2016 Ghana 5087431 Damages (i.e., losses)

1. A;

2. B

The Federation of National Private Taxi Transportation Business Associations

October 13, 2017

November 10, 2017

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff A 23,50,000 won, 22,00,000 won to the plaintiff B, and 15% interest per annum from April 14, 2015 to November 10, 2017, and 15% per annum from the next day to the date of complete payment.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining claims against the defendant are all dismissed.

3. 3/5 of the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs, and the remainder is assessed against the defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff A 56,389,100 won, 50,000 won to the plaintiff B, and 50,000 won with 5% per annum from April 14, 2015 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 15% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

1. Occurrence of liability for damages;

(a) Facts of recognition;

1) On April 14, 2015, 2015, 13:25, Dro-type taxi (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant vehicle”), C driven a Dro-type taxi (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant vehicle”) and driven the front end of the Defendant vehicle into the front end part of the Defendant vehicle, while driving the front end of Gangnam-gu Seoul, Seoul, along one lane from the west underground streets to the west edge.

2) Due to the instant accident, F died of a multilateral trauma (hereinafter referred to as “F”).

3) The Plaintiffs are the offsprings of the Deceased, and the Defendant is the mutual aid business entity that entered into a motor vehicle mutual aid agreement with the Defendant.

【Fact-finding without any dispute over the grounds for recognition, entry of Gap evidence 2, 6, and 7, and Eul evidence 1-1 to 14, the purport of the whole pleadings

B. Determination as to the recognition of liability

1) According to the above facts, as the deceased died due to the operation of the Defendant’s vehicle, the Defendant is liable to compensate the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, who are the deceased and their bereaved family members, as mutual aid business operators of the Defendant’s vehicle, barring special circumstances.

2) Judgment on the Defendant’s defense of discharge

A) At the time of the instant accident, the Defendant: (a) was driving at a speed below 68km per hour; and (b) was installed with a protective fence to prevent the unauthorized crossing at the location of the instant accident; and (c) was posted to a banner to prohibit the unauthorized crossing; (d) the Deceased was going to cross the road to the six-lane without permission; (e) the Plaintiff was faced with the instant accident; (b) the Defendant’s driver of the Defendant’s vehicle could not be deemed to have a duty of care to ensure safe operation while driving along the motorway, and thus, it cannot be deemed that there was a pedestrian crossinging the motorway without permission, and thus, the Defendant should be exempted from liability.

B) The main text of Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act provides that "a person who operates an automobile for his/her own sake shall be liable to compensate for damages caused by the operation of the automobile by the death or injury of another person shall be held liable to compensate for the damages caused by the death or injury of the other person," and in principle, the proviso provides that "Provided, That this shall not apply in cases where a person who is not a passenger dies or is injured, and he/she is not negligent in paying attention to the operation of the automobile, but has proved that he/she or a third party, other than his/her own or his/her driver, has intentionally or negligently caused any defect or function in the structure of the automobile, and that a person who is not a passenger of the vehicle, has been killed or injured, without due care, shall not be held liable to compensate for the damages caused by the death or injury of the person who operates the automobile for his/her own sake (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da31164, Feb. 9, 1993; 203Da316464, Feb.

In addition, the conviction in a criminal trial means that there is a burden of proving that the judge has a conviction to the extent that it excludes a reasonable doubt with respect to the facts charged, while the judgment of innocence merely means that there is no such proof, and it does not mean that the absence of the facts charged has been proven (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da27055, Sept. 14, 2006). While criminal liability for illegal acts is held liable for acts violating social legal order, civil liability is held liable for the act in violation of social legal order, and is subject to a public sanction against the actor, while civil liability is held liable for the act in violation of other person's legal interests, and the compensation system is based on the fair and reasonable burden of damages. Thus, even if it is an infringement without criminal punishment, it shall be examined from the perspective of criminal responsibility (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da6136, Feb. 14, 2008).

C) In light of the following circumstances, the evidence presented above and the overall purport of evidence Nos. 9 and 10 as well as the entire arguments, it is insufficient to conclude that even if the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle at the time of the instant accident performed his duty of front-time care, it was impossible to discover the Deceased, or even if the same was taken immediately after the Deceased’s discovery, it was impossible to avoid collision with the Deceased, and there is no other evidence to support this otherwise, the Defendant’s assertion is without merit.

① From the point where the deceased was shocked, the driver of the Defendant vehicle appears to have found the deceased at around 36.6m Skid mark, and the driver of the Defendant vehicle appears to have found the deceased at the time of shocking the deceased. However, the road driven by the Defendant vehicle is a straight line from about 300m prior to the point where the instant accident occurred, which was a low time, and the accident occurred at around 13:25m prior to the point where the instant accident occurred, and the weather occurred at the time, but did not run away. The Deceased was worn on a flue color, and was going to the port from the right side of the Defendant vehicle, and was in conflict with the Defendant vehicle at one-lanes of the three-lanes. As such, there was no obstacle to finding the deceased until the driver of the Defendant vehicle shocks the deceased.

② At the time of the instant accident, the Deceased was a woman of 61 years old, and the first reporter was present at the time of the instant accident, at the middle of the road, and at the time of the instant accident, the Victim was present at the time of the instant accident. Even if the Deceased was to cross the road beyond the time of the instant accident, it appears that such speed was not rapid in light of the age of the Deceased, and the Deceased appears to have been crossing the said road at the right angle line rather than the shortest distance, rather than the shortest distance. It is difficult to deem that the driver of the Defendant Vehicle could not at all find that the Deceased could not start crossing the road from the third lane.

③ The location of the instant accident is 70km per hour. The National Science Investigation Agency: (a) estimated the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle at the time of the accident by the same distance; (b) presumed it reasonable to apply the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle at the time of the accident to 0.4 to 0.6; and (c) presumed the speed of the Defendant’s vehicle at the time of the accident to be 61km through 75km. However, in accordance with all the conditions, such as the condition of the typhe of the typ, etc. as an estimate, the actual Musp coefficient differs; (c) in applying the foregoing Musp coefficient as the maximum value of 0.6 meters at the time of the instant accident, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant’s vehicle driven at a speed exceeding the limit of 75km at the time of the instant accident, and thus, it cannot be concluded that the Defendant’s vehicle driven at a speed within the limit of 0.5 meters at the time of the accident (in criminal cases against the driver of the Defendant vehicle, by applying the average value of the Mus.

④ Although the instant accident did not run off at the time of the accident, the road surface was sucked after the start at the morning. The distance was proportional to the speed increase and reflects it to the mast coefficient. In the case of the asphalt surface normally built at 0.6 to 0.8 or 0.6, the mast coefficient in the case of the asphalt surface in the state of 0.6 to 0.0.0.6. As such, in the case of the sprink surface in the state of milch with the same speed, the distance of the sprink is increased by 1.3 to 1.5 times in the case of the sprink, compared to the case where the surface was built on the premise that the speed of the sprink is the same, the driver of the Defendant vehicle is obliged to reduce the speed more than that of the ordinary limit considering the increase in the distance of the mil road (in the case of the criminal law, penal provisions should be interpreted strictly, so it should not be interpreted that the scope of the sprink under Article 19(2) of the Civil Act should not be interpreted.

C. Limitation on liability

However, according to the above evidence, a crosswalk with signal apparatus is installed in the vicinity of the site where the instant accident occurred, and even if a protective fence was installed to prevent pedestrians from crossing without permission, the deceased was found to have been negligent in crossinging the three-lane road without permission by using the gaps open without connecting the protective fence, and since such errors were the main cause of the instant accident, the deceased's fault in calculating the amount of damages that the Defendant is liable for damages. However, in light of the above circumstances, the deceased's fault ratio is 70% and the Defendant's responsibility is limited to 30%.

2. Scope of liability for damages

(a) Funeral expenses: 5,00,000 won (the expenditure of the plaintiff A); and

B. Limit of liability: 30% of the defendant's liability ratio (see the above 1.C.)

(c) Compensation money;

1) Reasons for taking into account: Circumstances revealed in the arguments in the instant case, such as the background of the instant accident, the deceased’s age and degree of negligence, and the personal relationship with the Plaintiffs

2) Amount recognized: 30,000,000 won for the Deceased, and 7,000,000 won for each of the plaintiffs.

(d) Inheritance relationship; and

(a) Amount of inheritance: 30,000,000 won; and

2) Inheritance shares: Each of the plaintiffs 1/2

3) Inheritance amount: 15,000,000 won each (=30,000,000 Won X1/2)

[Judgment of the court below] The ground for recognition

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff Gap 23,50,000 won [15,00,000 won for inheritance, funeral expenses of KRW 1,50,000 for funeral expenses of KRW 5,000,000 for 0.3], solatium of KRW 7,000 for 22,00,000 for 222,000 for 00,000 for 15,000 for inheritance amount of KRW 15,000 for 7,000 for 7,000 for 0,000 for 00 for 14, 2015 for 200,000 for 23,50,000 for 15% for 10,000 for 23,000 won for 20,000 for 30,000 for 15% for 20,000 for 20,000 for 20.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendant are accepted within the above scope of recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as they are without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Jong-jin