The judgment below

The part concerning Defendant A and B shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant B, under a democratic political system, the freedom of speech is the most fundamental right and it does not necessarily mean that it should be sufficiently guaranteed in the election process.

In addition, since it is necessary and important to verify the candidate's eligibility to be in charge of public service in the election for public office, the freedom of the press for the verification of eligibility shall also be guaranteed, and for this purpose, if there are circumstances making the candidate feel illegal or bad morals, the raising of a question should be allowed, and the raising of suspicion against the candidate should not be easily obstructed by prior to the public judgment.

However, if the basis is widely permitted to raise an imminent suspicion, it would result in a significant result that damages the reputation of the candidate for divinga, as well as misleads the choice of the voters in an imminent election, even if the suspicion is found to be true, which would result in a significant violation of the public interest.

Therefore, even if it is for the purpose of verifying whether the candidate is eligible to serve as a public official, it is not permissible without limitation and it is allowed only when there are reasonable grounds to believe that such suspicion is true.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Do6138 Decided February 20, 2003). Therefore, in the crime of publishing false facts under Article 250(2) of the Public Official Election Act, a person who claims that there was no suspicion against the other party, actively proves that the public prosecutor was false, but actively asserts that there was no suspicion against the other party.