Whether a State-owned property loan agreement is concluded eight times each year after the completion of prescription, and can be deemed as an expression of intent to waive the profit upon completion of prescription.

It is difficult to interpret the loan charges under the loan agreement for the land he/she knows as his/her own ownership, at least on the date belonging to this case, at least to approve that the land is not his/her own land to the other party, and otherwise, it is difficult to interpret it differently. Furthermore, if there is no evidence to deem that there was any defect in the expression of intention in the conclusion of the loan agreement, the possessor of the State-owned property loan agreement, which was concluded after the acquisition by prescription, was made not only once but also eight times each year, and no other evidence exists in the conclusion of the loan agreement, it can be deemed that

Articles 245(1) and 184 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Choi Gyeong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1

Korea

Suwon District Court Decision 93Na1125 delivered on June 10, 1994

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Suwon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below found that the land of this case was originally registered in the name of Japan and reverted to the defendant as the property devolving upon the non-party 1's execution of the above land, and the above possession was succeeded to the above non-party 1, and the plaintiff purchased the land of this case and its ground house from the above non-party 1 around March 1967, and continuously occupied the land of this case. The above non-party 1 or the plaintiff's possession of the land of this case was automatically converted into possession from January 1, 1965 to 20 years after the expiration of the prescription period, and decided that the plaintiff's acquisition by prescription was completed on January 1, 1985 on the ground that the non-party 2, who was the non-party 1's father, gave up the interest of the prescription period since the completion of the above prescription period, but it was hard to find that the plaintiff was a state-owned property owner of the land of this case from the defendant's Eup for 198 years after the expiration of prescription period.

However, it is difficult to accept the court below's rejection of the defendant's defense.

In addition, it is difficult to interpret the loan agreement differently in addition to approving that the land is not his own land for the other party, at least one day belonging to this case. Furthermore, the above fact-finding of the court below is based on the testimony of the non-party 3 of the court below, who is the plaintiff's own witness, and the above fact-finding of the court below is based on the non-party 3's testimony, which is the plaintiff's own witness, unless there is any data suggesting that there is any defect in the plaintiff's expression of intent in entering into the above loan agreement, it can be deemed that the plaintiff clearly expressed his intention not to assert the profit of the completion of the statute of limitations on the land of this case. However, the court below's rejection of the defendant's defense on the ground of such circumstance does not constitute an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on the waiver of the statute of limitations interest, which affected the conclusion of judgment

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)