1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance citing the instant case is that of the court of first instance citing the reasoning of the judgment as to the instant case, since it is identical to the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance excluding adding or adding the following matters. Thus, it is citing this as is in accordance

2. The portion added or changed shall be subject to the resolution by the board of directors of November 14, 2014 “the resolution by the board of directors of November 14, 2014” of 5 pages 9 of the first instance judgment.

The 9th parallel 15th parallels to 18th parallels in the judgment of the first instance shall consist of the following parts:

According to the evidence No. 38 (the minutes of the defendant's board of directors, June 11, 2015, and four pages (the minutes of the meeting of the plaintiff who attended the board of directors on the day and leaves the meeting, but the plaintiff's signature and seal is not attached to the minutes) of the defendant's board of directors, the chairperson C of the defendant's board of directors shall ask the plaintiff on any day before the board of directors is held on June 11, 2015, "whether the existing board of directors about the pro rata property portion should not be withdrawn unless the remaining amount of H is paid." The plaintiff shall also be deemed to be invalid for the existing board of directors on the pro rata property portion without the payment of remaining amount by H. The plaintiff shall be deemed to have reached the resolution if the contract is reversed, and it shall also be supported by the fact that there is a certain degree that the existing board of directors on pro rata property portion would be invalid without the payment of remaining amount by H. The plaintiff's remaining portion shall not be further revised as follows.

In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that “the Defendant paid KRW 40 million to the Plaintiff on June 24, 2014, and the above KRW 40 million was paid for the partial repayment of the Plaintiff’s loan to the Defendant, which was discussed until that time, and thus, the Defendant would waive the benefits of the completion of the extinctive prescription.” The above evidence argues that “The Defendant would waive the benefits of the completion of the extinctive prescription.” The above evidence is as follows.