1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1...

1. The reasoning of the court’s explanation as to this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, except for adding the following judgments, thereby citing it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Additional determination

A. 1) The Defendant’s assertion and C had already concluded a lease agreement on October 19, 2012 regarding the instant housing, and the Defendant was subject to the first priority repayment under the Housing Lease Protection Act, and the said agreement was implicitly renewed, and also reached the instant lease agreement on January 1, 2015. Therefore, the instant lease agreement is merely an extension of the lease agreement as of October 19, 2012, where the first priority repayment of the small amount deposit is recognized, and it does not constitute a fraudulent act. 2) As such, the first priority repayment right under Article 8 of the Housing Lease Protection Act grants a kind of statutory security right that can be paid in preference to claims secured by the mortgage against the leased housing and taxes (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da66291, Sept. 5, 2003). Therefore, the obligor’s act of establishing the right to lease in excess of the obligor’s obligation solely on the leased housing should be considered as an act of reducing the obligor’s property.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2003Da50771 Decided May 13, 2005). In addition, as stated in the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited earlier, the Defendant is recognized as having entered into a lease agreement with C on October 19, 2012 with regard to the instant real estate.

However, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 6 and Nos. 1 and 2, the instant lease agreement was concluded on October 19, 2012, and the lease deposit.