate payment and remaining payment, the defendant company can be deemed to allow the above non-party to operate the motor vehicle under the name of the defendant company until the registration date of the change in the name of the registration ledger. Thus, other special circumstances do not appear. Thus, the defendant company is responsible to direct and supervise the employees of the motor vehicle controlling the motor vehicle, as well as the above non-party who actually carried out the motor vehicle even if there is no de facto interest in its operation, so it is reasonable to regard the defendant company as "the person who operates the motor vehicle for his own sake" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (see this case, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 78Da294, Sept. 26, 1978).

Therefore, the court below's determination that the defendant company was not responsible for the sale of this automobile is ultimately not sufficient to conduct a trial, or it is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the appeal to the effect that this part of the court below is justified.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Dra-ro (Presiding Justice)