2012Du5015 Requests for revocation, including corrective orders

Emymoral Symorio corporation

Fair Trade Commission

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Nu14765 Decided January 11, 2012

June 26, 2014

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of any statement in the supplemental appellate brief not timely filed).

1. As to the establishment of unfair collaborative act

A. Article 19(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “Fair Trade Act”) prohibits “agreement on an act of unfairly restricting competition”. The agreement includes not only explicit agreement but also implied agreement. Here, the essence of the agreement lies in the communication between two or more enterprisers. As such, it cannot be deemed that there was an agreement as a matter of course on the ground that there was an external form consistent with the act listed in each subparagraph of the above provision. However, it can be deemed that there was an agreement between the enterprisers, even if there was a proof of circumstance that could recognize the reciprocity of communication among the enterprisers (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du17421, Nov. 28, 2013).

Therefore, after the company with a high market share in the over-market market has first determined its price based on its own decision, other competitors are confiscing its price, and business operators are aware of all these circumstances as the price-fixing practice has accumulated for a considerable period of time, if the communication related to the pricing is proven or if it is possible to confirm their personal contacts in light of various additional circumstances, it can be recognized that there exists an agreement to unfairly restrict competition.

나. 원심은, (1) ① 주식회사 이원(이하 'E1'이라 한다)과 에스케이가스 주식회사(이하 'SK가스'라 하고, E1과 SK가스를 함께 '수입 2사'라 한다)는 엘피지(이하 'LPG'라 한다)를 수입하여 상당 부분을 충전소와 석유화학회사 등에 판매하는 한편, 정유 4사인 원고와 에스케이에너지 주식회사(이하 'SK에너지'라 한다), 지에스칼텍스 주식회사(이하 'GS칼텍스'라 한다) 및 현대오일뱅크 주식회사(이하 '현대오일뱅크'라 한다)에도 일부를 판매하고 있는 사실, ② 원고를 비롯한 정유 4사는 원유를 정제하는 과정에서 생산한 LPG와 위와 같이 수입 2사로부터 구매한 LPG를 충전소 등에 판매하는 사실, ③ 수입 2사는 2002. 12. 31.부터 2008년 12월까지 거의 매월 말경 전화 등을 통해 서로 상대회사의 충전소에 대한 LPG 판매가격에 관한 정보를 교환 또는 협의하고 충전소 판매가격을 결정해 왔으며, LPG의 판매실적자료와 판매계획을 서로 교환하기도 하고 적정한 중간이윤을 유지하는 방향으로 기준가격을 결정하기로 하는 등의 가격정책을 논의하여 온 사실, ④ 수입 2사는 매월 말경 위와 같은 방식으로 판매가격을 결정한 후 곧바로 충전소 등과 원고를 포함한 정유 4사에 모사전송의 방법으로 그 가격을 통보하였는데, 구체적으로 SK가스는 SK에너지와 원고 및 현대오일뱅크 등 3사에 충전소 판매가격을 그대로 통보하였고, E1은 GS칼텍스와 원고 및 현대오일뱅크 등 3사에 정유사에 대한 판매금액 즉 충전소 판매가격에서 할인금액을 공제한 금액을 통보한 사실, ⑤ 이에 따라 원고를 포함한 정유 4사는 다음 달 1일부터 적용될 자신들의 판매가격을 결정하였는데, 2002년 가격자유화 조치 이후 2년 동안 하였던 가격결정과 같은 방법으로 현대오일뱅크는 수입 2사 판매가격 중 높은 가격 수준으로, SK에너지는 SK가스와 동일한 수준으로, 원고는 최저가 수준으로, GS칼텍스는 E1의 판매가격과 비슷한 수준으로 가격을 결정해 온 사실, ⑥ 국내 LPG 사업 담당 임원이나 팀장들은 신년, 경조사, 임원변경 또는 한국LP가스공업협회의 협회장 변경 등이 있는 경우 모임을 하거나 비정기적으로 골프모임을 가지면서 주로 상호 경쟁을 자제하고 LPG 가격을 고가로 유지하는 것에 관한 공감대를 형성하여 왔는데, 원고의 담당직원 A은 2006년 5월부터 같은 해 12월 사이에 4회 정도 모임에 참석한 사실, ⑦ 또한, 원고 등 6개 회사의 LPG 수급업무 담당자들은 2004년부터 2007년까지 LPG 수급 관리 차원에서 연 4~5회 정도 모임을 하였는데, 어느 업체의 판매가격이 매우 낮게 형성되어 있다는 정보를 듣게 될 경우 전화로 연락을 하여 실제 판매가격을 확인하기도 한 사실, ⑧ 그에 따라 2003년 1월부터 2008년 5월까지 5년 5개월 동안 원고가 결정한 LPG 판매가격은 프로판의 경우 SK가스에 대하여 최대 4원/kg 정도, E1에 대하여는 최대 4.7원/kg 정도 차이를 보였으며, 부탄의 경우 SK가스에 대하여 최대 4원/kg, E1에 대하여 최대 4.2원/kg 정도의 차이를 보였을 뿐인 사실, ⑨ 그런데 피고가 LPG 판매회사들의 가격담합을 포착하고 이에 관한 기초조사를 시작한 직후인 2008년 5월 말경 원고가 다음 달에 적용될 가격으로 결정한 가격은 프로판의 경우 SK가스에 대하여 20.57원/kg, E1에 대하여는 18.3원/kg 정도의 차이를 보였고, 부탄의 경우 SK가스에 대하여 11.06원/kg, E1에 대하여는 8.5원/kg 정도의 차이를 보여 이전과는 다른 현저한 가격 차이를 나타내었고, 이러한 경향은 이후의 가격결정에도 그대로 유지된 사실, ⑩ 한편, 원고의 가격이 이처럼 이전과 다르게 큰 차이를 보이자, E1의 영업담당자가 2008. 6. 3. 원고의 LPG 구매담당자와 통화한 후 '판매가격에 따른 정유사 동향 및 대응'이라는 제목의 문서를 작성하였는데, 그 문서에는 원고의 위와 같은 가격결정으로 가격차이가 계속될 경우 SK가스와 협조하여 수입사가 원고로부터 구매하는 LPG의 가격을 변경할 예정이라는 내용이 기재되어 있는 사실 등을 인정하고, (2) 이러한 사실 등을 비롯한 판시 사정들을 종합하여, 원고는 수입 2사 및 나머지 정유 3사와 사이에 LPG 판매가격을 동일 또는 유사한 수준으로 결정하기로 하는 묵시적 합의 혹은 암묵적 양해가 있었거나, 적어도 LPG 판매가격을 공동으로 결정한 것으로 볼 수 있는 상당한 개연성이 있다고 인정되어 그러한 행위를 할 것을 합의한 것으로 추정된다고 판단하였다.

C. According to the above facts of the court below's finding, it seems that the enterpriser's prior notification of the selling price to competitors is different from the case where he imitates the selling price by his own decision on the basis of the information obtained by other enterprisers after unilaterally determining the selling price and publicly announcing it through the specific process. ② In particular, since the Plaintiff has been continuously notified by the importer of the selling price for the period of not purchasing the LPG, it is difficult to see that the Plaintiff was simply notified of the selling price as a customer, and it is very exceptional that the Plaintiff almost coincides with the LPG selling price of a large number of enterprisers regardless of the change in the quantity of surplus in each season for a period of five to six years, and ④ under the circumstance that the two companies are notified of the monthly selling price of the filling station every month, even if each business operator did not directly discuss the selling price at each of the above groups regularly and non-scheduledly open continuously, it can sufficiently have the effect of agreement by discussing the price stabilization, self-competitive competition and high-priced maintenance.

In addition, examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination that there was an implied agreement to determine the Plaintiff’s selling price of charging stations at or almost similar to the pre-determined price of charging stations between the Plaintiff and import two companies, etc. is deemed based on the aforementioned legal doctrine. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding unfair collaborative acts and their agreement, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence contrary to logical and empirical rules, or by failing

2. On the commencement date of the collaborative act

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion disputing the agreement, on January 1, 2003, on the premise that the Defendant had reached an agreement on price collusion with the Plaintiff, etc. from January 1, 2003.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

3. As to the termination date of unfair collaborative acts

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion disputing the termination date of an unfair collaborative act on the ground that: (a) the Plaintiff, on June 1, 2008, determined the selling price to produce a significant difference between the two revenues only from the date when the Plaintiff was on June 1, 2008; and (b) determined that there was no illegality in the Defendant’s measure that decided May 31, 2008 as the end of the Plaintiff’s collaborative act was against the agreement, such as reducing the price to the level that would have existed without the collusion; and (c) as long as seen so, claiming the principle of equality in comparison with the GSketex recognized as June 30, 207 as the end of

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal

4. As to the deviation and abuse of discretionary power in the calculation of penalty surcharges

(1) The Defendant: (a) it is clear that the instant collaborative act is a price collaborative act that has an effect of restricting competition; (b) it is difficult to find the effect of increasing efficiency; (c) the effect of the instant collaborative act is not nationwide when the Plaintiff et al. occupies 100% of the LPG sales market; and (d) when considering the fact that the main purpose of the instant collaborative act is an item essential for ordinary people’s lives, such as cooking, heating, or automobile fuel, it constitutes a very serious violation; (b) however, considering the fact that the substantial part of the instant collaborative act overlaps with the period in which the Act was applied before the amendment, the Defendant set at the lowest of 7% at the basic penalty surcharge level; and (b) the lower court determined that it is difficult to view that

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the principle of deviation, abuse, and equality and vision of discretion, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

5. As to the relevant sales amount

The lower court determined to the effect that as long as LPG purchased by the Plaintiff from the importer sells it to the charging station, etc. at the price determined by the instant collaborative act, the sales amount is also included in the relevant sales, on the ground that it should be deemed as a product directly affected by the instant collaborative act.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding relevant sales or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged

6. As to the prescription on the disposition

Even in cases where enterprisers have reached multiple agreements over a long-term period of time, if each of them aims to achieve the same purpose on the basis of a single intent, and continues to be continuously implemented, it is reasonable to deem that the series of such agreements, barring special circumstances, is one unfair collaborative act as a whole, barring special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du15176, Mar. 11, 2010).

(1) On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, such as that it is reasonable to view that the collaborative act of this case was continuously carried out for the purpose of price collusion on the basis of a single intention, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the act of this case prior to five years prior to the date of the instant disposition had expired since it was a separate act, since the overall collaborative act of this case was judged to be one unfair collaborative act.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is based on the foregoing legal doctrine, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine or omitting judgment, thereby adversely affecting

7. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-chul

Justices Lee Sang-hoon

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Kim So-young