1. Defendant B shall give each point to the Plaintiff among the buildings listed in the attached Table 1 List No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 1.

1. The building listed in the separate sheet No. 1 to determine the claim against Defendant B is the real estate owned by the Plaintiff, and the ship connected each point of which is indicated in the separate sheet No. 1, No. 2, 3, 4, and 1 among them by Defendant B.

The fact that a person occupies and uses a 300 square meter (hereinafter referred to as the “instant building”) of a 300 square meter of a lub roof on the ground of this part is not in dispute between the parties, or may be recognized by taking into account the respective descriptions in subparagraphs 1 and 2, and the overall purport of the pleadings in witness E’s testimony.

According to the above facts, as long as Defendant B did not assert and prove the source of possessory right, it is obligated to deliver the instant building to the Plaintiff who exercises the right to claim the removal of disturbance based on the ownership of the instant building.

As to this, Defendant B church, as the father of the Plaintiff, was the actual owner of the instant building, and E delegated the matters concerning the lease of the instant building to F. Defendant C, the representative of the Defendant B church, was suffering from a banner on the instant building. On November 24, 2015, Defendant B church contacted with the phone number indicated on the relevant banner, and agreed with Defendant B church around November 24, 2015, agreed to lease the instant building with the terms of lease of KRW 10 million for lease deposit and KRW 1.5 million for monthly rent. On November 27, 2015, Defendant B church, as the owner of the instant building, agreed to lease the instant building with the content of the lease contract. Since it was concluded on November 29, 2015 with the title to use the instant building as a church, Defendant C, the actual owner of the instant building, the title of which was the owner of the instant building.

However, the entry of No. 4, which conforms to the assertion of the Defendant B church that entered into a lease agreement on the instant building, is not trustable in light of the witness E’s testimony, etc., and the entry of No. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 5.