Whether the presumption of registration is broken solely on the ground that a person who completed registration pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Transfer of Real Estate has asserted different from that stated in a letter of guarantee or a written confirmation about the cause of acquisition (negative

Article 3 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (Amended by Act No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992); Article 186 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court en banc Decision 200Da71388, 71395 Decided November 22, 2001 (Gong2002Sang, 129)

Plaintiff

Defendant (Law Firm Cheongn, Attorney Clinical-gu, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Daejeon District Court Decision 2008Na8926 Decided November 5, 2008

The part of the judgment of the court below regarding the land No. 1 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon District Court Panel Division. The remaining appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. A registration made under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (hereinafter only referred to as the “former Act on Special Measures”) shall be presumed to be a registration in conformity with the substantive legal relationship. The presumption power of registration transfer made under the Act on Special Measures shall not be broken unless a letter of guarantee or confirmation prescribed under the Act on Special Measures is proved to be false or forged, or not legally registered for any other reason. In addition, even if a person who completed registration under the Act on Special Measures claims that he/she acquired a right based on other grounds for acquisition, unless there are special circumstances such as where it is obvious that he/she is unable to complete registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate or it is obvious that the content of his/her assertion is an instrument itself, and it shall not be deemed that the presumption power of registration made under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Real Estate is broken, and it shall be presumed to be sufficient to prove the fact that the new grounds for acquisition by other materials are not true (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Da13708.

2. With reference to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below determined that the land No. 1 and the land No. 2 of this case were the land registered as the land owned by the deceased non-party 2, who is the deceased non-party 1, who was the deceased non-party 1, and that the registration of ownership transfer was completed on October 7, 1965. With respect to the land No. 1, which was in force on March 31, 1980 pursuant to the "former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership Ownership" (Act No. 3094, invalidation), which was in force on January 10, 1970, the ownership transfer registration was completed on the land of this case for which the defendant had purchased the land of this case under the name of the non-party 1, which was in force on Dec. 7, 1994, the court below determined that the defendant's new evidence was not sufficient to acknowledge the ownership transfer registration that the plaintiff purchased the land of this case from the plaintiff 1, as the new owner.

3. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, Article 3 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (amended by Act No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992) applied to the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the defendant for the land No. 2 in the name of the defendant (amended by Act No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992) provides that "this Act applies to the real estate provided for in Article 2, which was actually transferred due to legal acts, such as sale, donation, exchange, etc., and the inherited real estate and the real estate on which no ownership preservation registration has been made," but the defendant asserted that the real estate No. 2 in the case of this case was donated from the deceased non-party 1 at around 1979, and therefore, the court below's decision that the new ground for acquisition was not reversed on the premise that the new ground for appeal by the defendant constitutes the subject of the above special measures, and there is no violation of law by misunderstanding of legal principles

4. However, we cannot agree with the judgment below that the court below did not reverse the presumption power of transfer of ownership registered in the name of the defendant with respect to the land No. 1 of this case for the following reasons.

The defendant also asserted that the land of this case was donated from the deceased non-party 1 on or before December 1979, and this part of the registration of transfer is in accordance with the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (amended by Act No. 3094 on December 31, 1977 and amended by Act No. 3159 on December 6, 1978). The main text of Article 3 of this Act provides that "The real estate stipulated in Article 2 of this Act, which was actually transferred due to legal acts such as sale, donation, exchange, etc. before December 31, 1974, shall be applied to the real estate and the real estate, the ownership preservation registration of which was not yet made, so it is obvious that the grounds for the defendant's assertion cannot be subject to the said Act, and therefore, the presumption of the registration shall be deemed to have been reversed.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below that made a different judgment is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the presumption of ownership transfer registration made under the Act on Special Measures, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal on this part is with merit.

5. Therefore, the part concerning the land of this case among the judgment below is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)