Seoul Administrative Court 2012Guhap171 (29 December 2012)

National Tax Service Review Division 2011-0125 (Law No. 29, 2011)

A tax invoice shall not be deemed to be a false tax invoice, and shall not be deemed to have been in good faith or without fault.

The facts of lending the name of the non-party corporation and the fact that the supplier under the tax invoice of this case was aware that it is different from the actual supplier, and even if not, if the plaintiff confirmed the above facts with due care, it would be said that the plaintiff did not know of the above facts by failing to confirm it even though he could have known of the above facts.

Article 17 of the Value-Added Tax Act

2012Nu21439 Revocation of Disposition of Imposition of Value-Added Tax

Federation of Korean AAA.

Head of Seocho Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2012Guhap171 decided June 29, 2012

January 17, 2013

February 21, 2013

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The defendant shall revoke the imposition of value-added tax of 00 won in 2007, 000 won in 2008, and 000 won in 2008, and 000 won in 2008.

1. The reasons for the judgment of the first instance are reasonable, and therefore, it shall be accepted as the reasons for the judgment in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act (However, the second and seventh "BB Comprehensive Certified Architect" shall be read as "BB Comprehensive Construction," and the fourth and fourth "violation of construction industry" shall be read as "violation of the Framework Act

2. The plaintiff asserts that the disposition of this case, which denied the deduction of the purchase tax amount pursuant to the tax invoice of this case, was unlawful because he did not know that the tax invoice of this case was false and did not know that it was false. However, the first instance court's judgment which cited the above facts is legitimate, and the evidence cited in the first instance court's judgment and the evidence submitted in the appellate court's judgment and the following circumstances which can be recognized by considering the whole purport of the argument of Gap evidence No. 11-1 through No. 19 as a whole, can not be acknowledged, and the plaintiff's assertion cannot be justified.

A. From 2005, PCC, as an advisory member of the Plaintiff, had the Plaintiff advise on the arrangement and management of the AA, and had it become naturally aware of the Plaintiff’s business and the stuffed stuffed. From the beginning of 2007, PapCC knew that the Plaintiff was planned to perform the instant construction work, and came to know of the plan to do so. In December 2007, she had been aware of the fact that the Plaintiff was planned to perform the instant construction work, she had the Nonparty corporation borrowed a construction business license from the non-party corporation through the stm of the managing director of the non-party corporation, which became aware of the plan to perform the instant construction work, and had she prepare to receive the instant construction contract in the name of the non-party corporation along with PapD.

B. ParkD and ParkE had been selected as a successful bidder by means of submitting a false tender, etc. as if there were competitive biddings, and thereby, they were indicted due to the violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry and the obstruction of business by fraudulent means. From the above criminal trial on March 5, 2009, ParkD directly submitted a summary of pleadings (Evidence No. 11-4) to the court on March 5, 2009. In the above summary of the pleadings, the Defendant (LD) presented 6 construction companies including the non-party corporation at the direction of the CC, but the Plaintiff did not have any intention to actually harm the Plaintiff. In addition, GaE also argued to the effect that Ga had been present at the 20th anniversary of the pleadings (Evidence No. 11-3) that were directly submitted to the court, and that GaD was first presented as a witness of the 20th anniversary of the tender tender of the 20th anniversary of the 19th anniversary of the 2nd of the 2nd of the 3th tender tender.

C. On Oct. 17, 2008, the Busan District Court’s Dong Branch Branch issued a warrant of detention (Evidence A No. 11-8) to the leCC issued by the judge of the Busan District Court on Oct. 17, 2008, a suspect (leCC) requested the head of Park Jong-D branch, who is a person in charge of selecting the contractor, to select the non-party corporation as the contractor without undergoing a normal bid procedure through KimF (the former representative of the plaintiff) who is the plaintiff’s adviser entrusted the construction work in fact by the plaintiff, and that Park Jong-D decided the non-party corporation as the successful bidder by accepting it. Meanwhile, the leapCC withdrawn the construction cost of this case transferred to the account in the name of the non-party corporation, and withdrawn the construction cost of this case from 00 won for the first time on Dec. 21, 2007.

D. The non-party corporation appointed the GG as the site director of the instant construction, and the actual site of the instant construction was managed by Park E-E under the direction of the PCC.

E. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff and Park DoD did not verify whether the instant construction was conducted by the non-party corporation, and whether the non-party corporation was using the money transferred to the account under its name for the construction cost of the instant case.

F. In light of the above point, Park Jong-D, an employee of the plaintiff, had been aware of the fact that leCC lent the construction of this case to the name of the non-party corporation at the time of the conclusion of the construction contract of this case, and that the supplier under the tax invoice of this case was aware of the fact that the supplier was different from the actual supplier, and the plaintiff also knew of the above fact through Park Jong-D, an employee of this case, and even if not, if the plaintiff confirmed the above fact with due care, the plaintiff did not confirm the above fact even though he could have known of the above fact, so it could be said that he did not know of the above fact, and therefore, it was negligent in not knowing the above fact.

3. If so, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed for reasons.